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It happened that, a grower gave [the  
blind man] a bunch of grapes as chanty As they 
were very ripe, the bunch o f grapes broke up in his 
hands. He decided to have a feast. We sat on a 
fence and he said:
-Now I would like to be liberal with you: I 
would like for both o f us to eat this bunch of 
grapes, and that you have as much from it as I. We 
will divide It in this way: we will take turns picking 
from it  but you must promise not to take more than 
one grape each time. I will do the same until we 
finish it and in this way there will be no deception 
With this poc*. we began; but then in his 
second turn, the traitor changed his mind and  
began to take them two by two, supposing that I 
should do the same, i was not content with 
catching him up, and went further still: two by two, 
and three by three, ans however I could ate them 
The grapes finished, he sat there a bit with the 
naked stalk in his hand and, shaking his head, he 
spoke:
-Lazoro, you have deceived me I would 
swear to God that you have eaten the grapes 
three by three.
-/ did not-i replied; but. why do you suspect
me?
The sagacious blind man replied 
-You know how I see that you ate them 
three by three? Because I ate them two by two 
and you kept quiet.
Sucedió que...un vendimiador dio [a l ciego] un 
racimo de limosna Como estaban muy maduras, 
se le desgranaban el racimo en la mano y acordó 
.hacer una fiesta Nos sentamos en una vana y 
dijo
■Para que veas adonde liego mi liberalidad, quiero 
que hoy comamos ambos estas uvas, a portes 
iguales Haremos uno cosa: tú picarás una vez y yo 
otra, con tal de que me prometas no tomar cada  
vez mas de una uva Yo haré lo mismo hasta que 
las acabemos, y de esta suerte no habrá engaño 
Hecho así el concierto, comenzamos, mas pronto 
el traidor mudó propósito y empezó o tomar de dos 
en dos, considerando que ..yo debía de hacer lo 
mismo. Como vi que él quebraba la postura, no me 
contenté de ir a la par con el: dos o dos y tres a 
tres, y como podía las comía Acabado el racimo, 
estuvo un poco con el escobajo en la mano, y 
meneando lo cabeza, dijo:
-Lázaro, me has engañado Aseguraría 
que tú has comido  /os uvas de o tres
-No es cierto- respondí yo; mas cPor que 
sospecháis eso?
Contesto el sagacísimo viejo:
-cSabes en que veo que las comiste de 
tres a tres?. En que yo comía de dos a dos y 
callabas
Lazarino de formes, Anónimo

A mis padres
A mi abuelo, 
admirador aquí y en el cielo

Preface
This dissertation has been written between 1992 and 1995. These have been critical 
years for the process of European Unification, in which a wave of pessimism has swept the 
rosy perspectives at the beginning of the decade. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty 
(December 1991, ratified in 1992) set the programme to reach a Monetary Union and 
closer political ties among the European countries. However, the structure on which 
Maastricht had to be developed immediately crumbled: the Treaty was hardly endorsed 
by the citizens who were given the chance to vote on it; the war in ex-Yugoslavia has 
revealed the lack of cohesion and resolve among the European countries and, finally 
German unification and economic slowdown pushed the European Monetary System to 
the verge of collapse in 1992 and the year after.
Although we are exclusively concerned with the latter, monetary issue, we are 
aware that the whole idea of a united Europe rests on the existence of institutional and 
economic mechanisms which are suited to an heterogeneous group of contries. Therefore 
I believe that the exchange rate arrangement sustaining the transition to a Common 
Currency should be carefully devised in order to reinforce rather than weaken the 
cohesion and cooperation among the members of the European Union.
The shift from Europhoria to Euroskepticism has also influenced my mood deeply, 
and this is observable in the critical position that I adopt throughout the dissertation 
regarding the European Monetary System. The reader will already realise in chapter one 
my reservations towards the main result of target zone models, namely, that fixing the 
exchange rate around a band exerts a stabilizing effect on the exchange rate through 
agents' expectations.
This conclusion crucially depends on the credibility of the arrangement. As a matter 
of fact, credibility is the central issue of this dissertation, We take up the task of showing 
how and why the lack of credifcili+y makes the exchange rate arrangement unsustainable. 
Much as in the story of the Lazarillo above, the authority cannot expect to be believed 
when its 'w icked nature' prevents her from respecting the commitment implied by the 
arrangement.
In the second part of the thesis. I propose some mechanisms to bypass this 
credibility problem; retaking the idea advanced above, the design of the system should 
be flexible and transparent enough to be acceptable for every country. I recognise that 
the ideas I put forward here are based on very simple models and therefore they have 
no immediate applicability. I hope though that they serve as a reflection on the economic 
foundations to build a Monetary Union.
I have enjoyed four years at the European University Institute and I have glimpsed 
the appeal of a real 'European community ' of cultural exchange while respecting 
diversity. I recognise that here all the means work in favour of a positive atmosphere, but 
it should be our compromise to translate this climate of enriching co-existence to all the 
levels of the European Union.
Therefore, this work has a special value for me, because it deals with the idea of 
an integrated Europe. This is not at odds with the critical stand I have adopted. On the 
contrary, I think that a constructive critique is necessary to push this project ahead and 
that it is worthwhile to try it.
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Methodological Note
Equations and charts are labelled chapter by chapter When mere is a reference to a equation or 
figure of other chapters, the number of the chapter will be specified before the figures (ie  if I refer to 
figure or equation 3 of the first chapter in me second chapter I will write figure I 3. equation [ l .3). 
respectively)
The bibliography is common to all chapters and it appears at the end of the dissertation
In the next few years, the European Union will take decisive steps towards shaping 
its future as economic and political entity. One of the cornerstones of this process is the 
prospect of a common currency, for which an Institutional schedule exists (Title VI of the 
Maastricht Treaty). The abolition of national currencies. If fulfilled, will culminate a story of 
around thirty years of exchange rate arrangements, which have sustained the 
configuration of the European Union.
Indeed, it Is hard to Imagine how the European Union could have been kept 
together without the existence of an exchange rate system. The building of the European 
Union has been based on multiple compromises and channels to achieve cooperation. 
On the monetary side, the successive exchange rate arrangements have provided the 
framework for policy coordination among the member countries.
While the contribution of exchange rate arrangements to the deepening of the 
Single European Market Is beyond any doubt. Its desirability on pure economic terms is 
open to discussion. Any exchange rate arrangement limits the scope for autonomous 
monetary and-to a lesser extent- fiscal policy In the member countries. This constraint on 
econom ic policy Is the basis for the endless debate on flexible as opposed to fixed 
exchange tates and on optimal currency areas; although an analysis of these Issues Is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, they underlie most of It'.
'-So© Friedman (1953) for the classical argument In favour of floating exchange rates and Johnson (1973) 
foe a  formalbatton of these arguments. The contributions of Poole (1970). tOndeberger (1970) and Boyer (1978) 
challenge these conclusions. For an updated account of the debate, see Genberg (1989).
Stating wtth the seminal contribution by Mundel (1961). the Opttnum Currency Areas Iterature deals 
wtth the condMons which favour the establishment of a common currency. MacKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) 
provided additional considerations. This area has recently been revived due. precteety, to the hortzon of a 
Common Currency In Europe (See Masson & Taylor (1992). de Grauwe (1992).Corden (1993). Tavtas (1993)).
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The Exchange Rote Mechanism (ERM) In the European Monetary System is the 
current exchange rate arrangement among the Europeon economies. The ERM 
establishes a target zon* for the nominal exchange rate by setting a central parity around 
which the exchange rate can fluctuate within a band. The central parity can be modified 
by agreem ent among the members (realignments), giving rise to a regime of semifixed 
but adjustable exchange rates.
Although the ERM has not changed in essence since Its Inception In 1979, its nature 
has evolved according to the changing political and economic environment2. When It 
was established. Its main aim was to provide a stable mechanism for the deepening of 
the European Common Market and. In particular, for the Implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. However, the occurrence of the oil price shocks In the seventies 
changed the nature of the system completely. The relatively successful performance of 
Germany In a  period of severe Inflation induced the development of the 'EMS-lnflatlon' 
hypothesis, whereby keeping the exchange rate fixed with respect to the Deutsche Mark 
would allow other countries to borrow credibility for antlnflatlonary policy from Germany, 
reducing as a result the rate of domestic Inflation. Therefore, the ERM started to be 
considered as a disciplinary device to rein In domestic Inflationary tensions and keeping 
the parity fixed becam e a key component of the policy strategy for the ERM's high 
Inflation countries.
The practical Implication has been that the ERM has changed from a loose 
arrangement with multiple realignments to a harder system with few realignments. Indeed, 
between the Basel-Nyborg Agreements In 1987 to the 1992 crises of the EMS, the system 
behaved as a 'de fa c to ' fixed exchange rate system. This period of the EMS has been 
known as the 'new EMS' (Gkavazzl & Spaventa (1991)). This period was characterised by 
the strength of the currencies in high Inflation countries. This striking feature came about 
because progress In convergence was being achieved and short-run strains In the policy 
m anagem ent were not apparent in this period; This 'convergence p lay ' (Portes (1993)) 
contributed to Increase the credibility of the system and the resulting parities were 
sustained by the financial markets.
After this period of relative stoblllty, the system has suffered in the last few years its 
worst crises since its establishment. Essentially, these difficulties arise from the conflict 
between the common objective of maintaining the established parities alongside the
2-Se© GfQ6 & Thygesen (1992) or Gtavazzl & Gtovannlnl (1991).
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domestic goals of the member countries. In a time of recession and uncertainty3.
Currently, uncertainty also reigns over the future of the Common Currency. Let us 
recall that the Maastricht Treaty assigns a central role to the ERM In the transition process. 
Now that the stability of the system has vanished. It seems that there Is a void of Ideas as 
how to m anage the transition to a Common Currency, although the original schedule of 
the Treaty continues to be officially maintained.
In any case. It should be recognised that the official view correctly emphasises that 
the situation Is better than before the crises: first, the large devaluations have roughly 
restored 'equilibrium' exchange rates; second, the crisis may have been helpful in 
Indicating those countries which may not converge, as Dornbusch (1991) suggested and, 
finally, recovery seems to be well underway. All these foctors might clear the horizon of 
some of the obstacles and make the eventual EMU target feasible.
However, Inflation could again become a central concern when recovery gets 
stronger, due to the large deficits accumulated In the Idst years. Consequently, there may 
be attempts to return to the old rigid EMS In order to rebuild the disciplinary mechanism 
which was thought to work so well in the eighties. If this were the case, some difficulties 
could appear. First, It Is not clear how the credibility of the system can be restored In the 
short term. The reaction of the markets to the restoration of the old bands Is feared 
because of the concern that the markets will begin by testing the commitment of the 
authorities when It Is achieved. Second, even If the new system Is stable, why should It 
promote more discipline than before?.
What then are the alternatives?. An adequate answer should consider In turn the 
following questions: is the ERM an adequate mechanism for the transition process to a 
Common Currency or, more generally. Is a target zone desirable?. If so. Is there a better 
arrangement than the current ERM?4.
3-Rase & Svensson (1993), Elchengreen & Wyptosz (1993). Portes (1993) and Goldstein et al. (1993) offer cn 
account of the EMS 1992 crises. Elchengreen & Wyptosz (1993). Sutherland & Ozkan (1994), Obstfeid (1994) and 
Bensatd & Jeanne (1994) ateo develop formal models to explore the reasons for the co»c**e.
4- After the crises, numerous answers have been given to these questions A first group of reactions has 
dismissed the need of a target zone, and offered a wide variety of alternatives. Some have advocated for the 
continuity of the pseudo-floating regime which foiosved the August '93 crisis (a 30% fluctuation band); Thb 
alternative ts open to competitive dev equations and It wK not be valid when Inflationary pressures reappear.
Other possibility would be a sudden move to a Common Currency. It assumes that me only source of 
divergence Is the existence of «afferent monetary póteles and that a Common Currency would consequently 
eliminate the divergences.
This and similar proposals dismiss some Important facts: first, countries are stf vulnerable to asymmetric 
shocks as the evidence gathered by Bayouml & Bchengreen (1992) show; second, the deepening of the 
Integration process Induced by the Single Mcrtet may Increase this posstbüty. because economic Inte^atlan 
work In favour of higher degrees of spectcfeatton. as the Economic Geography Iterature has hl^i»g^ted (See 
Krugman (1991a). RnaBy, the absence o< a safety net of fiscal transfers (see Sachs & Sala-l-Mart1n (1991)) to offset
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Note that. In fact, the ERM was not originally designed to serve as a disciplinary 
device. Indeed, the empirical evidence does not clearly show that It has succeeded in 
this objective5. This suggests that the design of a exchange rate arrangement should be 
consistent with the goals It Is Intended to achieve and this conclusion applies to the design 
of a exchange rate system for the transition to a Common Currency. In my view an 
adequate exchange rate system should:
a / Induce discipline and at the same time be politically feasible: 
b / avoid Irresponsible behaviour through transparent rules; 
c / be capable of dealing with unexpected events In an orderly manner and 
d / facilitate policy coordination.
An adequate combination of these Ingredients would deliver a suitable degree 
of commitment and would render the system credible from Its Inception. Then, a proper 
m anagem ent of the regime could allow for a ropld accumulation of reputation, and a 
smooth transition to a common currency could be achieved.
In the light of these comments, it Is clear that the management of exchange rates 
has played a fundamental role In the evolution of the European Union and will continue 
to do so until a Common Currency Is adopted. In this dissertation, the focus Is placed on 
the 'new EMS' both because It has Inspired the analysis of an Important set of models for 
exchange rate determination (target-zone models) and because It Is the accepted 
framework to manage the transition to a Common Currency.
These two reasons suggest the division of this thesis Into two well-defined parts.
In the first part, we extensively study forget zone models; the second part is primarily 
normative and it focuses on the design of exchange rate targets. I adopt a quite critical 
stand In both parts. On the one hand, target zone models are of limited Interest If the Issue 
of credibility Is not properly addressed: Indeed, existing target zone models have failed to 
do so. On the other hand. It seems clear to me that the ERM Is not appropriate for the 
transition to a Common Currency.
Our main objective Is to shed some new light upon the underlying conflict 
between an International commitment to an exchange rate arrangement and the 
domestic policy goals and constraints. The two parts are thus closely related. While the first 
part highlights such a conflict, the second attempts to provide the means to overcome 
It. Now we present In more detail the plan of the thesis.
these shocks mcfces the adoption of a Common Currency unodvlsabie. at least for the periphery countries
6-See GJavazzl A Gtevamlni (1989) and Coins (1968)
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Plan o f the thesis
The first part Is composed of three chapters, in the first chapter, theoretical target 
zones models are considered. The second chapter surveys the empirical evidence on 
target zones, which serves to Introduce the analysis of the Spanish experience in a target 
zone. Finally. In the third chapter, a model of heterogenous beliefs Is presented which 
permits the consideration of dynamics In the design of a target zone.
Despite the multiple extensions and Improvements that have been made since the 
seminal target-zone model of Krugman, some Important aspects are still excluded from 
the modelling. Our theoretical research has been consequently directed towards fulfilling 
some of the gaps.
To begin with, the assumption of perfect capital mobility has not been relaxed yet. 
despite the well-documented recurrence of capital controls preceding realignments In the 
ERM and the current academic debate on the need to reconsider them again. In section
III of the first chapter, we relax this assumption.
The explicit consideration dynamics In target zone models Is even more relevant, 
since only then can questions of sustainability be properly addressed. The hypothesis of 
rational expectations allows us to obtain a state-dependent solution between 
fundamentals and exchange rates but. In my view. It severely limits the degree of realism 
of these models.
By relaxing such strong hypothesis and allowing for heterogenous expectations, 
dynamic trajectories can be generated for the exchange rates. The model of chapter 
three allows us to give an Interpretation to the actual behaviour of the exchange rate In 
target zones, by considering the dynamics of credibility. It will be shown that a target zone 
with divergences In the fundamentals Is unsustainable In the long-run and that credibility, 
which evolves endogenously In this model, determines the collapse of the target zone.
Empirical Issues are also addressed In this thesis, by contemplating the Spanish 
experience In the ERM In chapter two6. In this case our approach has slightly differed from 
the standard methods: Instead of imposing an 'a  priori' econometric model on the data, 
we have opted for a very flexible method through the application of the Kalman filter.
The second part approaches exchange rate targets from a policy perspective, 
although the framework of analysis differs In the two chapters contained In this part.
6-Thts model Is the result of Joint work wtth J.Humtoerto Lopez y Vicente Orts. The econometric Implementation 
of the model is due to the first author crtd the economic Interpretation belongs to Prof. Orts and myself.
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However, both shore the Idea that flexibility Is key to the design of an adequate 
exchange rate strategy and that the exchange rate should receive the consideration of 
Intermediate target for policymakers.
In chapter four we use the dynamic forget zone model to explore the 
convergence gains that a target zone may provide. The deflationary effect of an 
overvalued currency contributes to reduce Inflation differentials. The first section analyses 
the effects of convergence In Inflation differentials on the sustainability of the band and 
on the chances of success of a  target zone. It will be shown that the EMS target zone may 
fall even In this case. This raises the question which we address In this part: How should 
appropriate exchange rate targets be designed?.
Our first answer Is what we have labelled the 'convergence bands' proposal which 
Implies a  reform of the EMS. According to this scheme, the target zone requires a 
continuous adjustment of the central pdrlty, according to the evolution of the Inflation 
differentials plus, an eventual a  progressive tightening of the bands. The system avoids 
large exchange rate misalignments and monitors the rate of exchange rate variation as 
long as convergence Is achieved. An 'entry clause' could be added to the rules, such 
that countries which attain convergence can enter the monetary union automatically. The 
choice of the correction parameter and the width of the band Is central for the success 
of the zone, for It determines the degree of discipline required to achieve convergence.
Therefore, not only can countries enter the monetary union at different moments, 
but this alternative also has the advantage of containing 'a to carte ' components, which 
should be agreed upon beforehand. This makes the gains and losses of the system 
transparent from the outset. In this way I believe that the convergence bands proposal 
delivers a  stronger commitment to discipline and. consequently, a higher degree of 
credlbSlty.
The second alternative addresses the question of exchange rate targeting from a 
general optimizing approach, when governments have an explicit loss function to 
minimise. We consider a  static model In which two countries that care not only about 
Inflation, but also about employment, have to decide whether or not to target the 
exchange rate and. If they decide to do so, what is the best targeting strategy. This is In 
the spirit of the policy coordination literature In which targeting only pays If the outcome 
Is better than the non-cooperative solution, so that the exchange rate acts as a surrogate 
for policy coordination. The results show that the choice of exchange rate target depends 
on the type of shocks affecting the economy although policymakers may keep a certain 
discretion regarding the choice of exchange rate targets.
6
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This dissertation appears at a time when exchange rate targeting may not be a 
popular Issue. The recent experience of the EMS Is similar to the end of the Bretton Woods 
system. Yet the free float period which Immediately proceeded the collapse of Bretton 
Woods eventually proved to be also unsatisfactory. New attempts to design exchange 
rate arrangements soon followed (McKinnon (1984.1988) and Williamson (1985)). and the 
European Union set up the 'snake' before Bretton Woods was officially abandoned 
because the stability of exchange rate was held to be essential for the Common Market.
In any case, a more open-minded approach to the design of exchange rate 
targets Is called for. The flexible approach adopted In part two shows that optimal 
strategies for targeting the exchange rate can be found. We have to recognize that these 
are Just the first building blocks of a more ambitious project. This dissertation points out the 
difficulties of the Issue. In my opinion, the effort Is nonetheless worthwhile because there 
Is much more at stake beyond the economic goal of a common currency for Europe.
7
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Target-zones models deal with the behaviour of exchange rates In a regime of 
fixed parities with fluctuation bands. These models have mushroomed In the literature since 
the seminal work by Krugman (1991, circulated In 1987) and have reached their zenith in 
the beginning of the nineties, when they appeared regulorly in the economic Journals. This 
chapter describes target zones models from a theoretical point of view but It should not 
be considered a technical survey. Rather, we Intend to evaluate the virtues and flaws of 
these models and to provide a framework to Introduce the modifications which we 
propose'.
The next chapter will address the empirical Implications and evidence on target 
zones. We have adopted this division for convenience, but both are complementary, 
because the empirical findings stimulated the extensions of the target zone basic model.
The resedrch on target zones has evolved In three distinct, albeit overlapping 
phases. In a first stage the basic target zone model was set up, which already contained 
the main insights. However, as we will see In the second chapter, when the empirical 
implications were tested against evidence, the results were so unfavourable as to call for 
a second phase. In which a series of extensions were developed In order to approach the 
models to reality. The most significant step was the relaxation of the perfect credibility 
assumption. Once the possibility of exchange rate realignments was contemplated, some 
of the empirical problems were overcome. Finally, the third phase has less to do with the 
functioning of exchange rate target zones and more with the rationale for target zones.
The basic model Is presented In section I. In section II, some of the strong 
assumptions of the previous model are relaxed to consider the issues of credibility and
'-Pesentl (1991), Bertota (1993) and Svensson (1992a) atso provide accounts of the literature The volume 
edited by Knjgmcn & Miller (1992) Is wholly devoted to target zone models
8
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capita! controls. The role of Interventions and reserves deserves special mention, so that 
section III Is devoted to It. We will see that alternative assumptions on Interventions affect 
not only the results of the basic model but also influence the credibility and raises the 
possibility of sterilized Interventions In the cose of Imperfect capital mobility. Finally, section
IV explores the attempts to Introduce target-zones models In an optimizing framework. In 
order to approach the Issue from a normative perspective.
9
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of fundamentals, that Is. of the current fundamentals and the present discounted value 
of future fundamentals-where the Inverse of the Interest rate semlelastlclty ( //a ) turns out 
to t>e the discount factor:
(4)
a Jx
This expression Implicitly rules out bubbles because the stability condition of 
standard forward looking models applies:
_ i-t
llmr__e • 5 ,0
Free float solution
Let us consider first that no target zone Is Imposed on the exchange rate, so that 
It floats freely. Therefore, we take money supply as given (dm=0). The process for the 
velocity shocks and hence the fundamentals ore assumed to follow a Brownian motion 
which Is the analogue to a random walk In continuous time:
d f^ id t* c d z  15)
where dz Is a  standard Wiener process, such that E(dz)=0. E(dz>)=dt. so o is the variance 
In the growth of v-and fin this case- by unit of time and // Is the a drift term. It also follows 
from this specification that:
V ,\frQ  - W Qntjo*r)
So
vxzt
Integrating then the saddlepath solution (4). we obtain the free float solution for the 
exchange rate:
(6)
that Is. the exchange rate expectation is simply equal to the drift of fundamentals and the 
exchange rate Is a linear function of the level of fundamentals, yielding a 45° degree line 
In Figure 1.
Target zone
Let us assume now the effects of Imposing a target zone on this model. In this case, 
the monetary authorities are expected to defend the band through non-sterlllzed
12
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Interventions in the foreign exchange markets In order to prevent the exchange rate from 
surpassing the band. Interventions are assumed to take place at the edges of the bond 
(marginal Interventions) In order to control the process for the fundamentals. This monetary 
rule Is perfectly credible and as such It appears In the information set of agents.
It Is convenient first to give an intuitive explanation for the result we derive below. 
Let us Imagine that we are close to the upper edge of the band. For simplicity, we assume 
that the process for the fundamentals has no drift (jj=CJ) What Is the conditional 
expectation for the change In the exchange rate near the edges of the band?.
Let us consider the upper limit of depreciation. In a free float regime, the exchange 
rate expectation Is zero, but note lhat now, if the fundamental decreases, the exchange 
rate will fall, but If the fundamental Increases, the exchange rate will only Increase until 
the edge of the band, because the monetary authority will Intervene with certainty. 
Therefore, the exchange rate will be expected to appreciate, E¿ds,/dt)<0. due to the 
expected Intervention at the edges of the band. It also follows from this that, the closer 
the exchange rate gets to Its upper limit s.. the greater the appreciation expectation, 
since the room for the fundamentals to Increase becomes smaller and the room to 
decrease larger. As a result, the linear relation of the free float case between the 
exchange rates and the fundamentals no longer holds. We now show this result more 
formally.
The Intervention of the authorities at the edge of the band Is represented by two 
regulators dL.dU which take the form of purchases and sale of reserves and are only 
activated at the lower and upper limits of fluctuation, respectively. This modification 
affects to the process for the money supply, which is now dm=dL+dU and consequently 
the fundamentals now follow a regulated Brownian motion:
df*)idt+<3dz+dL-dU
dL>0,Vs»s. (7)
dOO.Vs*s. 
di.-dlMD.Vse (s.^ J)
Note that In this case, the original process is modified at the edges of the band 
and the rational expectation solution has to account for this modification. By Ito's lemma, 
the exchange rate expectations can then be expressed as:
E^ . =(i s{f)dt+±c7s¿ f)d t. V s.<s<s.;
E ^ iis tO d t+ itfs ^ O d t-s / iO d U . If s=s„ (8)
dt 2
E ^ l=n s/ifJdt+-La25/O df+s((OdL, If s_=s 
dt 2
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If we compare the free float solution with the expectation In the Interior of the 
band, we can observe that to achieve the previous free float result the derivative s, should 
be one and the second derivative s„ zero, such that fundamentals and exchange rates 
are linearly related. Substituting (8) Into (3), the model above Implies a second order 
differential equation, whose solution has the following form:
♦A,ev -*A2e v  C9)
where are the roots of the characteristic equation and A,. Aj are constants of 
Integration, which take zero values In a free float. On the contrary, they are different from 
zero when a  target zone Is In place.
The characteristic equation of this differential equation Is
-2£i_X2+<x|iX-l *0
and the roots are given by:
V -J L  L1 o2 ao2 ^  o2 ao2
B*/(afi)2+2ao2
The values of the roots Just depend on the Interest rate semlelastlclty (a) and the 
parameters of the brownian motion (the drift n and the standard deviation c). Now the 
constants A,. Aj have to be solved for the boundary conditions. These easily follow from 
observing (8). The continuity of the expectation at the edges of the band and, 
consequently of the exchange rate-fundamental relationship Implies that $/fJ=s/fJ=0. 
These boundary conditions are also called 'smooth pasting' or value matching conditions 
In the literature, and they are solved as follows*.
Taking the derivative of the differential equation, we get
0-1 ♦AlX1e v -*AJX?e v - 
0*1 ♦AlX,eM-+/\2Xze v -
from which A ,A 2 is solved as a function of the parameters of the model. Then the 
saddlepath value of the target zone Is defined by the following expression:
4-Hefe I have followed Ftoot & Obstfetd's (1989) explanation, but there are other kind of derivations Wee those 
of Dtxlt (1909), Kiugman (1989) or, relating It to the reserve position and attacks. Hood & Garber(1989) and 
Krugman & Rotemberg (1990)).
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H2(ev,i',-el’w ’V M e w 'v -ew ' ^  (10)
X,X, (ew -e w )
The non-linear component of the solution (Q) Is the reason for the curvature of the 
new S-curve In Figure Is. The relation between fundamentals and exchange rate bends 
down. Implying that the effect of the fundamentals on the exchange rates decreases as 
the limits of fluctuations are approached. The slope is lower than In the free float case 
within the fundamentals range and at the boundaries, variations In the fundamentals 
have no effect whatsoever on the exchange rates, as revealed by the smooth pasting 
conditions. It can also be shown that the smaller the roots, the wider Is the wedge 
between the free float and the target zone solution. The effects of the parameters on the 
characteristics of the curve are derived from the expressions of the roots.
The existence of a drift disturbs the symmetry of the model because the roots are 
différents. From HO), we can observe that with a positive drift the exchange rate Is at the 
upper part of the band when the fundamentals are zero; since the smooth pasting 
conditions continue to hold. It Is clear that the slope of the curve is lower (steeper) at the 
upper (lower) part of the band than In the drlftless case. Higher values of o reduce the 
values of the roots and Increase the slope of the curve. This result Implies that the target 
zone Increases the stabilization effect with higher levels of volatility In the fundamentals. 
An opposite results holds for the parameter a.
Finally, the slope of the curve can be shown to decrease when the band narrows. 
This suggests that the stabilizing effect of the target zone becomes more Important as the 
bands are reduced, matching the findings of Delgado & Dumas (1992).
These features deliver the so called 'honeymoon effect' mentioned by the 
literature: the Imposition of a target zone has a stabilizing effect on the exchange rate, 
reflected In the higher divergence In the fundamentals with respect to the free float 
solution. In the case shown In the figure the band has a 12% width, the process Is assumed 
to be drlftless. the Instantaneous standard deviation o Is equal to 10% and a equal to 1.
The stabilizing effect of the target zone can be more formally shown by computing 
the (Instantaneous) exchange rate variability from the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate process o’ (Svensson (1991a)).
- ft highly simplifies If the process Is drlftless <p-0). Hrstty. from (8) X,-*?-*. Secondly, sine© the bands ore 
supposed to be symmetric f.—f.. Then, It Is stratitfofward to show that A,»-A,«A- M e“"- e “*)).. flnaty, the 
exponential equations are substituted by hyperbolic trigonometric functions and the solution b W - 
slnhMAcosh<kfJ. Now. It Is strati tforward to check that the derivative at the boundaries Is zero.
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Figure 1-Exchange rate and fundamentals In a target zone
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exchange rale
Figure 2-The stabilizing effect of a target zone. Interest rates and position of the exchange rate m the band.
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Since the exchange rate is a function of the current and expected fundamentals. 
It will also follow a brownian motion of the type: d s ^ d t+ a ’dz. Applying the Ito's lemma 
to this expression. It turns out that o’ Is Just the product of the standard deviation of the 
process for the fundamentals multiplied by the slope of the S-curve“: &=s/3. Since the 
slope Is less than one, the Instantaneous standard deviation Is less In a target zone than 
in a free float regime (o).
Interest rates
The difficulties In the definition and measurement of the fundamentals Imply that 
Interest rate differentials (b=l-f). being directly observable are the most convenient 
variable for an empirical assessment of the model, as we will see In chapter 2. The new 
relationship- which we will denote curve Is Implicit In the structure of the model. The 
UIP condition Implies the equivalence between Interest rate differentials and exchange 
rate expectations In th^ band (b=E/ds/dt)). Substituting this expression In (3) we get;
8(0=— -!?- (1 1 ) 
a
which we define as the magnitude of the 'honeymoon effect'7. From figure 2 we observe 
that at the lower (upper) part of the band, the Interest differential Is positive (negative) 
and equivalent smooth pasting conditions hold. The Intuition behind this figure corresponds 
to the expectation mechanism we described at the beginning: a positive Interest rate 
differential reveals an expected depreciation of the currency in the lower part of the 
bands.
As above, the standard deviation of the Interest rate process (os) can be 
obtained. From (11), this turns out to be oi=('o’-o)/a. while In the free float case, it Is equal 
to zero. Therefore, we observe that stability In the exchange rates In a target zone Is 
attained at the cost of a higher volatility in Interest rates.
‘ -The drtft of the process is strrpty the Interest rate differential, from the UIP condition: ¿/-6.
7-Ofc*erve that In the free float case of expression (6). the Interest differential ts constant and equal to the 
drtft In the fundamental n.
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ll-Extensions to the model
The structural characteristics of the economy (conveyed In our model by the 
parameters of the monetary model and the process which drives the fundamentals) and 
the Institutional setup of the band (fluctuation bands. Intervention rules) determine the 
features of the basic target zone model. The empirical tests which followed the first wave 
of target zone models and which are described In chapter two revealed the weaknesses 
of the basic model and encouraged further research.
The basic model Is solved under quite strong assumptions which, once relaxed, 
affect both the results of the model and the ability to defend the band, by broadening 
the set of Instruments In the hands of the authorities. Figure 3 displays a scheme with the 
determinants of a sustainable target zone. We can observe that the sustainability of the
18
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band Is determined by three different factors: discipline, credibility and financial 
integration. All of them are In turn Influenced In one way or another by the assumptions 
concerning the role of reserves and Interventions, which will be considered In the next 
section.
The first factor which appears In the chart Is discipline in the conduct of monetary 
policy to keep the fundamentals within the band. This Is conveyed in the commitment of 
the authorities to keep the range of variation of the fundamentals within the bounds of 
the target zone (f.< f  < f j .  This Is the Implicit argument which underlies the basic model 
and tt Is the key feature in the long-run success of a target zone. The long period of 
exchange stability In the ERM would suggest that It has been a strong disciplinary 
mechanism.
However, the existence of wide divergences between countries and the ultimate 
collapse of the system defy this view . One of the main purposes of this dissertation Is to 
present arguments against such belief.
Credibility
Given the tangency points at the edges of the band, the assumption of perfect 
credibility Implies that the band cannot collapse whatever the level of fundamentals. The 
reason Is that the authorities are always expected to restrain the behaviour of the 
fundamentals. The basic model Implies not only that the band Is completely credible but 
also that this full credibility Is exogenously given.
The scheme reveals that there are determinant elements in the formation of 
credibility. The role of reserves will be explored In the next section; the second element is 
reputation. In a more realistic model the system's past performance should be included 
In the Information set, such that agents would take It Into account when forming their 
expectations. Hence, a system with frequent realignments may not enjoy reputation and 
consequently the bands may not be credible. On the contrary, a band which has been 
successfully defended even In objectively difficult circumstances may render the system 
more credible. From this perspective, the Interaction between reputation and credibility 
can be seen as a self-feeding mechanism: the defence of the band builds up a stock of 
reputation which delivers a flow of credibility, facilitating the defence of the band.
The dynamic nature of this Interaction cannot be grasped by the state dependent 
solution of the model, we are considering in this chapter. The reoder will have to wait until 
the chapter three, where a time dimension Is Introduced to observe the evolution of this
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feedback. Here the degree of credibility is token as given or. at the very most, state- 
dependent.
Let us start by writing the exchange rate expectation In terms of conditional 
expectations. We assume that when the bands cannot be defended there Is a 
realignment and that In this case, the exchange rate jumps to Its free float solution:
P (12)
where a>f is the probability of realignment at time t. Up to now, the assumption of perfect 
credibility has kept co constant and equal to zero.
What are the effects of a positive probability of realignment?. The answer depends 
on the characterization of the realignment sfce. To introduce the issue, we will follow 
Krugman (1991b) and Pesentl (1991).
Let us dispense for a moment with the assumption of Infinitesimal Interventions and 
consider point f ( f )  In figure 4. When the exchange rate reaches Its upper limit the 
authorities face the following decision: either defend the regime and push the exchonge
S-curve relating exchange rate &  fundamentals
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rat© Into the band ( f ( f )  — $(f)) ,in which case the exchange rate Jumps downwards; or 
It, letting the exchange rate Jump to Its free float level (sc( f )  _  f) . These termsrepresent the 
conditional expectations above. In particular, the latter term Is In this framework the size 
of the realignment*.
The 'a  priori' exchange rate expectation ts determined by the no-arbltrage 
condition, which Implies that the expected Jump In the exchange rate Is zero:
-to ï& n -s 'in w  0 »
a t
Rearranging,
04)
where $ (f)  Is given by the complete credibility solution in (10).
The existence of a positive realignment probability affects the properties of the 
model In the following way. Let us express for convenience, the new. unknown solution as
sc{r)=fc*ar 05)
where Cl has yet to be determined.
Substituting the perfect credibility and this new solution into (14), we get
fc+n*=o>,(fcM l 06)
Solving out n ' It turns out that It Is equal to:
CTKI-Cùpn ci 7)
which renders the solution for the Imperfect credibility model extremely simple; after 
substituting this expression Into (10), we get the basic equation of the model with imperfect 
credibility:
08)
Not© thot now the slop© In the curve within the band Is steeper than In the perfect 
credibility model. Th© stabilizing effect of the target zone Is therefore reduced. With no 
credibility (18) collapses into the free float solution (10) and there exists no honeymoon 
effect at all.
Another Interesting feature of this approach to Introduce imperfect credibility Into 
the model Is the Implied breakdown of the smooth pasting conditions, as It Is apparent 
In figure 4. Now the S-curve Is not tangent at the edges of the band; the derivative Is 
positive and therefore, the exchange rate Is not Insensitive anymore to changes In the 
fundamentals at the edge of the bands.
8-Without loss of generality. we assume that the process Is drtfttess
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Bertola & Svensson (1993), Bertola & Caballero (1993) and Tristanl (1994) propose 
alternative approaches to modelling Imperfect credibility, which emphasize other points 
of Interest.
Bertola and Svensson define the realignment risk (c,) as the product of the 
probability of realignment and the size of the realignment. In terms of the above model 
this is simply given by
The novelty In their approach is that they assume an additional continuous time 
process for c,. which now appears as a second state variable of the model.
If c t is assumed to be positive and uncorrelated with the fundamental process, the 
new solution shifts the S-curve to the left In figure 1 and shifts up the (S j) curve In figure 
2. The simulations they carry out show that these modifications describe better the 
observed behaviour of the Interest rate differentials.
The advantage of the realignment risk approach will become apparent in chapter 
two. With a further refinement In the derivation of the conditional expectations. It allows 
for a method to extract an estimate of the expected realignment from the data. On the 
contrary, this specification does not dispense with the smooth pasting conditions and this 
Implies that even with Imperfect credibility the model does not effectively bind the range 
for the fundamentals.
Also note from the above expression that, according to the Pesentl-Krugman 
specification, the value of c, positively depends on the position of the exchange rate In 
the band, because the wedge f-s(f) widens as the exchange rate approaches the 
bounds of fluctuation. However, In the specification of Bertola and Svensson the 
realignment risk Is given exogenously’ .
The model of Bertola and Caballero Is closer In spirit to the specification of figure 
4. They take Into account the effect of the fundamentals on the credibility of the target 
zone. Their result Is noteworthy because In this case not only the smooth pasting conditions 
do not hold but the slope of the curve Is greater than in the free float and ir reaches a  
maximum. Instead of a minimum at the edges of the band. This Implies that an Imperfectly 
credible target zone may have destabilizing effects on the exchange rate or, as they put 
it, a 'divorce effect' Instead of a honeymoon effect may arise.
Finally. Tristanl (1994) proposes a more flexible way of modelling of the realignment 
process which conveys the previous alternatives. Although the slope of the target zone
9
-Actuaty, Bertola & Svensson Indirectly allow that the realt^ment rtsk depends on the position of the 
fundamentals, by making posstote a positive correlation between the processes which drive fundamentals end 
the realignment rtsk.
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may be larger than one, the smooth pasting conditions are preserved.
We will see In the next chapters that credibility Issues have been of a crucial 
Importance in restating the significance of target zone models in practice.
Financial Integration. Capital controls
The Uncovered Parity assumption Implies complete financial Integration among 
markets. Capital markets are perfectly integrated when the possibility to Impose explicit 
cap ita l controls is ruled out and there Is perfect substitutability among assets. The literature 
has In general embraced the assumption of complete financial Integration.
Nevertheless, the effective Imposition of capital controls or the threat of their 
potential Imposition have constituted an Important barrier to the Integration of financial 
markets. Empirical evidence in Rogoff (1986b) and Artis & Taylor (1988) also reveals that 
capital controls have played an outstanding role In maintaining the exchange rate 
stability In the ERM, especially In turbulent period».
Directives on perfect capital mobility have only been Implemented at the end of 
the eighties. In spite of this, the recent turmoil In the ERM has resuscitated the possibility to 
Impose some sort of capital controls to achieve a smooth transition to EMU.
The existence of extremely sophisticated and sensitive foreign exchange rate 
markets may Introduce excessive Instability in the exchange rates, it Is widely recognized 
that short term movements In the exchange rates are driven by fads, rumours or other 
types of seemingly Irrational behaviour rather than by economic fundamentals. Reports 
of the Bank for International Settlements (1986) and empirical evidence gathered by Allen 
& Taylor (1989) for Instance, stress the Importance of these phenomena In actual 
exchange rate expectations. Therefore. Imposing capital controls would be directed to 
Inhibit the destabilizing Influence of the markets.
The Implementation of the controls build on the seminal proposal of Tobin (1978) 
to 'throw sand In the wheels' of capital flows (1978). The sand to which Tobin referred was 
a small tax on short-term foreign exchange rate market transactions. This Idea was retaken 
by Dombusch (1986) who coupled It with the possibility of a dual exchange rate market 
and, more recently. It has been the subject of a Policy Forum whose contributions discuss 
the need to resort to them to preserve the possibility of EMU10.
Economic efficiency and technical arguments advise against these controls. These 
measures prevent an optimal allocation of resources and worsen consequently welfare;
,0-See In the Economic Journal (January 1995) the contributions by Greenaway. Elchengreen,Tobin & 
Wypfcxz, Garber & Taylor, and Kenen.
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moreover, bearing In mind the sophistication of the markets, capital controls may be 
rather difficult to Implement technically and prone to be circumvented (see Garber & 
Taylor (1995) and Kenen (1995)). Nonetheless, this has to be balanced against the huge 
losses that the collapse of the ERM, provoked by a panicking market, may bring about. 
In any case, the debate remains open.
Now, we explore how these aspects modify the model through the Interest Parity 
Condition and provide the authorities with new Instruments to defend the band. In this 
section, we will deal with the Imposition of capital controls and In the next section the 
consequences of Imperfect sustltutablllty on the role of Interventions will be examined. The 
relevance of these Implicit barriers are evident from the extended Mundell-Fleming model: 
the lower the degree of capital market Integration, the more room there exists for an 
autonomous management of the monetary policy.
The domestic demand for money depends on the money market or on-shore 
Interest rates, denoted as k consequently, the Interest rate differential S refers to the on­
shore rates. However, as Glavazzl & Glovannlnl (1989) stress, there will exist a wedge 
(denoted by d) between on-shore rates and off-shore rates (/oW), when capital controls are 
present:
CW-U (19)
This differential arises because transactions In the Euromarkets (determining off­
shore rates) are not subject to the Imposition of capital controls while the domestic rates 
are. Domestic rates higher than Eurorates reveal then the will to Insulate the domestic 
market from capital Inflows; this positive differential would Indicate the existence of 
controls for capital Inflows, and vlceversa negative differential reveal the existence of 
controls on capital outflows. This provides the duthorltles with an additional tool to support 
the band.
Since the demand for foreign currency depends on the off shore rates, the Interest 
parity condition In (1) should Include this differential, which represents the existence of 
capital controls” :
S, < / , - 0  * E ^ + d ,  (20)
d t
Capital controls appear as a simple additive term in the new Interest parity 
condition and the authorities have the possibility of Imposing them when they wish.
However, from the previous discussion of credibility we can observe that a perfectly
"-Here we have assumed that the foreign country does not Impose controls, such that f -/„'w?
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:igure 5 .0 -Capltal controls In a target zone, t - 0.5
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Figure 5 .l>The gap derived from capital controls on the Interest differential.
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credible target zone would not require the Imposition of controls to defend It; controls 
should be required then only In the cases of Imperfect credibility.
In particular, when the band Is under strain. If the position of fundamentals 
determines the credibility of the band, as In most of the models considered above. It 
follows that the Imposition of the controls will also depend on the position of the 
fundamentals: control on Inflows (.d>0) would be Imposed when fundamentals approach 
the lower edge £. control on outflows (d<0) when they approoch the upper edge f,.
To Introduce this Intuition Into our specification. Alberola (1992) defines the 
param eter y to express (20) as:
^51 (2 1 )
where dM. 1 -7)8; 0st<1 
where 7= 7 represents a situation with no capital controls. Substituting this new IP Into the 
monetary model the basic equation now Is
s=f+(afy)E(ds/dt)
In this modified model, the characteristic roots are smaller In absolute value, so that 
the S-curve stretches out as y->0. figure 5a displays the effects of capital controls on the 
S-curve. When there Is no capital mobility at oil y=0. fundamentals are unbounded. In 
figure 5b we can observe the behaviour of the Interest rates In the face of capital 
controls: note that when the currency Is strong (lower band) ond controls are Imposed, 
larger Interest rate differentials are possible than those Implied by a situation without 
controls. The dashed line represents then the off-shore Interest rate and the wedge 
between both lines Is the magnitude of d.
Comparing 4 with 5,a, we can observe that capital controls exert an opposite 
effect than the loss of credibility. Therefore, capital controls In a target zone model are 
designed to offset losses In credibility and eventually safeguard the zone from collapse. 
In Alberola (1992). this trade-off between credibility and capital controls Is explored In 
greater detail.
As we have mentioned, the current role of capital controls Is open to debate. In 
any case, the removal of legal barriers to capital mobility precludes the use of this 
Instrument at the moment. The loss of this facility consequently should weaken the target 
zone, unless It Is interpreted as a stronger commitment to discipline the domestic policies.
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lll-lnterventions and reserves
The Intervention mechanism conveyed In the basic model Implies that when the 
exchange rate hits the band (I.e. s=sj. the Central Bank Intervenes through a sale of 
reserves (dR<0), reducing the level of fundamentals and driving up the Interest rate, in 
order to push the exchange rate back Into the band. There are however different ways 
to model Interventions and their effects.
These modifications affect the Implications of the model In many respects and this 
Is explored In this section. First, we change the assumption of Intervention at the edges to 
allow for Intramarginal Interventions. Secondly, the costs of Intervention In terms of reserves 
are considered to show that there Is a link between the sustainability of the bond. Its 
credibility and the stock of reserves. Finally, we highlight the possibility of sterilized 
Interventions when there capital markets are Imperfectly Integrated.
Intramarginal Interventions
The assumption of marginal and Infinitesimal Interventions does not fit the actual 
behaviour of Central Banks In the ERM. On the one hand, discrete Interventions should be 
considered; on the other hand. It Is recognized that, especially after the Basel-Nyborg 
agreements. Interventions are carried out throughout the band (see Mastropasqua et 
al.(1988), Dominguez & Kenen (1991). Undberg & SOderiln (1992), Lewis (1990)).
The consideration of discrete Intervention schemes does not present difficulties and 
the basic Insights of the model are maintained (see Avesani (1991)). However, the 
Introduction of more realistic Intervention schemes In the model comes up against the 
technical difficulties of stochastic calculus. Therefore, the assumption of Intramarginal 
Interventions is Introduced through very simple mechanisms In Froot & Obstfeld (1991a), 
Delgado & Dumas (1992). Llndberg & Sôderlln (1992).
It Is then assumed that the Central Bank leans against the wind and sells reserves 
as fundamentals deviate from the central parity. This sale is assumed to be a constant 
proportion (h) of the fundamentals deviation; this feature Is conveyed In the parameter 
h which Indicates the degree of mean-reverslon In the procès. At the edges marginal
27
Part l-Modeès 1-Tar get-zoo« models
EXCHANGE RATE & FUNDAMENTALS
0.08 p  
0.06 - 
0.04 - 
0.02 - 
0 - 
-0.02 - 
-0.04 - 
♦0.06 - 
-0.08 L*-
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
fundamentals
:igure Ó.O-IntTamarglnal Interventions within a target zone. Degree of reversion parameter y-0.7
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL A EXCHANGE RATE
I
s
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
exchange rate
Figure 6.b -interest rate differentiate wtth Intramarglnal Interventions. Note that the relation Is cJmost ttnecj.
28
Part l-Moctob M arget-zones rrxxM s
Interventions are assumed as before. Intramarginal Interventions Imply that the exchange 
rate Is controled by the authorities throughout the bands, not only at the edges. The 
driving process In (7) Is consequently transformed In the following mean-reverting Omsteln- 
Uhlenbeck process:
df~Qi-hf)dt+odz+dL-dU {22)
The resolution of the model proceeds as In the marginal Intervention case, but now 
the general solution to the differential equation Is given by:
s*_i!2fL *A. *a M f1«* 3 (23)
1 *ah ' ^ 2  ^  ^  o jh
where M (.... ) Is the confluent hypergeometrlc function. The solution Is derived In the
mentioned papers, applying the smooth pasting conditions to derive A ,A r
For our purposes It Is enough to observe figure 6 which compares the cases of 
marginal and Intramarginal Interventions. Note that the non-linearities are of smaller order, 
such that the curve Is only significantly bent close to the edges In order to fulfill the smooth 
pasting conditions.
The slope of the curve Is now lower than in the marginal Intervention case. Implying 
that the stabilizing properties are enhanced. However, the Intramarginal intervention, not 
the Interventions at the edge, explain this result. From above, the managed float solution 
Is s=(f-HJ4j ) / ( l  +ah). which Is also displayed In figure 6,a with a lower slope than the free float 
solution. Therefore, Intramarginal Interventions have additional stabilizing effects on 
exchange rate through expectations even when no target zone Is In force, but 
fundamentals are only bounded when a target zone Is imposed.
Reserves and credibility
We could conclude from above that htramarglnal Interventions facilitate the 
defence of the band. However, the benefits of Interventions should be compared with the 
costs In terms of reserves that defending the target zone Implies, both In the case of 
Intramarglnal and marginal Interventions.
Target zone and speculative attacks models have strong affinities because both 
of them emphasize the Interaction between fixed and floating regimes through 
expectations. The basic target zone model dispenses with the problem of reserve drain 
when intervention takes place. Krugman & Rothemberg (1990.91). Flood & Garber (1991) 
and Dumas & Svensson (1991) for unilateral bands and Delgado & Dumas (1992) In the 
case of bilateral bands focus on this shortcoming and attempt to lay a bridge between
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both strands of the literature.
Although the focus Is on fixed regimes, the seminal paper by Krugman on 
speculative attacks (1979) tackles the Insertion of dynamic constraint on the Interventions 
In a target zone. His model of balance of payment crises asserts that a currency which 
tends to depreciate mokes the peg unsustainable In the long run, since the continuous 
leaking of reserves exhaust them at a certain point.
Agents, however, can anticipate the future depletion and know that after the 
reserve stock reaches a  minimum level (to be determined), no more Intervention will be 
possible. At that point, an speculative attack against the currency Is carried out. the 
exchange rate returns to Its free float level and the reserve stock Jumps to zero. However, 
the depth of capital markets precludes arbitrage, so that the exchange rate Is not 
expected to Jump. This no-arbitrage condition Is useful to compute the minimum level of 
reserves.
This setup Is adapted to forget zones by Krugman and Rothemberg (1990). 
Assuming a one-sided band and substituting the expression for the fundamentals Into (3). 
we can rewrite (8) as
s=m+v+<xii+Ae1'''
Just before the speculative attack Is triggered at v=v. the (modified) value 
matching condition holds for the last time'2.
s, . -1  ^ ,A e x,w^ )
The constant A can then be solved to obtain the expression for the exchange rate 
Just before the speculative attack Is triggered
5 *m+v*+aii-_L
which has to be equal to the exchange rate after the attack, given by the free float 
expression:
s.=mr+v -mp
where m' Is the money supply after the attack. The loss of reserves or size of the attack 
Is therefore given by 1 /X, and from (2) m'=ln(D) and the reduction In the money supply 
is:
- Note that the»© exists an Inconsistency between this claim and the treatment of credibility above, since 
Imperfect credtoHfty precludes the tangency point solution Indeed. K/ugrncn & Rothemberg stress that the 
smooth pasting condition only should be expected to hold when there Is a large enough stock of reserves 
Therefore, they Imply that the credtoWty process just takes two values: a>-0 before the speculative attack end 
» •  1 at the moment of the attack. This ctartflcatton makes both analysis compatible.
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D
Equating this equation with the size of attack the minimum ratio of reserves to 
deposits that makes the band sustainable Is computed:
£ > e * - l  « «
D
The message of this extension Is that target zones are unsustainable In the long run 
If one-sided Interventions are needed to defend the band. In a similar framework Dumas
& Svensson (1992) give an answer to the related question of how long does an unilateral 
target zone last. They show that the drift In the fundamentals and the Initial stock of 
reserves are the determinants of the duration of the target zone.
The approach of Krugman and Rothemberg provides Interesting Insights but It 
hardly considers the link between reserves and credibility (see footnote 11). Bertola & 
Caballero (1991) attempt to fill this gap by making the probability of realignment (to) 
depend on the number of Interventions. If the number of net Interventions (the sum of 
positive and negative Interventions) Is denoted by J. this Implies that fa=<a(j). a>/>0. The
implications of these modifications is the existence of a realignment risk which varies with
time (or Interventions) and that the long-run properties of the exchange rate are similar 
to the case of a free float or. more precisely, to a crawling peg.
Reserves and financial Integration. Sterilized Interventions
Up to now. we have assumed that there Is no scope for sterilized Interventions. 
However. Obstfeld (1988) and Dominguez & Frankel (1990) show that sterilized Interventions 
can be effective In the short run through two different channels, expectations and asset 
equilibrium, leading to two different effects: the signalling effect and the portfolio effect.
This question has been addressed by Alberola, López and Orts (1994a), where we 
take as starting point a simplified Central Bank balance sheet:
/?+8c=H (26)
We can observe that the reserve stock plus the stock of domestic assets held by 
the Central Bank (Bc) equals the high-powered money supply (H). This magnitude, 
multiplied by the monetary multiplier (x) constitutes the money supply. Substituting and 
taking logarithms we arrive at the following expression for the fundamentals which Is 
equivalent to (2):
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f,~ v, *inxt *in(/?f *Be) (27)
A sterilized Intervention compensates the variation In reserves with an equal 
variation of the opposite sign In the stock of domestic assets held by the Central Bank 
(dR=-dBJ such that the money supply remains unaltered.
The signalling effect determines the structure of the basic model. Recall that the 
model Is solved assuming expected Interventions at the edges of the band; therefore, the 
stabilizing effect of the target zone depends on the signal derived from future 
Interventions. Moreover, when the band Is not completely credible, the situation of the 
stock of reserves may determine the sustainability of the zone, as we have Just seen. 
However. It should also be mentioned that a continued and decisive defence of the band 
may Increase the credibility of the band, despite the simultaneous reduction In the reserve 
stock. In figure 4, we can observe that a gain In credibility pushes the exchange rate Into 
the band with no variation In the fundamentals. This Implies that the Intervention can be 
sterilized as far as It provides gains In credibility.
As a  matter of fact in our model of chapter 3 this mechanism plays a  role. More 
precisely, w e consider the two opposite effect of Interventions: the positive effect which 
Is linked to  this signaling effect; the negative effect has to do with the loss of reserves 
attached to the Intervention.
In order to Introduce the portfolio effect, the assumption of perfect capital 
Integration has to be removed again. In this case, assets are not assumed to be perfect 
substitutes.
Let us consider with the help of a simple portfolio model how the degree of asset 
substitutability allows the sterilization of the Interventions. There are two countries and the 
non-monetary financial wealth (WO Is given and consist of the domestic (fl) and foreign 
(S') bond supplies which are also fixed: W=B+B\
The supply of domestic bonds (8) Is demanded by the private sector (Bp) and the 
Central Bank (BJ. Changes In the private sector demand for domestic bonds (dBJ 
depends on the uncovered Interest differential and Is weighted by a parameter (q) which 
stands for the degree of asset substitutability as we will see below:
d B ^ q W rO -E ^ l)  (28)
dt
A negative uncovered differential reduces the demand for domestic bonds. This 
negative excess In demand is offset by the Central Bank sterilized Intervention consisting 
In the purchase of domestic bonds (.dB^O) and a simultaneous sale of reserves, such that
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the money supply remains unaltered:
dBs=-dBc=dR<0
Substituting the above equality Into (28) and solving for the interest differential we 
arrive to the new expression for the Interest parity:
ds.
St^E,——+rt (29)
where
r=dR/q
can be seen as a premium which arises from the Imperfect substitutability. The parameter 
q  Is positive and Increasing with the degree of substitutability and It tends to Infinity when 
the substitutability Is perfect. Perfect substitutability Implies then a political risk equals zero.
Contemplating (29) as an equilibrium condition the portfolio effect can be easily 
explained. For Instance. If 5 Is smaller than the exchange rate expectation, the currency 
will depreciate and In order to defend the band a sale of reserves takes place.
In the basic model, the adjustment Is bom by the Interest differential (Increase In 
8), through the reduction of the money supply and fundamentals derived from the 
unsterlllzed Intervention.
However, now we can count on an additional way to establish the equilibrium, 
which operates through the right-hand side term: for positive values of q. If the sale of 
reserves Is sterilized, r Is negative, fulfilling equivalently the equilibrium condition.
Also note that for higher degrees of asset substitutability, the size of the sterilized 
Intervention must be larger; this means that the higher the financial Integration between 
markets, the more difficult Is to carry out effective Interventions.
Imperfect substitutability has the same Implications that the Imposition of capital 
controls. More precisely, considering the transformation q=y/l-y. we observe that as 7 — 
1. q  — 00 and d.r -* 0. Thus, we can generalize the meaning of the parameter 7 as 
representing the degree of financial Integration.
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IV-Why target zones?
The basic target zone model puts forward a basic argument In favour of fixing the 
exchange rate around a band of fluctuation: when there Is credibility, market 
expectations help to stabilize the exchange rate around the central parity. It Is no wonder 
then that the papers which address the usefulness of target zones have focused on 
stability issues. Stability Is considered not only with respect to the exchange rates, but also 
with respect to Interest rates, output and prices.
The second point emphasized by the results of target zone models Is the scope for 
discretion In the m anagement of economic policy. However, this limited degree of 
monetary autonomy may vanish when credibility problems arise. Some of the contributions 
we consider now have considered this Issue; this in our view represents an Important step 
In extending the Implications and In examining more realistically the rationale for 
exchange rate target zones models.
Exchange rates. Interventions and Interest rates
Krugman & Miller (1992) provide an original argument In favour of target zones. 
They recognize that rational expectations Is a strong assumption to explain exchange rate 
behaviour. In particular, they consider the existence of stop-ioss traders which do not care 
about fundamental but Invest (dlslnvest) In a currency when Its price Increases (falls) 
above (below) a given threshold. They show that this leads to an Inverted S-shaped curve 
for the exchange rate. However, when a target zone is set and the market recognizes the 
commitment of the authorities to defend the announced band Inside the threshold, the 
behaviour of these agents will be stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
A more relevant contribution Is contained In the papers by Svensson (1992) and 
Miller & Zhang (1994) where the consideration of the problem Is taken from an optimal 
control perspective.
The results of the basic model are determined by the expected evolution of 
exchange rate and fundamentals, which In turn depend on the behaviour of the
34
Part 1-Models 1-Tar get-zones models
authorities regarding the defence of the target zone. Therefore, a time Inconsistency 
problem arises here: authorities may And convenient to renege on the arrangement after 
having benefltted from the expectations of the agents on the Initial announcement. These 
papers address this problem In the specification of the target zone. Thus, In both of them, 
the target zone Is seen as a commitment technology to tie down agents expectations.
In the paper by Svensson. a quadratic loss function for the Central Bank Is 
considered and exchange rate and Interest volatility appear as arguments. The non- 
llnearltles Implied by the target zone Impose serious obstacles to the analytical solution of 
the problem. This Is overcome by considering a linear approximation which Is quite 
accurate In the case of target zones with intramarglnal Interventions, as we observed 
above.
The basic model shows that the choice of regime Implies a trade-off between 
exchange rate and interest rate volatility. Svensson uses this optimizing framework to find 
the most satisfactory trade-off. This Is obtained either by a strong commitment to a target 
zone or by setting short-run Intermediate targets. As a consequence, the degree of 
m onetary autonomy that a target zone seems to grant Is limited by the need to commit 
or follow short-term targets.
These Ideas are more elaborated by Miller & Zhang (1994). They build on previous 
work on optimal Interventions on target zones by Avesanl (1991). Costs of Intervention are 
assumed proportional to the size of the Intervention and they are Included In the loss 
function. On the contrary. Interest rates considerations are dropped.
The problem Is set up as a game between the Central Bank and the private sector. 
The outcom e of this game Is that announced bands are optimal for both participants and 
tim e consistent. While Avesanl concludes that marginal Interventions are optimal, the 
results derived by Miller and Zhang stress that the optimal rule Implies continuous 
Interventions throughout the band.
The problem that both contributions share Is that the optimal solution Is given at the 
the onset. In the form of an open-loop solution. No feedback on the solution Is considered 
and therefore the target zone design is not affected by the evolving circumstances.
This Is a serious limitation in a system like the ERM where credibility evolves over 
time. Avesanl et al. (1994a) attempt to overcome this drawback by setting up a target 
zone In an optimizing approach which allows for the feedback of the evolving 
environment on the design of the target zone. Apart from the goal of stability. It Is also 
acknowledged that the target zones Imposes undesired restrictions on the authorities and 
consequently, flexibility Is an additional objective. Flexibility Is attained through the
35
Paît l-Modete 1-Target-zone» mode*»
possibility to surprise markets. Of course, this has costs In terms of credibility which are 
conveyed in their specification, too.
This framework allows the authors to design flexible target zones with soft bands. 
There is again an explicit game between the authorities and the private agents. The 
announcement of the central parity Is done then on a strategic basis and exchange rate 
targets are corrected when the costs reach a predetermined threshold. More Interestingly, 
the evolution of credibility Is explicitly considered and It Is shown that the target zone can 
be hardened when authorities accumulate reputation. We return to the Idea of credibility 
dynamics and reputation In the second part of the dissertation.
Final targets
The formalization of exchange rates In an optimization approach considered up 
to now considers the choice of the band from a Central Bank perspective, nanowty 
focused on exchange rates or Interest rates. However, these are oner all Intermediate 
targets for policymakers.
Following the approach of the policy coordination literature, the loss function 
should really contain some consideration of employment or output and Inflation. Some 
attempts have been made In this direction: first, we consider the contributions of 
Sutherland (1992), Gros (1990) and Beetsma & Van der Roeg (1992) and then that of 
Cuklerman et al. (1994). In chapter five we will consider the Issue in a static monetary 
model of policy coordination.
The three first papers consider the Issue from the point of view of stability of output 
and prices. The loss functions set penalties for the deviations of output and prices from the 
equilibrium levels. Sutherland compares a completely fixed exchange rate, a free float 
and a target zone with marginal Interventions and finds that the target zones Is superior 
to the other two regimes. Gros (who does not explicitly consider a target zone model) and 
Beetsma and van der Ptoeg (who assume sticky prices) reach the same conclusion: 
intramarginal interventions are optimal, contrary to the results of Avesanl (1991). The 
second set of papers also demonstrate the superiority of a managed float over a target 
zone. Therefore, given these broader considerations, a target zone seems to be a second 
best alternative to a managed float.
Evidently, the Incorporation of final targets Improves the framework of analysis. 
Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the objective of a target zone In practice goes 
beyond simple considerations of stability. In the Introduction we have seen than the ERM 
has become a disciplinary device In the minds of policymakers and that this role has been
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enhanced In the Maastricht Treaty. Other target zones seem to have been set up for 
similar reasons, as the Scandinavian experience documented in Lehmussarl et al (1993). 
Llndberg et al (1992). etc. and the more recent unilateral pegs of developing countries 
to the dollar, studied by Helpman et al. (1994) Illustrate13.
Thus, the approaches which have been considered In this section Ignore at least 
some of the reasons why target zones are adopted. The contribution of Cuklerman, Klguei 
and Lelderman Is a notable attem pt to remedy this flaw.
They start by allowing the costs of pegging the exchange rate to depend on the 
variations In competitiveness which. In turn, affect output. Therefore, If the policymaker is 
not satisfied with the current level of the real exchange rate, the temptation to 
manipulate the real exchange rate will arise.
This Is formalized In a loss function of the following type:
W(s)=Q(f-s)+s2
where the second term Is the cost In terms of exchange rate Instability and the first term 
refers to the desired real exchange rate.
If some degree of stlcklness Is assumed, a real depreciation (appreciation) can be 
achieved by making the nominal exchange rate, 5, larger (smaller) than f  , thus, as In 
Avesanl et al. (1994a), surprises In the nominal exchange rate Is the channel through which 
policymakers can satisfy Its objectives.
The value of Q Is revealed to the market at each period and It determines the 
weight of the 'real' objective in the loss function with respect to the stability objective. A 
value for Q  different from zero reveals that the policymaker views the current exchange 
rate unfavourably.
The sign of Q  gives Information about the real exchange rate objective of the 
poUcymaker. Q<0 reflects a desire to alleviate Internal recession through a nominal 
depreciation (this would be. In general, the case for periphery countries) and a positive 
Q  reveals a wish to appreciate the currency. It Is evtdent that a higher absolute value of 
Q  Increases the Incentive to cheat on the agreement and therefore reduces the 
perceived commitment of the authorities. The credibility of the arrangement is in this way 
linked, although In an Implicit way. to real variables.
The model Is not exempt of problems though. In particular, the solution Is not 
forward looking as the rest of models, but It makes use of autoregressive expectations, 
such that the stabilizing behaviour of target zones Is not built around the future expected 
path of the fundamentals, but on the history of the process.
,3-The references for the ERM can be found In the Introduction
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Despite this caveat, the results of this model show that there exists a trade-off 
between credibility and flexibility: the higher Is the reputation of the policymaker 
commitment, the narrower can be the width of the band. The model also shows that the 
realignment probability Increases at the upper limit of the band. As a result the 
realignment risk once again turns out to be positively related to the divergence In the 
funddmentals (defined In terms of the real exchange rates).
These Insights will be used to explore the relations between fundamental 
divergences and sustainability of the band In chapter three.
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V-Fmal remarks
This survey has presented the elegant models of target zones. The Intricacies of 
stochastic calculus make difficult to extend the m oderation and explains why the 
extensions have regarded the basic model with flexible prices Instead of sticky prices 
which are more realistic.
However, the major limitation of target-zones models Is, In my view, the 
deterministic and state-dependent nature of the solution. The lack of empirical evidence 
has encouraged extensions of the model, mainly on the Issue of credibility, but the 
Introduction of dynamic elements has been hindered by the restrictive assumption of 
rational expectations. The static nature of the model also limits the Insights of the model. 
The emphasis on the stability properties of target zones which are derived from the models 
has biased the profession towards Justifying target zones as stabilizing devices, except for 
the notable exceptions which we have reviewed.
The shift of emphasis from stability to discipline in the perception of the ERM took 
place In the middle of the eighties, that Is, It was prior to the development of target zone 
models. This fact Is striking and unfortunate alike and It may have contributed to the 
discredit of these models after the fall of the ERM.
Notwithstanding this, the efforts m ade by the optimization strand of the target zone 
literature to convey the Issues of credibility and commitment explicitly In the model should 
be acknowledged. This step Is significant because It leads to the consideration of the 
actual reasons for the adoption of a target zone and on Its sustainability In an optimization 
framework.
These remarks suggest that there still exists a wide field for target zone models to 
explore. Our contribution Is presented In the third and fourth chapter of this thesis. There, 
w e attem pt to Introduce explicit dynamics into the model, at the cost of dispensing with 
the derivation of a closed form solution. This opens up the possibility of considering several 
crucial Issues (credibility, reputation) and more realistic objectives (sustainability, 
convergence) In a dynamic framework.
The second promising area Is to develop further the optimization perspective
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reviewed In the last section. More precisely, a global optimizing framework could fill most 
of the gaps we have pointed out In this chapter. By global we refer both to the 
consideration of bilateral target zones and more comprehensive economic models. We 
will return to this point m the conclusions.
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This chapter complements the previous survey on theoretical target zone models. 
We roughly follow the same structure of chapter one: the empirical evidence on the basic 
model Is first examined and then we consider the empirical implications of the extended 
models.
The empirical analysis of target zones models has focused on the experience of the
O
ERM and the Scandinavian peg to the Deutsche Mark. The feature that differentiates 
these regimes Is that the first Is a bilateral target zone and the second Is an unilateral peg. 
Nonetheless, the results do not differ substantially.
The empirical evidence regarding the basic model has determined to some extent 
the development of the extended models surveyed In chapter one. The speed at which 
empirical research has evolved Is remarkable. This has helped us to leam more about the 
real functioning of the target zone and. as we will see In the conclusions. It has moderated 
the Initial enthusiasm for target zone models. Particularly disturbing for the literature has 
been the collapse of the ERM.
The empirical search has been mainly directed to characterize the Imperfect 
credibility of the band because It has been considered the main reason for the empirical 
failure of the basic model.
I wlH review several approaches followed by the literature, and, among them 
Alberola. López and Orts (1994a). The latter consists of an unobserved component 
decomposition of the elements determining the behaviour of the interest rate differentials 
In Spain. Our conclusions are similar to the majority of the literature, but we believe that 
we have overcome some statistical problems within the literature.
The existence of realignment risks has led to the empirical exploration of its causes: 
reputation, the position of the exchange rate in the band and economic fundamentals. 
The reputation Issue Is closely related to the credibility of the band and consequently to
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the design of sustainable target zones; the evidence on the band position has endorsed 
a negative view of the ERM as destabilizing mechanism. The role of fundamentals merits 
a special mention In the conclusions, because their obscure Influence has Inspired our 
dynamic model In the next chapter.
The remainder of this chapter Is organized as follows. Section I studies the evidence 
on the basic model; section II analyses the elements which disturb the basic relationship: 
Interventions, controls and especially realignment risks. Section III provides an account of 
the trajectory of the Spanish peseta In the ERM until Its first realignment, using an 
unobserved component analysis. Section IV presents an overall Interpretation of the results 
of the empirical evidence and discusses the extensions which are partially developed In 
the rest of the thesis.
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l-TESTS ON THE BASIC MODEL
The basic target zone model presented In chapter one highlights the relationship 
between three economic variables: exchange rates, fundamentals and Interest rates. The 
behaviour of these variables Is explored In this section. The most extensive empirical 
analysis of the basic model has been carried out by Flood, Mathieson and Rose (1991) 
and consequently It constitutes our main reference. However, their analysis Is 
supplemented with oiher contributions. We use the Spanish data from the first regime of 
the peseta In the ERM, from Its entrance (19/06/89) until the first realignment (15/09/92) to 
Illustrate the empirical evidence'.
Fundamentals and exchange rates
The central implication of the model is the non-llnear relationship between 
fundamentals and exchange rates represented by the S-curve in figure 1.1. Therefore, the 
most direct Implication to test the relationship Implied by (1.3).
The main problem Is how to define the fundamentals. In the simple theoretical 
model, they consist of the money supplies and outputs or, alternatively, of the price level 
differentials between the two countries whose exchange rate Is considered. However, as 
we will see below, the concept of fundamentals Is much wider, depending on which 
structural model of exchange rate determination Is being used; moreover, structural 
models have failed to explain the evolution of the exchange rate (Meese & Ropoff (1983), 
Frankel & Rose (1994), McDonald & Taylor (1994)).
Flood et ai. (1991) overcome this problem In a rather naive way by letting the 
funddmentals be determined by the data. Note that from (1.3), fundamentals can be
'-The data a e  dally (788 observations) Sources for the data are Servtclo de Estodfettca (Banco de España) 
and Dotastiearn Interest rates are Euromarkets one-month deposits,The central parities with respect to the 
German Mark and French Franc were set at 65 pts/DM and 19.38 pts/FF, respecttvefy, and a 12% fluctuation 
band wtth respect to the central partty was alowed.
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solved out as f=s-a(LÍ). Rood & Rose (1993) carry out the same exercise and label the 
resulting estimation as virtual fundamentals. The right-hand side terms are observable and 
consequently a measure for fundamentals can be obtained once the value of the interest 
rate semlelastlclty (a) has been determined.
Flood et al. (1991) consider two measures for a. The first consists of estimating the 
parameter directly. Taking the theoretical process for the funddmentals to be In discrete 
time (I.e. assuming they follow a random walk) and taking differences from the expression 
(1.3). a can be estimated. The existence of many currencies and regimes In which a turns 
out to be negative does not deter the authors, which simply exclude these cases from the 
sample. The second method simply uses the value for a values from the literature.
The results from these rough methods are hardly surprising: few linearities appear 
and even In these cases, they do not take the form foreseen by the theory. Moreover, 
they do not tend to appear In the countries more commlted to the ERM. as It should be 
expected too.
The lack of evidence on the theoretical non-linearities Is not exclusively derived 
from the unreliability of the method. Neither Smith & Spencer (1991) reach conclusive 
results, applying the Method of Slmuldted Moments2.
On the whole, testing a  hypothesis with a variable which Is not observable and has 
to be constructed creates difficulties, and few conclusions can Indeed be derived. The 
exercise has still less value when confronted with the clear results obtained by using more 
direct and observable measures to test the Impact of a target zone on exchange rates.
Statistical properties o f the exchange rates
Exchange rates and Interest rates are directly observable, so that the empirical 
Implications of the model are Immediately apparent. Figures 1 .a X> display the position of 
the peseta In the ERM with respect to the DM and French Franc, respectively and the 
Interest rate differentials In such period.
Regarding the behaviour of the exchange rates, three statistical properties are 
derived from the basic target zone model:
-The unconditional distribution is U-shaped within the band.
-The conditional distribution of the standard deviation is reshaped.
-The exchange rate displays mean-reverslon.
2-7b® Method of Simulated Moments consists of choosing the model parameters to generate the series of 
fundament«* and exchange rate which best repdcate the statistical moments of the observed data. The results 
show that the historical moments are quite different from the simulated ones.
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GERMANY
:ig u re . 1 .a.-lnterest rate differ enflais and deviations from the central partly. (1969-93)
FRANCE
Figure l.b-lnterest rate differentiate and deviations from central partly (1989-93)
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Applying the results of Harrison (1985) to the target zones. Svensson (1991a) shows that 
since. In the driftless case, the fundamental distribution Is uniform, the S-curve relation 
Implies that the mass of probability Is higher at the edges of the band. Empirical evidence 
in Bertola & Caballero (1993), Flood et al. (1991) and Undberg & SGderiln (1994) 
contradicts this result. Rather, the probability tends to accumulate at the center of the 
band.
Figures 2.a,b show a particular feature In the Spanish case: the exchange rate 
distribution exhibits a peak (for France) close to the lower limit of the band, reflecting the 
strength of the peseta In most of the period, but a U-shaped distribution Is not observoble.
Chen 8t Glovannlnl (1993) derive a technique to directly estimate the distribution 
functions for the exchange rate In a target zone. Their results also show that the estimated 
distributions do not match the theoretical shapes.
The second property derives from the standard deviation expression In chapter 1 : 
o*=s/o. Since the slope of the S-curve Is decreasing until It reaches zero at the edges of the 
band, the distribution reduces Its probability mass as it approaches the edges, where it 
reaches a  null value. In figures 2.a.b we observe a quite uniform distribution and similar 
patterns are also found In the literature.
Testing the hypothesis of mean reversion Is more Interesting because. It Is related 
to some of the credibility tests which are discussed In the following section. The hypothesis 
Is conveyed by the negative relation between Interest rate differentials (In this case 
expected exchange rate depreciation) which appears In figure 1.2 The assumption of 
perfect credibility Implies that the exchange rate will return to the center of the band. 
However, Svensson (1993) argues that this feature Is robust to the specification of the 
m odel and that it persists in the case of Imperfect credibility because the mean reversion 
is defined with respect to the expected long-run value, which can well not be the central 
parity.
The statistical implication Is that, contrary to floating regimes (see Meese & Rogoff 
(1983)) the exchange rate Is expected to be statlonary-/(D;. Therefore, unit root tests can 
be applied to reveal the mean-reverslon property of the series. Notwithstanding this, we 
have to be aware In what follows that the experiment with simulated data carried out by 
Froot 8c Obstfeld (1991b), reveals that this mean-reverslon hypothesis only holds for narrow 
bands and with large samples.
The most popular unit root test Is the (Augmented) Dickey-Fuller test, whose general
form Is:
A,sf*p0+ M (- ^ ,  (1)
where x=1 and the null hypothesis states that the series contain a unit root, l.e j5,=0.
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Svensson (1993) finds implicit evidence that the null hypothesis Is rejected, so that 
the series are stationary3. His results are confirmed by Weber (1991), Caramazza (1993) 
and Thomas (1994). However, these results are biased by the way the unit root tests are 
performed. Dally data are applied on a monthly basis and Hansen & Hodrlck (1980) stress 
that the overlapping observations can affect the correlation of the residuals and 
consequently the estimation of the model. However, as López (1995) and also Svensson 
point out. If standard errors are computed through the application of the Newey-West 
procedure In order to account for autocorrelated residuals (Newey & West (1987)) this 
problem Is bypassed and the estimation of p, In the test Is superconslstent under the null 
hypothesis.
The main problem arises on the validity of the Dickey-Fuller critical values of the 
distribution. López (1995) shows that testing for unit roots with overlapping data requires 
a correction of the critical values, otherwise the test Is biased towards the rejection of the 
null hypothesis4. After the approplate corrections are applied. It turns out that mean 
reversion only appears for the strongest currencies of the system: Guilder, 3elglan Franc, 
French Franc and Danish Krone, that Is, those currencies which 'a fortiori' did not realign. 
Hence, on this basis we could argue that the basic model Is only supported for these 
currencies.
Interest rates
Interest rate differentials equal exchange rate expectations when the UIP Is fulfilled. 
Svensson (1992b) argues that the risk premium In a target zone should be negligible and 
the empirical evidence In Rose & Svensson (1991) confirms this hypothesis for the DM/FF 
parity In the ERM5. Therefore, interest rate differentials (i>) should be negatively correlated 
with the position of the exchange rate In the band*. Although the relationship displayed
3-L6pez (1995) compute« the Implicit values for the untt roots test reported In Svensson's paper.
4-The analysis of Svensson Includes the Interest rates In the regression and this may also bias the test towards 
the stattonarlty hypothesis, as he himself recognizes
The correction factor as calculated by L6pez Is 122. shifting the critical vciue of the Dickey Fuier test 
at S% from -2.89 to -3.50 for one month maturtty assets (20-22 observations)
5- An alt emotive to Interest rates Is to work wtth forward premia because they have the odvantage of 
requiring the fulfilment of the covered parity, on this alternative. BartoMnl & Bodnar (1992) And no support for the 
basic model In forward premia.
6-R e g a rd in g  the statistical properties of the Interest rate distribution Is U-shaped and the standard d eviation  
Is also rrshaped. These properties (Jrectty derive from the exchange rate distribution results. Bgures 2.a£> and 
d.c.d do not dbpiay such features.
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In figure 1.2 Is not linear. Svensson (1991c) shows that It becomes steeper and more linear 
as the maturity term for the considered asset increases (the result resembles figure 1.6 for 
Intramarglnal Interventions). Therefore, a linear relationship of the following type can be 
postulated for estimation, which Is the observable counterpart of (1.11):
6 ,*c,+bs{ *tt (2 )
where s' Is the deviation of the exchange rate with respect to the central parity, b  Is
expected to be negative and e Is an error term.
Apart from being a simple, linear and directly observable specification, the
attraction of this expression Is that It Is general because the variable c moy be defined In 
so as to capture the degree credibility of the band, as we will observe below.
The basic model requires however that the value of c, Is constant and equals zero, 
because perfect credibility Is assumed7. In practice, this negative relationship Is difficult 
to find. Graphical methods (Svensson (1991a), Weber (1991), Flood et al. (1992) and 
Undberg & SGderiln (1994)) display quite diffuse scatterplots of the relation, similar to the 
plots In figures 3.a,b. Direct estimation of the parameter yields no better results.
The overall picture on the evidence of the basic target zone models Is apparently 
appalling. No single prediction of the model Is fulfilled In practice and. In several cases, 
completely opposite results are found. Nevertheless, I think that the econometric analysis 
to test the basic model has been poor and that, therefore, Inferlng the failure of the basic 
model or. more generally, of target zones from these result is Inadequate. We will return 
to this point at the end of the chapter.
In any case, the Immediate consequence of these findings has been to 'stimulate 
researchers to ge t back to the drawing board' as Svensson (1992c,p.l29) puts It. New 
models of target zones which relax the most unrealistic assumptions have been 
developed, as we have seen In chapter one. On the empirical side, efforts have been 
concentrated In devising refined methods to study the rest of factors which play an 
empirical role In target zones.
-Note that this specification resembles the unit root test In (1) where Interest rate differentiate are substituted 
by changes In the exchange rate. When UIP holds, expression (2) Is a particular case of (1) The parameter c 
Is In this case equal to the long-run expected value of the exchange rate, so that the point which Svensson 
makes Is that In the unit root test the exchange rate wW be stationary around a constant If the expected long-run 
mean value Is ctfferent from the central partly.
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ll-TESTING THE EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
c
Relaxing the assumptions of marginal Interventions and perfect credibility affects 
the critical features of the model. We briefly review in the first place the effects of and 
evidence on Intramarglnal Interventions and capital controls so as to concentrate later 
on the realignment risk and Its determinants.
Interventions and capita l controls
The existence of Intramarglnal Intervention Is a documented fact in the case of the 
ERM and In other unilateral target zones (see references In chapter one). The hypothesis 
of Intramarglnal Intervention changes the S-curve relationship (see figure 1.6) and. 
consequently the testable implications of the model. The Implied non-linearities are now 
reduced, which would explain the results of Flood et ai. (1991). Undberg and SOderiln
(1992) show that, when the fundamental process is driftless, the distribution of the 
exchange rate Is approximately a truncated normal, which is closer to the observed 
behaviour of the exchange rate data; such evidence of Intramarginal Interventions allows 
them to explain much better the empirical features of Swedish data.
The possibility of capital controls has been completely neglected by the literature, 
as pointed out In chapter one. However, figure 4 displays the differential between the on­
shore (one month Interbank rates) and off-shore (Euromarkets) Interest rates In Spain. We 
observe that there Is a positive, yet decreasing wedge, indicating the existence of controls 
on Inflows. Only In the last few periods, prior to the realignment did the differential turn 
negative, as a result of the devaluation expectations8. This suggests that the role of 
capital controls may have been disregarded too quickly.
*-The Economist also stressed the existence of this wedge m Ranee during the EMS crises, despite the 
theoretical assumption of perfect capital mobility, after the Implementation of the Directive on free flows of 
capitals. The reason pointed out by the magazine Is the pleod of the Banque of Ranee to the commercial banks 
to sustain the Rench franc during the crisis.
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Capital controls
Figure 4-CapttcM controto (cf) measured as the dOTerent between domestic and Euromarket mtefect rates
Realignment risk
Imperfect credibility In a target zone has been the most studied empirical Issue of 
the target-zones literature. Any empirical Implication of the target zone model, even the 
mean reversion property may be reversed when a (vortable) realignment risk Is present In 
the data. We observed In the discussion on credibility In the previous chapter that any 
relation Is then possible between the fundamentals and the exchange rate or between 
the Interest rate differentials and the position of the exchange rate In the band. Two types 
of analysis can be distinguished In this area. The first type regards the methods to extract 
the realignment risk from the data; the second has attempted to analyse the determinants 
of the realignment risks In the target zone. We will review each of them in turn.
The first approach to test the credibility of the model was devised by Svensson 
(1991b) and Is extremely simple, as he explicitly recognises In the title of the paper. The 
simplest test compares the expected returns of the domestic and foreign asset of the 
same maturity CO , taking Into account the feasible variation of the currency within the 
band. This imposes Implicit upper (/tfJ and lower (/t N) limits on the rate of return of the 
domestic assets If the band Is credible, represented by the dashed lines In figure 7:
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When the domestic rate of return surpasses one of the Implied limits, this Is evidence 
of Imperfect credibility of the target zone. Empirical evidence In Svensson (1991b) and 
Flood et al. (1991) show that the hypothesis of perfect credibility Is In general rejected 
before realignments for most currencies and regimes.
Nevertheless, this test implicitly assumes that the exchange rate can only be 
realigned when It reaches the edges of the band. Thus. It provides a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for the existence of a realignment. In practice, a realignment can 
also occur even though the test suggests perfect credibility andm consequently this 
method overestimates the credibility of the band;
Figure 5 displays results for the Spanish case for assets of a one-year maturity. We 
can observe that the band turns out to be credible for the French Franc and for most of 
the period against the Deutsche Mark. Before the ERM crises there Is no problem of 
credibility. Justifying the above remarks.
For the rest of currencies the zone was deemed to be credible according to this 
method right until Just before the first crises; only Just before the September turmoil and 
then for most of the period until the widening of the bands (period September '92-August 
'93) is the band seen to be non-credlble for the French Franc (see Avesanl et al. (1994b)).
The 'drift adjustment' method has been proposed by Bertola & Svensson (1993) and 
has been Implemented In most of the successive empirical analysis of target zones, starting 
with Rose & Svensson (1991). Undberg et al. (1994) and again Svensson (1993). It consists 
of extracting the realignment risk from the data In order to give a explicit measure of the 
credibility of the band.
The expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate In a target zone can be 
decomposed Into two elements: the expected rate of depreciation within the band (or 
respect to the central parity (s')) and the expected rate of change In the central parity
Expectations of realignments Inside the band can Introduce peso problems In the 
estimation, as we will discuss later on. Therefore, It Is convenient to express the expectation 
terms in (4) as conditional expectations, as we did In expression (1.12):
(O:
E£stJ^ E A s ;,^ E £ C ,^ (4)
f., I mol^ VTWi^ ) 1 ~ i^){E,(.ASf t~t I no '•oigrvnan^
E£CtM*» t{Et(ACtt^  I moignrr*n$
(5)
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Sventson simplest tesi (one year) Germany
Figure 5.0- Svensson's credèbWty test fx  Germany.
Svenssoo simplest test (one year): France
Figure s.b- Svensson's credibility test for Ranee.
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where we recall that cof Is the probability of realignment from time t up to time t and the 
expectation of change In the central parity conditional on no reallgment Is of course zero.
Assuming that the UCP Is fulfilled the expected rate of change In the central parity, 
is simply equal to, from (4):
EAC ,^S ]-E£sU  i6i
The expected rate o f devaluation (c,') captures the variation of the exchange rate 
exclusively due to the reallgment, and Is then defined as the sum of the expected Jump 
on the central parity plus the expected net Jump of the exchange rate within the band, 
when a realignment occurs:
IwafgrvnonP I no m atpvrwnfl  ^ ^
From the above expressions, the expected rate of devaluation can be simply 
expressed as the difference between the Interest rate differential and the expected rate 
of depreciation within the band, conditional upon no reallgment taking place:
Cf *5 f-£ f(AS tJrr I,*, reofgrvTwn») ^
where the conditional expectation has to be estimated.
The estimation is straightforward. Since the no realignment condition applies to the 
perfect credibility case, the basic target zone relation applies; the consideration of assets 
of a  relatively long maturity and the existence of Intramarginal Interventions, allow us to 
assume hi the rest of the chapter that the relation Is linear.
It is then reasonable to regress the effective depreciation within the band (I.e. 
conditional upon no realignment) on the position of the exchange rate In the band:
I no "*($' - s ^ V M r  ho, (9)
where ko Is d dummy variable for each period between realignments of the currency and 
the sign of k, Is expected to be negative. Taking expectations, we obtain an estimate of 
the expected depreciation conditional on no realignment.
The results of these tests are reported in the literature for different asset maturities 
x - 1,3,6.12. in general they show that for most of the currencies the expected rate of 
devaluation with respect to the DM Is small but not negligible between realignments and 
It shows a peak in the periods Immediately prior to the realignment. There Is a tendency 
for c '  to decrease, indicating that the ERM has consolidated Its credibility. In any case, 
the magnitude of the crises of 1992 does not seem to have been anticipated by the 
agents in their realignment expectations (Rose and Svensson (1994)). The expected rates 
of devaluation move closely together between different maturities because the shorter- 
term Interest rates prompt shifts In the yield curve. As a matter of fact, the realignment 
risk series are very similar to the Interest rate differential series In most of the sample, which
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is to b© expected given the estimation method.
One apparent feature of this method is that the regression only makes sense If the 
exchange rate series are stationarity; otherwise, the parameter k, Is not significantly 
different from zero. This does not mean however that the test Is Invalidated by the 
existence of a unit root In the exchange rates, because In this case the expected rate of 
devaluation would be simply given by the Interest rate differentials.
The papers which apply the drift adjustment method And significant negative 
values for these parameters, although not all of them carry out unit root tests explicitly. 
However, we must Interpret these result with caution. In the discussion above we stressed 
that In equation such us like (9) It Is necessary to correct the Dickey-Fuller critical values; 
none of these papers takes such a consideration Into account.
In any case, comparing (2) with (8,9). we can observe that, the Intercept term In 
the former coincides with the expected redllgnment risk and that k,=b. so that the drift 
adjustment method removes from the data the noise due to imperfect credibility; If the 
parameter Is significantly negative the Implication of the (extended) target zone model 
is endorsed by the data: once the disturbance term due to imperfect credibility Is 
accounted for. the data display a negative relationship between the Interest rate 
differentials and the position of the exchange rate In the band, as Implied by the basic 
theoretical target zone model.
Weber (1991) uses on alternative method to study the credibility of the target zone. 
He aHows for a time-varying devaluation risk to be estimated through a Bayesian multi­
process Kalman filter. The Idea is to convey in a State Space representation the 
relationship between Interest rate differentials and the position of the exchange rate In the 
band, appearing In (2).
The stimulus to Weber's approach Is precisely his observation that the exchange 
rate series are not stationary In some regimes of the ERM. This makes him think that the 
realignment risk shifts between a stationary behaviour such as in Svensson (1991a) and 
a non-statbnary process, as In Bertola 8c Svensson (1993).
Consequenlty, two different specifications are proposed for the devaluation risk 
(c,) as sub-models of the general State Space form. The Bayesian component of the filter 
determines the stochastic shifts using the Information provided by the data. The results 
obtained by Weber coincide with the drift-adjustment method: a reduction of the 
devaluation risk throughout the and significant negative values for the parameter b 
which supports the target zorie* extended model.
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The contribution of Aiberola, López and Orts (19<?4b) Is developed In the next 
section. This methodology is based on the specification of Weber (1991), although the 
implementation is quite different. We also make use of the Kalman Filter because we 
consider that It is an adequate method to extract Information from the data. However, 
w e dispense with the multi-process setting and the specification of the devaluation risk Is 
set up beforehand by observing In detail the statistical behaviour of the series under study. 
This approach is probably less sophisticated than Weber's but It Is much more robust on 
a statistical basis9.
Other contributions (Frankel & Phillips (1991)) use a survey of forecasts to calibrate 
the credibility of the system which is seen to Increase with time.Finally, It Is noteworthy to 
mention the contribution of Avesanl et al. (1994.b) which combines a study of the 
credibility of the system with some economic policies guidelines. They use their optimal 
targeting strategy (commented In the previous chapter) to study the credibility of the 
FF/DM parity. Their method simply Involves to generate exchange rate series in their 
model until finding the one which most closely follows the behaviour of the FF/DM until the 
realignment. Then, they use the credibility measures conveyed In their model and 
com pare them with other measures as the simplest credibility test In Svensson and a 
detailed series of statements In the Economist. The comparison reveals a close relationship 
between the theoretical measure and that actually perceived In the markets. Finally, the 
information accumulated In the flexible target zone model allows to determine 
endogenously the optimal band width of the new announcement. This Is used to suggest 
the reaction of the ERM members to avoid the collapse of the system: widening the band.
What's In a  risk
The existence of a well-defined measure for the realignment risk (with the statistical 
caveats we Indlcdted dbove) has encouraged research Into the factors which determine 
Its evolution. The methodology Is similar In all the cases, and consists on a more or less 
sophisticated linear regression of c, on the explanatory variables. Several types of factors 
have been considered: the position of the exchange rate in the band, reputation of the 
authorities and economic fundamentals. The next table summarises the components of 
the realignment risk and the results of the empirical evidence.
’ -We w * see that the parameters are chosen by maximum likelihood and that the priors of the Kalman Rter 
are obtained wtth accurate computational algorithms. On the contrary, Weber seems to have set these 
parameters ad hoc and thb shed doubts on the redablHty of his results
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GENERAL REGRESSION
c.=ò .s*.+[ò; a. .(m.-m.')*f632(y,-V-#)+fcj3(;i.'n. ))+[ò4 XN.♦ò^ PEER.+ô^def./GDP.))* (ô.. *òwi.) *&5R.
DETERMINANTS OF C, REFERENCES EFFECT I
1-Deviations of the exchanae rate Chen & Giovannini, YES
(s'). 6,>0 Caramazza, Thomas
2-Measures of reputation
-S.d of future exchange rate Rose & Svensson YES
(o ^ )6^>0
-Time span since the last Chen & Giovannini YES
realignment, (T). b ^O
3-Model fundamentals
-Money suoplies (m t-m,').b31>0 Rose & Svensson NO
-Outputs (V,-y,>&a2<0 . Rose & Svensson NO
-Inflation differentials fa -n ’y .b^O Rose & Svensson.Ayuso et al. Mixed
4-Economic imbalances
-Trade balance (XNJ.b^O Ayuso et al. NO
-Fund.Eq.Exchange Rate
(FEERJ.b42<0 Thomas NO
-Fiscal imbalance as %GDP
(defJGDP). b43>0 Rose & Svensson.Ayuso et al. NO
5-Deflationary bias
-Unemployment rate (pj.b5,>0 Thomas.Caramazza YES
-Real exchange rate (qJ .b^O Klein & Marion NO
-Interest rates ( ij b ^O Klein & Marion NO
6-Reserves (RJ.br<0 Ayuso et al. NO
NB The regression above cs an simplification The literature uses some times the variables in levels others 
in differences, sometimes lags or leads, etc
The sign of the parameters refers to the expected sign
Table 1 -Decomposition of the realignment risk accorc<ng to the empirical research
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The inclusion of the position of the exchange rote In the band (s') has special 
relevance. We observed In figure 3 the blurred relation between it and the interest rate 
differential (a  good proxy for realignment risk), contrary to the standard assumptions. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the position of the exchange rate In the band Is 
positively related to the realignment risk (Chen & Giovannlnl (1993,b), Thomas (1994), 
Caramazza (1993)). This Implies that the actual relation between Interest rates and the 
position of the exchange rate In the band may be positive as the Imperfect credibility 
models of Bertola & Caballero (1992) and Tristanl (1994) suggest. This contradicts ogaln the 
central prediction of target zone models because In this case the target zone may have 
a destabilizing effect on the exchange rate.
Rose & Svensson (1994) and Chen & Giovannlnl (1993b) Include two different 
measures of reputation In the target zone. Rose & Svensson (1994) build on the Idea that 
the ERM leaves some scope for monetary autonomy and not using It Increases the 
credibility of the authorities (Svensson (1992a)). They use the standard deviation of the 
future expected exchange rate as a proxy of such autonomy and find a slgnlflcatlvely 
positive relationship, as the theory suggests. The measure used by Chen and Giovannlnl 
Is simpler. They use the time span from the previous realignment as a measure of 
reputation. Using this method a negative sign Is found in the regression.
Both empirical results confirm the Importance of the commitment of the authorities 
to enhance the stabilizing effect of the target zones.
The factor which Is common to all the papers Is the explicit consideration of same 
economic variable representing the fundamentals. The choice of the variables Is based 
on economic considerations derived from different areas of the literature.
The most obvious candidates are money and output which appear In the 
underlying model of target zones (Rose & Svensson); prices. In the form of Inflation 
differentials Is another obvious candidate if price stlcklness Is considered and some sort of 
PPP Is assumed (Rose & Svensson (1994), Ayuso et al. (1993)).
External and fiscal Imbalances should also be taken into account; Its rationale can 
be found both In the currency crisis and the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
(FEER) literature. External Imbalances can be Introduced simply by taking the current 
account deficit (Ayuso et al.(1993)) or more ellaborate measures based on FEERs which 
also convey the effect of Inflation differentials, too (Thomas (1994). Fiscal imbalances
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affect long-run expectations of Inflation and consequently the credibility of the zone10; 
and can be measured by the deflclt/GDP ratio as In Rose & Svensson and Ayuso et al.
Some measure of unemployment (such as NAIRU in Thomas (1994) and the 
unemployment rate In Caramazza (1993)) can capture some of the real costs derived 
from pegging the currency to a low Inflation country. The overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate and the higher Interest rates that a devaluation risk imposes on the country 
Imply a  deflationary bias which may affect the credibility of the target zone (Klein & 
Marlon (1994)).
Finally, reserves Is other obvious candidate because It Is a signal on the 
sustainability of the band. However. Ayuso et al. (1993) find no significative correlation.
The conclusions from these analysis are mixed. An Important restriction lies in the 
difficulties to find high frequency data for many of the assumed fundamentals; a second 
Is that the joint consideration of a great number of variables, many of them highly 
correlated, makes It difficult to pick up reliable response values. Finally, the explanatory 
power of these variables, taken separately is usually quite low. Despite this caveats, one 
Interesting Implication found In Ayuso et al. (1993) Is that when longer maturities are 
considered, fundamentals seem to be able to explain better the behaviour of 
realignment risk. Apart from this, each paper identifies different measures of fundamental 
as being significant. Some consensus only seems to appear around the unemployment 
variable and to a lesser extent Inflation differentials (Rose and Svensson In certain cases, 
Ayuso et al. for long maturities, but not In the rest).
On the whole, there does seem to be an effect fundamentals on the realignment 
risk, but ft is difficult to grasp It statistically. The reason, which we develop at length In the 
next chapter Is that some kind of fundamental Imbalance justifies the flnal collapse of the 
parities, but they only occasionally Influence the behaviour of exchange rates and 
realignment risk In the short run. This is consistent with the results of Allen & Taylor (1989) 
who underline that foreign exchange markets are mostly driven by short-run 
considerations.
,0-The problem of debt crises, stressed In the currency crisis literature b not fcely to have much relevance 
In a European context.
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lll-An approximation to the Spanish experience in the ERM
Spain entered the EC on 1 January 1986 whereas the Incorporation to the ERM took 
place on 19 June 1989. The strength of the peseta until Its first realignment Is remarkable, 
especially given the magnitude of Inflation differentials with Germany and that It was one 
of the first currencies to realign In the monetary crises of the ERM. This strength can be 
explained by the economic environment In Spain In these years. The economic 
consequences of Spanish integration Into the EC and the ERM are explored for Instance 
In Vlrtals et al. (1990), Viftals (1990) and Dolado and Vlftals (1991).
Spain being a relative large country, the prospect of joining the Common Market 
boosted growth from 1985 onwards, but this extremely expansive cycle was constrained 
by structural Inefficiencies which kept Inflation rates high. Economic policy was therefore 
aimed at easing these constraints through an expansive fiscal policy while restraining at 
the same time monetary growth to control domestic Inflation.
Time was ripe to consolidate the reduction of the Inflation differential achieved up 
to that moment: Spain joined the ERM to narrow further the Inflation gap by benefiting 
from the German reputation, despite the attached costs In terms of the external balance. 
In spite of the discipline Imposed by the system, interest rate differentials have remained 
relatively high at a time when an intense process of financial Integration has been 
Implemented. Finally, macroeconomic indicators started to converge to 'European levels' 
(as Spaniards use to put It), but too slowly to close the gaps. However, this seemed to 
satisfy the markets which accepted the rules of the convergence play  (see Portes (1993)) 
in a EMS which was living its golden days.
High Interest rates and economic expansion kept then the peseta strong in the 
system, and caused a sharp overvaluation of the real exchange rate (see figure 8 below), 
providing a  classic example of the 'new EMS'. The process of financial Integration which 
accom panied the strength of the peseta was such as to call for an active defence of the 
(lowerl) band through Interventions which boosted the Spanish stock of reserves.
After four years of currency stability and economic expansion, growth slowed down 
and the mirage vanished: inflation had not converged, the public deficit boomed, capital 
poured out of the country and the accumulated fundamentals Imbalances placed the
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peseta In the eye of the EMS storm.
The model
In this section we undertake an empirical analysis of the Spanish experience In the 
ERM target zone". We Intend to measure the stabilizing effect of the existence of the 
ERM on exchange rate expectations by exploring the Spanish data with respect to two 
other currencies of the ERM: the French Franc and the Deutsche Mark.
Let us recall that the target zone will be considered to stabilize expectations If a 
negative relation Is found between the Interest rate differentials and the position of the 
exchange rate In the band, that Is:
&f*c,+bs't +£, (2 *)
where b<0  under the target zone hypothesis.
We have already pointed out that the Implications of the basic model do not hold 
for the peseta. Exploring the reasons for the rejection of the basic model requires a 
statistical analysis of the exchange rate and Interest rate differential series. The results of 
this analysis will also help us to reformulate the structure of the empirical model. In this 
approach, we depart from previous empirical models, in that no process for the variables 
of the model (especially c,) Is assummed 'a priori'. Therefore, we formulate a flexible 
model for c, of the form:
c f»nc+pcM +0(fl)Tl,
(10)
with p e  (0.1); 0(S)-1-e,S-e2B2-.... E i^ O : Ei 
where B Is the backshift operator, such that fl*xt=xw . and all the roots of t (B)-0 lie on or 
outside the unit circle. Note that the only restriction Imposed on the empirical model Is that 
t ,  In (2 ') follows a white noise process.
Given this specification, we are able to explore the actual process for c„ given our 
data set. The behaviour of the data specifies completely the structure of the model and 
then we can estimate It applying the Kalman Filter.
The summary statistics of the differenced series contained in Table 2 show several 
noteworthy points. Firstly, the series present excess kurtosls-malnly In the Interest rate 
differentials- Indicating that they are highly nonnormal; further, the column labeled S(0) 
provides estimates of the spectral densities at zero frequency. As noted by several authors, 
(e.g. Cochrane (1988)), this provides a useful diagnostic on the permanent (that Is,
"-For the Spanish cose we are considering see Serrat (1992), Rodriguez (1992) and Ayuso et a! (1993) They 
show that the band ts credble In the studied period ('09-be^nning 1992).
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Table 2-Stattsttcs of the dally changes In the series
Mean SD SiO)« Skew Ex. Kurt
5© -.Ü06 .202 .01 -1.58 17.31
(.004) (.093) (.186)
s© -.001 .273 .05 .3142 1.513
(.008) (.092) (.186)
-.003 .197 .01 -1.09 19.66
(.005) (.093) (.186)
Sf -.000 .253 .04 .3509 1.661
(.007) (.092) (.186)
SCO)«) Is a Baftett estimate of the spectral density at zro frequency using 40 lags. 
Newey-West Standard errors m brackets.
components with a  unit root) and transitory components In the series. Judging from point 
estimates, there seems to be far more persistence of shocks In s'-the deviations with 
respect to the central parity. On the contrary, the Interest rate differentials exhibit some 
degree of mean reversion towards a downwards trend, and this could lead to the 
rejection of a  random walk model. Consequently, we test for the existence of a unit root 
In the autoregressive representation of each series against two alternatives: one consistent 
with fluctuations around a constant mean -t„- , the other with stationary fluctuations 
around a deterministic linear trend-v Table 3 contains the corresponding Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests; In both cases eight lags are Included to account for serial 
correlation, although after the first lag the results appear to be Insensitive to the number 
of lags.
We can see that there Is very little evidence against the unit root hypothesis If the 
considered alternative Is statlonarlty around a constant mean. However, as noted above, 
a more relevant alternative would be to consider whether the Interest differentials could 
present stationary fluctuations around a deterministic linear trend. As the results show, the 
French differentials (dp) are actualiv stationary (l(0)>around a deterministic trend, whereas 
the German differentials (6q) contain a unit root (1(1)). Finally, both exchange rate
63
Port 1-Models 2-Emplrlcal Evidence. The Spanish case
Table 3-Augmented Dickey Fuller tests
Sg * s.
T„(8) -.76 -2.09 -2.03 -l.W
i,(8) -3.94 -2.07 -3.82 -200
Numbers for ^ are t statistics on in the regression Number for xt are t statistics on ft, In the
regression Critical values at 5% are -2.86 for ^ and -3 41 for i t.
deviations (.s'F are 1(1 )'2.
From these results, we can o'.-serve that for France a constant parameter c. would 
Imply that the residuals e, In (2') should contain a unit root, given that-8/  being 1(0). 
around a deterministic trend, and V  Is l(l>- these series cannot be cointegrated. For 
Germany a cointegration relationship could be possible, as both series are 1(1), hence we 
test for ft. EG(5) In Table 3 shows that both series are not cointegrated, and as a 
consequence maintaining a constant parameter for c would also Imply a unit root In e,. 
This explains to some extent the blurred relationship between 8 and s. when a constant c, 
Is assumed as displayed In Figures 3. This Is the reason to formulate the flexible model for 
c, In (10).
The lack of cointegration between the series 8 and 5' Implies that the hypothesis 
of p=l is not rejected, and c, Is 1(1) for both countries. Note that the unit root previously 
contained In the residuals (when c, was constant) Is now shifted to the variable 
parameter c r The second element to determine is the order of x(B); this Is done with the 
help of the autocorrelations of the differenced series, displayed In Table 4. There, we can 
see that for s' an IM A (l.l) process Is an acceptable representation, whereas the series 8 
seem to be well represented by a pure random walk13. Therefore, the MA polynomial for
,2-Here we do r*ot have the problem of averlqpplng observations In the exchange rate because 0 -11n our 
case. As a matter of fact, it was the contradiction between the outcome In the unit root test here and using the 
drlft-adjtistment test that motivated López (1995) to study the conectlon mechanism.
13-Note that this would In some sense contradict the previous IntegrabWty analysis. In which 8* was considered
to be 1(0) around a deterministic trend. In order to reconcie these results we have regressed ^ on a constant,
a Rnear trend and the lagged variable wtth these results:
bf-0.051  - O.OOQd t  + 0.89 8m+u,
(0.06) (0.0001) (0.01) £*«.99
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c, is the sum of a MA(1) and a white noise, and a model for c, consistent with the data 
would be given by an IMA(1,1) plus a drift (jic). Finally, the value of the drift will arise from 
the estimation below.
Table 4 -Statistics of the daily changes In the series
lag 1 2 3 4 5
Sg .03 .02 -.05 -.07 -.01
Sq -.14 .05 -.09 .01 -.04
Sf .07 .01 -.00 -.06 .05
Sf -.19 .07 -.09 .00 -.05
Standard Errors ±2/TV076
Estimation procedure
The estimation of the model conveyed In equations (2MO) Is designed to obtain 
the relationship between Interest rates and position of the exchange rate in the band and 
check whether the theoretical hypothesis Is fulfilled. This Implies to extract the Intercept 
term (cp from the interest rate differential series 8 In order to remove the 'noise' that 
Imperfect credibility brings about In the basic relation. Previous to applying the Kalman 
Filter, the model has to be expressed In State Space form.
where the residuals show no autocorrelation. This result would Indicate that A6, folows an ARMA process with Aft 
parameter +,».89 with a drift equal to -0.0004. and a MA polynomial wtth a unit root. This ARMA representation 
would Imply the fo4ow1ng MA representation for Aiy: 9 ( B ) - 118- 006*-..., that Is, wtth very low pcrameters as 
expected. There Is however something we should note now: the presence of strong outliers Is known to cause 
additional problems In the Identification of ARMA models, due to the their effects on the autocorrelation 
function, in fact, simply by dropping out the first five observations cf the series, cixa smoothing observations 183-
92. the correiograms for present an IM A(l.l) structure (8-10). which Is ckxer to what we would expect 
accordng to the process we have Identified for iy.
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Rewriting the equations In State Space form we obtain the following expression
a,*7aM +/?u,
,  ,  (11)
E(zJO ECt2t)-c l: £(u,)0. E(u,u,>l4: E(ct,)*Q
where
wtth
( 12)
Z»(l 0 0 0); af-(c f \i, ti, nM) '
and
v3y
i i -e o o„ 0 0 0
0 1 0  0 0 0 0 0
/?-
0 0 0 0 o, 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0.
Eiutur)*lt . the Identity matrix o f order 4
where the unknown parameters b, jie. a *. ot2. and t are chosen so that they satisfy the 
restrictions Implied for the model and they maximize the likelihood function, or 
equivalently, the log likelihood:
logl—Iio g 2n -lX ) iog |ff| - l £  © W ’e,
£ * M £ M
(U)
where
e,-S,-Ps>Zo„M
The first equation Is known as the measurement equation, and the second Is the 
transition equation. Notice that the unobserved component c, and the drift for Its process 
(ji*) are Included In the state vector a,.
Some remarks are In order at this point about some of the assumptions made 
above; first, given that when we deal with Integrated variables, our estimation problem 
could be understood as the estimation of a colntegratlng vector for 6f, c, and s,'. of the 
form (1 -1 -b ) ‘; in this case. Stock (1987) shows that the estimator of b. Is superconsistent, 
even when we work with dally data on monthly maturity assets and the problem of 
overlapping observations arises as we discussed above. Secondly, we have assumed 
homoskedasticlty ( E(t,3)=ct2 for all 0, which, for financial data, can be considered a 
strong assumption. Nevertheless, as Florentlnl and Maravall (1993) show, the changes In 
the estimates of the parameters and of the unobserved component between models with 
and without Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastlc (ARCH) residuals, are negllblble.
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Having cast the model In State-Space form, the Kalman Filter Is a common method 
to compute the Gaussian likelihood function for a trial set of parameters (for a discussion 
see, for Instance, Harvey (1989)). The filter recursively produces minimum mean square 
error (MMSE) estimates of the unobserved state vector given observations on 4V The filter 
consists of two sets of equations, the prediction and the updating or correction equations. 
Denoting by a,., the optimal estimator of a,., based on information up to and Including 
and letting PM denote the 4x4 covariance matrix of the estimation error, that is:
Pm 1  (IS)
the Kalman Filter consists on the recursive application of the following set of equations to 
extract a value for the state a,:
Prediction Equations
<V.=TOm (16)
Pt/t-\ *TPt.} T'+RQR'
Parameter correction equations
r/r-i
where the subscript t/t-1 Indicates that the optimal estimators for Pand a are at time fare 
computed with the information available at time t-1. Given initial values a^ P0 the filter
computes the estimate a, for a, at time t={1.2....Tj. However, given that the state vector
Is not stationary, those Initial conditions turn out to play a very important role. In fact, with 
Incorrect Initial conditions In the nonsfatlonary case, the results of the estimation 
procedure may be Inaccurate (see, Gomez 8c Maravall (1993)). In order to compute these 
Initial values several alternatives are offered In the literature, such as de Jong (1988), which 
Is explained In the appendix and It Is the method used here.
Results and Interpretation
Maximization of the log likelihood of the above state space model gives the results 
summarized In Table 5. Figure 6 shows the Intercept terms c, for Germany and France and 
figures 7 ,a.b dlspldy the adjusted interest rate differentials (5®*) obtained by substractlng 
c, from 8,. that is. they display differentials net of the Intercept term. Some results are worth 
mentioning:
-First, the sign of the response parameter b Is negative, but the theory states,
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though Its value is very small-see the slope of the ') scatter plot, and note the different
scale with respect to the (&.$') scatterplot m figure 3-, highlighting the small Influence of 
the band on the Interest rate differentials (for France the band would explain 6,15% of the 
differentials; for Germany only 1,42%). Moreover, In the case of Germany the sign is In the 
limit of significance.
-Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous result, the term c, accounts for 
most of the differentials (see figure 6).
-Finally, the residuals (et) are white noise and of small magnitude as figure 8 
displays.
Table 5-Results of the analysis
b 5E o7  0 57
GERMANY -.0679 .0084 .055 .432 .1275
FRANCE -.0754 .0130 .054 .438 .1233
Standard Errors computed numeric aty.
The disappointing results of the target zone model are explained by the behaviour 
of the series: the effect of the band on 6 relies on the expectation that the exchange 
rate wHI appreciate when It approaches the upper band, and viceversa; this suggests that 
the exchange rate Is expected to revert to the Interior of the band. However, the non- 
statlonartty of s' Indicates that the exchange rate does not display such mean reversion, 
thus, the position of the currency In the band cannot significantly Influence the interest 
rate differentials’4.
The parameter c, picks up the unit root Implied In the regression and this Is 
precisely the realignment risk underlying the agents' expectations. The trajectory of c, very 
close to 8, shows that the Interest rate differentials have reflected this Implicit realignment 
risk, rather than the expectations derived from the position of the currency in the band.
The obvious conclusion to draw from this analysis Is that the band has not been 
completely credible during the sample under study. However, the decreasing profile of
U-We should be cautious at this stage, since the lack of mean reversion can also be Influenced by the wide 
band In which the peseta is allowed to fluctixjte. For instance. Svensson (1993) rejects that s' are 1(1) for a l the 
EPM original cunencto6, but the Italan Ura. that ks. the currency generally acknowledged to have the worst 
reputation currency In the ERM, but also the only one flu c tu a tin g  wtthln a wide band In most of the period under 
study.
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IN TE R C E P T TER M : FRANCE *  GERM ANY
:lg. 7-Intercept term (c*)
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c, reveals that the zone has gained credibility throughout the period, except for the last 
months, as If the realignment which subsequently took place were anticipated.
Note that our results roughly match the empirical evidence found using the 
alternative methods reviewed above. However, It is clear from the data that the drift* 
adjustment method cannot be applied because the exchange rate series contain a unit 
root. Therefore, the expected realignment risk would equal the Interest rate differential 
which Is In practical terms, the same conclusion we derive. This result can be reconciled 
with Svensson's assertion that mean reversion Is a general feature of the model, even with 
Imperfect credibility. Actually, this feature depends on the degree of credibility. In our 
case, given the large existing realignment risk, the target zone seems to have enjoyed a 
low degree of credibility, low enough to reverse the expected behaviour of the series and 
to obscure the Influence of the target zone under a thick veil of uncertainty and risk.
Despite the apparent robustness of this result we have to be extremely cautious In 
Interpreting the entire Interest rate differential as a realignment risk. As Ayuso et al. (1993) 
point out. the expected realignment rate -or In our case c, -picks up expected exchange 
rate regime shifts, and this change In the Implicit regime can actually occur with the same 
central parity (for Instance, a Jump from the lower to the upper part of the same band). 
This Implies that the Interest rate differentials would overestimate the realignment risk. Note 
that this possibility Is even more likely In the case of a wide band.
As regards the determinants of the estimated the realignment risk, the variability 
showed by c, and, especially. Its progressive reduction until mid-1992 suggests that Its 
evolution has been determined by several elements. On the one hand, nominal 
convergence is reflected In the reduction of the Interest differentials; on the other hand, 
the process of financial Integration Implemented during this period may have allowed 
meaningful gains In the credibility of the exchange rate commitment; these gains have 
been reflected In the lower probability of the current band being abandoned-at least in 
the short run- and. consequently. In a lower realignment risk.
Finally, the factors which allow for the reduction In c, vanish around the end of the 
period (Summer '92): the deviations of the fundamentals from the policy targets, the 
general Instability in the ERM and the uncertainties regarding eventual Monetary Union 
swiftly erode the previous credibility gains and the term c, displays a change of trend, 
reflecting that the probability of a realignment starts to Increase. This increase In the 
realignment risk Is not stopped either by the increase In the Interest rate differentials nor 
by the depreciation of the currency within the band nor by the massive sale of reserves, 
and results In the strong speculative pressures which ended up causing the first 
realignment of the Spanish peseta on the 16th of September 1?93.
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IV-Evaluation of the evidence. Research prospects
The empirical evidence on target zone models Is at least weak. The different 
methods reviewed In this chapter have shown that target zones do not seem to have 
greatly affected the behaviour exchange rates: the regime has lacked In general perfect 
credibility and even mean-reverslon In the exchange rate Is a feature which Is only 
verified beyond doubt for a few currencies at the core of the system.
However, this Is a too strict Interpretation of the ERM. We have to distinguish 
between the empirical findings of target zones models and target zones regimes. It is true 
that the type of stabilizing non-llnearltles predicted by the models are not found In the 
data, but It Is also true that the ERM has reduced the volatility of exchange rates as all the 
studies on the Issue have shown (Artis and Taylor (1988,1993), Ungerer et al. (1990), etc.). 
However, the foreign exchange market Is subject to so much noise (rumours, fads) that 
any empirical evidence on any structural model Is elluslve. In my view, attempting to test 
In practice the bold implications of such stylized models Is a rather vain exercise.
The role that fundamentals have played In the empirical analysis is quite 
ambiguous. At the beginning of the chapter they have been used in the attempt to 
validate the basic model; they have reappeared In the end to explain the existence of 
realignment risk, that Is. to 'validate the invalidation' of the basic model. In none of the 
cases, the search has been very fruitful.
As pointed out above, economic fundamentals do not influence the exchange 
rate (or the realignment risk) on a day-to-day basis, but they are presumably crucial In the 
long-run behaviour of the exchange rates. Moreover, the evolution of current 
fundamentals Inform the markets about the future sustainability of the system and 
consequently they exert a reputational effect on the system and determine the probability 
of a realignment. The problem Is that fundamentals are unobservable and It Is difficult to 
define a reliable measure for them.
We saw in the introduction and in the overview of the Spanish case, the large 
misalignments that the ERM has allowed; figure 9*displays the evolution of the nominal
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PPP equ i I ib r  i um and exchange r a t e
------ EMCtoartQ« r« tt PPP mo
:igure 9-Real exchange rate On terms of PPP) and nominal exchange rate wtth respect to Germany
exchange rate and the real exchange rate in terms of consumer prices (a reasonable 
measure for the fundamentals) for the Spanish peseta. The sample period has been 
extended to Include the three realignments of the peseta between 1992 and 1993. They 
can be Interpreted In the light of this graph as natural episodes which return the 
exchange rate to Its equilibrium.
The expression for conditional expectations can be used to illustrate these points. 
Let us recall from chapter one that the overall exchange rate expectation Is made up of 
two components:
I ^ ^ P H l  I
Cfeio l^
which can be redefined in discrete terms and subdivided between expectations within 
the band and expected Jumps of the central parity as in (5) above.
The Important point to stress here Is the evolution of the probability of realignment 
(to) In the expression, which appears multiplying the expected magnitude of the 
realignment. From what has been said above, one can accept that the size of the 
realignment depends on the expectations that agents assign to the evolution of the 
fundamentals, on their actual evolution and on the difference between these two; this 
component should behave smoothly in absence of news. On the contrary, the probability
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attached by the agents to a realignment- can he highly volatile and very sensitive to 
news; o Jump In to can trigger a speculative attack against the existing parities'5.
The peculiar behaviour of the funddmentals In determining devaluation 
expectations and the exchange rates can consequently be explained by a probability 
term which Is close to zero most of the time between realignments, but switches to high 
values when some negative news hit the system. These shocks con be related or not to 
the evolution of fundamentals, If the fundamentals Imbalance Is large this can lead to the 
collapse of the band.
This argument Is similar to the peso problem literature. If the probability of a 
realignment Is positive (to>0) and the subjective distribution of the exchange rate 
Incorporates this possible event; 'a fortiori', If the devaluation does not occur, the 
observed data will tend to underestimate the actual risk which agents perceive In the 
foreign market. Indeed, the existence of peso problems In exchange rates create 
problems of non-statlonarlty In the exchange rates (Krasker (1980).0bstfeld (1987)) and 
prevents convergence In Interest rates. This Is a common problem to exchange rates pegs 
as the paralellsm between the ERM turmoil and the recent new 'peso problem' In Mexico 
Illustrate.
The consequences which can be drawn from this analysis win be developed at 
length In the remainder of the thesis: the first consequence regards the need to Improve 
target zone models and the second is related to policy Issues.
From a theoretical point of view. It would be desirable If the target zone models 
conveyed the variable Influence of fundamentals. The next chapter presents a dynamic 
model In which the evolution of expectations Is only occasionally affected by the 
behaviour of the funddmentals.
The economic policy Implications of the empirical analysis are developed in 
chapters four and five. The Idea Is linked to the question we put at the end of last chapter, 
that Is, the reasons for imposing a target zone on the exchange rate.
The evidence shows that in the long run, the target zone almost behaves like a 
crawling peg, as Bertola 8c Caballero (1993) have anticipated for a target zone with 
Imperfect credibility. Why then, is It necessary to go through those stressing periods of 
turmoil, where the reputation of governments Is put at stake If. in the end the markets go 
their way?. This Is of course the pessimistic interpretation of the ERM experience In fact, 
the idea of managing exchange rates Is not very popular at the moment, but we are of
l5-Ayuso et at. (1994) use a stmHai cpproach. However they assume that the evolution of fundamentcJs ts 
linear (Instead of attempting to measure It) and then compute the p»obab«ty of realignment.
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the opinion that exchange rate management is not impossible and it may be beneficial. 
Finally, It Is a fact that, sooner or later, the issue reappears because the exchange rate is 
a key variable to manage economic Interdependence and, hence, policy coordination.
Therefore, a more constructive Interpretation would be to stress the benefits of a 
exchange rate peg and to Identify the flaws of the system, so that It can be redesigned. 
The results given In the Idst part of chapter one take this perspective. Emphasis Is placed 
on the Importance of reputation and commitment for the sustainability of the target zone. 
These ideas are taken up again In the second part of the thesis.
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Appendix. Computation of initial conditions
In principle the starting values for the Kalman Filter a0 and Py are given by the 
mean and the covariance matrix of the unconditional distribution of the state vector. 
However when the state equation Is nonstatlonary the unconditional distribution of the 
state vector is not defined. Unless genuine prior Information Is available, the Initial 
distribution of a*, must be specified in terms of a diffuse prior. If we write Pa=xl. where k Is 
a positive scalar, the diffuse prior Is obtained as k-x». This corresponds with P0''=0. The 
distribution Is an Improper one since It does not Integrate to one. However, as Gomez & 
Maravall (1993) note, the use of the so called big k method Is not only numerically 
dangerous but also Inexact. Alternative Initialization procedures can be found In de Jong 
(1988) (the one used). Carraro & Sartore (1987) and Gomez & Maravall (1993). In de 
Jong's algorithm It is assummed that the Initial state vector can be partitioned Into D 
nonstatlonary and N-D stationary elements, and expressed as. 
a,=C,y,+C2y2
where 7, Is a Dxl vector containing the D non stationary elements, with a diffuse prior, that 
Is Var(y,)=°°l or (Var(y,)) ’=0. while y7. an N-Dxl vector has a proper prior, that fe,
E(yt>=m Var(yj)=V
In our model with stationary errors m Is a 3X1 where the first element Is set equal to 
a consistent estimate of 11 and the two other elements are zero, while V Is dldgonal matrix 
with the first element equal to zero, as given In Appendix 1; y, would be set equal to c, 
while y2= ( f J timJ'; C,=(1 0 0 0 V and C2= ( 0 The use of the big k approximation for y, 
is avoided by extending the Kalman Filter as follows. Define 
X,=(Y, 0)
where 0 In (.) Is a null matrix with D columns, (so In the model D=l). Then the standard 
Kalman Filter recursions would be initiated with 
^»1 <rC2VC2‘
The recursion for the state vector Is augmented so as to become a recursion for the 
matrices A, and A„M. defined as:
A=Ar|, , ^ flM2'F-'/Vf t = l ....T
76
Part l-Modeb 2-Empirical Evidence The Spanish ease
where
N,=Xt-ZA,i 
t-i—TAf.i 
with A ng=(Cfn C,) 
and
t t . t + N f i 'N ,  t= l....T
with Sa=0
The output from the above recursions Is used to construct the required statistics 
from the diffuse prior model as follows. First, partition N,. A1 and S, as follows:
N,=(v,° rvy, At=(a° A*,) and  S,=fS„S^' with
Sl(=iS*,° s’ ,’) S„=($\ SV
Then, as shown by de Jong (1988). the estimator of the vector for the diffuse prior 
starting values Is:
a ^ A td  -sysvr;
and
P ^ A V ^ -A V  
where S7  Is the generalized inverse of
The log likelihood function. Ignoring the constant term. Is given by
£,=- '/¿Lin I f , I -  fc/n | S \ | + fcsysy 's*T
The expression for the log likelihood assumes that the recursions are carried on until 
the end of the sample. However once S', becomes nonsingular the diffuse Alter can be 
collapsed to the usual filter. If S', Is nonsingular at some point t=i. then the usual Kalman 
Filter can be employed starting from values obtained for a, and P, for t=x.
It can be shown that S', Is non singular If
r(C, 'Z'. C, T'Z'.C, TT'Z'..... C, T'...Z7 =D
Since In our particular case r(C,'Z')=l. we can truncate at x=l. and the log likelihood 
function for the T observations becomes
£=£,- ’/¿Lin | F, | -'/¿Le,'F;'e, 
with £, defined as above and the sums evaluated only at t= 1.
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After the Basel-Nyborg Agreements, the ERM survived for more than five years 
without realignments. However, the diverging evolution of the fundamentals generated 
large Implicit misalignments In the exchange rate. The apparent currency stability In this 
period went hand In hand with the accumulation of deeper tensions and when these 
tensions eventually came to light, a series of exchange rate crises and multiple 
realignments followed which roughly reestablished exchange rate equilibrium, as we have 
seen In figure 2.9.
The main objective of this chapter Is to develop a dynamic model of target zones 
In order to give a formal explanation for the complex relation between fundamentals and 
exchange rates in a target zone which we highlighted In the previous chapter. We claim 
that fixing the nominal exchange rate within a band while divergences In the 
fundamentals persist may allow deviations from the equilibrium exchange rate In the short- 
run (the so-called honeymoon effect), but It will eventually become unsustainable In the 
long-run. More precisely, we Intend to show that a target zone with diverging 
fundamentals conveys a perverse mechanism which sooner or later leads to Its collapse. 
The experience of the 'new EMS' and Its ultimate collapse are consistent with this 
Interpretation.
We have seen in chapter one that when the target zone regime is credible, 
economic fundamentals between two countries are able to diverge more for a given 
exchange rate than In a floating regime. We have outlined the attempts to build target 
zone models which explain why a target zone loses credibility and eventually collapses 
In the face of speculative attacks, but these models are unable to endogenously 
generate exchange rate collapses. One reason is that the surveyed target-zones models 
do not treat adequately all the dynamic aspects of the model, in particular the evolutionm
of the credibility. Svensson & Dumas (1992) compute precisely the expected duration of
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a target zone regime, given a finite stock of reserves; however, they also miss dynamic 
credibility considerations, which Is In our view the factor which determines the collapse of 
the zone. This limitation reduces the interest of their results. Therefore, developing an 
endogenous dynamic process for the credibility In a target zone model seems necessary 
to us.
We observed In the models of the previous chapter that In the different models the 
honeym oon e ffect was fixed over time. We also noted that Imperfect credibility reduced 
the honeymoon effect. The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) which underlies the 
solution, while being essential to obtaining a closed form solution In target-zones models, 
strongly constrains the relationship between the exchange rate and the fundamentals In 
the form of a fixed honeymoon effect. Thus, if we are able to dispense with the limiting 
REH hypothesis, while preserving the rationality of agents, we may be able to introduce 
explicit dynamics In the target zone, such that the the credibility and the honeymoon 
effect evolve with time.
This Is done in section I by setting up a model with heterogeneous beliefs; each 
belief is based on a different model of exchange rate determination. This Implies departing 
from the expectation formation mechanism Implicit In the standard models. Nevertheless, 
there is still a  representative agent who solves an optimization problem, so that rational 
behaviour Is preserved; he Is simply faced with two different beliefs from which to make 
up his expectation, rather than a single model or belief as in the standard REH. This 
specification stresses the existence of an Implicit conflict between beliefs In a target zone 
system with diverging fundamentals.
After obtaining some Insights from a mathematical analysis of the model In section 
II. we simulate the model to examine different exchange rate trajectories (section III). We 
examine the characteristics of these trajectories, which depend on the degree of 
divergence between the fundamentals of the two economies. The observed stability of 
the 'new EMS' while the fundamentals between member countries continued to diverge 
can be explained by our model; we refer to this feature as the dynamic honeymoon 
effect since It changes over time. Although the target zone may endure periods of strain 
(attacks), the zone necessarily collapses, given the divergence of fundamentals. In the 
next section (IV), we show that this outcome can be interpreted In terms of reputation and 
credibility; this perspective also highlights the reasons for the empirical failure of target 
zone models. Section V sums up the conclusions.
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l-A TARGET ZONE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
It has long been recognized that structural models Incorporating rational 
expectations have failed to explain the evolution of exchange rates after the collapse of 
the Bretton-Woods system (Meese & Rogoff (1983)). This failure has generated o series of 
studies on how expectations are actually formed In the market and It has opened a vast 
field of theoretical research In which the strongest assumptions of the REH have been 
abandoned1.
The departure from REH is always hazardous since, quoting Goldberg 8c Frydman
(1993). 'the great appeal o f the Rational Expectations paradigm Is th a t ... the Implied 
expectations o f the agents have superior theoretical properties In terms o f unbiasedness 
and  consistency...and any a ttem pt a t moving away from the RE framework Immediately 
Implies the presence o f some degree o f arbrltarlness and Inconsistency'. Thus, we have 
to be careful to maintain the rational behaviour by agents when specifying of the model 
but allow the market to hold heterogeneous beliefs.
Agents In financial markets form their expectations under uncertainty and 
presumably do their best In a rational way to produce forecasts. The uncertain 
environment is crucial for the generation of heterogeneous expectations which Is 
invariably found among individual agents. Actually, It Is difficult to reconcile the 
omniscience Implied by the REH with the behaviour of the markets. Kurz (1991) stresses that 
agents may exhibit drastic differences In beliefs even when they share the same 
Information; this does not Imply at all that they are Inefficient, but that after efficiently 
processing the Information, different agents draw different conclusions, according to their 
different but rational beliefs. Kurz concludes that ’scientific knowledge Is limited and many 
different theories are com patible with the behaviour o f the data. The existence o f wide 
gaps In the knowledge o f the agents about the economy results In a speculative search. 
w Nch forms conjectures, hypotheses or theories and these are the main source o f 
heterogeneity o f beliefs’.
'-See. foe instance. Frankel & Froot (1987,1988), AJten & Taylor (1989). Goodhart (1991). and for a survey 
Frankei & Rose (1994).
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This heterogeneity of beliefs can be captured by a model In which the market 
expectation Is the result of aggregating the private beliefs of Individuals agents. Individual 
agents form their expectations conditionally on their Information set and according to 
different structural models, not Just the one model or view of the world Implied by the REH. 
The ogent's Information set mainly consists of the observed past data and of their 
knowledge about the evolving environment.
Note that none of the models which agents have In mind necessarily corresponds 
with the 'true' model, from which the exchange rate process actually derives. As a matter 
of fact, since the effective exchange rate Is Influenced by market expectations, it will be 
driven by the dominant model In which the market believes, regardless of whether It 
makes economic sense or not I.
Fundamental and Institutional beliefs
The existence of heterogeneous beliefs Is an Inherent feature of target zones 
regimes since the co-existence of two different well-established models for the 
determination of the exchange rate are Implicit:
-On the one hand, there Is the assumption that the exchange rate has to return to 
Its equilibrium level determined by macroeconomic funddmentals. This level would 
correspond to the free float solution and It determines In our model the fundamental 
beliefs.
-On the other hand, when an Institutional exchange rate arrangement Is 
established there exists a commitment adopted by the authorities to keep to the 
arrangement and this commitment to defend the parities Influences the beliefs of the 
agents. We refer to these beliefs as Institutional beliefs.
Then, each model generates a distinct belief structure. The market expectation will 
result In an aggregate of the expectations generated by both beliefs. Hence, one of the 
cruclol questions to settle Is how this aggregation Is determined. We start by describing the 
expectation which each type of belief generates.
Fundamental beliefs (0- The core hypothesis of any structural model Is the 
assumption that the exchange rate must ultimately be consistent with the level of 
funddmentals so that the equilibrium exchange rate (5) fulfills some specific fundamental 
equilibrium relationship, such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Fundamental beliefs evolve 
In the form of adaptive expectations so as to capture this Idea: we assume that the 
nominal exchange rate, s. Is expected to return to the equilibrium 5, at an adjustment
81
Part l-Modeb 3-A Dynamic Model of Target Zones
speed determined by the parameter p:
Ft: ASfFM*p(f(S„,)-sp H)
The superscript On this case F) denotes the expected exchange rate change on 
the basis of the corresponding type of belief; the corresponding subscript refers to 
expectation at time t regarding f+7. When the current exchange rate is lower than the 
equilibrium exchange rate. It is expected to depreciate and vlceversa.
Institutional beliefs (0 on the other hand, are determined by the existence of a fully 
credible target zone, corresponding to the basic model In chapter one. The commitment 
of the authorities to Intervene at the margins of fluctuation to defend the band Influences 
exchange rate expectations throughout their whole range of fluctuation.
This result has been formally obtained In chapter one. Fundamentals (S) follow a 
Brownian motion process which Is regulated at the margin when a target zone Is set up. 
The solution to this model Is of the following form, which Is equivalent to the expression 
( 1 .10) In chapter one:
s«JVn(s!s.^J (2)
where st s. are the upper and lower limits of fluctuation and Q Is a non linear function of 
the fundamentals. In our case S. The non-llnearlty Implies a wedge between the evolution 
of the fundamentals and the exchange rate, which delivers the so-called honeymoon 
effect.
Exchange rate expectations conditional on the existence of the target zone are 
determined by the mapping between the position of the exchange rate In the band and 
exchange rate expectations In this model, such as It appears In figure 1.2. Writing the 
exchange rate In terms of deviations from the central parity (s'=s-c). the Institutional beliefs 
are defined as:
(3)
Vs.ss Q',<0
where Q' Is a  non-linear function derived from Cl. and corresponding to expression (1.11). 
The closer the exchange rate Is to the upper llmit-s, (lower Ilmtt-sJ. the larger the 
appreciation (depreciation) that is expected.
It Is Important to note that the magnitude of the honeymoon effect Is largely 
determined by the width of the band and the drift In the fundamentals, with no explicit 
consideration of time and. In this sense, the honeymoon effect is static. We will see below 
that on the contrary our model allows the projection of the honeymoon effect In time.
♦
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Market expectations
Given the two models which potentially enter In any Individual agents beliefs, the 
market aggregates private beliefs to form the aggregate expectation. We assume that
the market Is composed of an arbitrarily large number of agents (1=12....n), whose
Individual expectations (as',,,,) are a weighted average of the expectations derived from 
the fundamental (f>) and the Institutional (/,) beliefs they hold, with weights equal to w',. 1- 
u/,. respectively. It Is further assumed that the expectations derived from the two types of 
beliefs are homogeneous across agents:
F,=/=V/,W„ V/
However, each agent Is assumed to place a different weight to each belief, 
according to their Individual perceptions of reality; Individual beliefs are consequently 
heterogeneous.
The market aggregate expectation is then simply the weighted average of the 
fundamental and Institutional beliefs:
As,'m =w/f,-Kl w l
0<w,'<l
Aggregating the agents, the overall market expectation can be obtained:
as£i * wf t < 1 (4)
0<wf<l
This specification is similar to that In Frankel & Froot (1988) in which each type of 
belief represents a type of agent In the market2. We adopt however a slightly different 
Interpretation. The market is thought to be a representative agent which forms its forecast 
as a  linear combination of the forecasts generated by two different models or beliefs. 
Zellner (1986) gives a formal Bayesian Justification to this approach and shows Its optimality 
under uncertainty. Now we turn to explore the Issue of optimality In our model.
Optimal forecasts
The market alms at maximizing the yield of its Investment In foreign exchange and
2- Abo note that (4) ts a restatement of the exchange rate expectations In conditional form which 
appeared In the previous chapters In which F represents the free float solution Therefore, our model provides 
an alternative Interpretation of that expression.
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In doing so It needs to formulate the most accurate forecast, conditional to Its knowledge 
of the economy (conveyed by the two models) and the information contained In the 
data.
Since the error variance of any linear combination of forecasts Is lower than the 
variance of any Individual forecast, the combined forecast of the models Improves upon 
any single forecast. Consequently, the market will And It optimal to use a linear 
combination of forecasts (see Granger & Newbold (1986)), such as In (4).
The values for Fand /are  now measured at each period from the data. Therefore 
the question to solve Is how to select the optimal weight w, which minimizes the one-step 
ahead forecast errors (^M). Subtracting (4) from the actual exchange rate change, the 
respective one-step-ahead forecast errors of the period are:
where
It Is Immediate to show that the market one-step-ahead forecast errors are
minimized by obtaining the Least Square estimator of w, from the regression:
where 15)
v;«As*-/,- Xk^ Fk-!-  ir - i....M
which, rearranging terms Is equal to (4), but with actual exchange rate changes replacing
the market forecast.
Allen & Taylor (1989) show that In the foreign exchange market the recent past 
Influences the current forecast more than distant periods. Thus, we will consider that the 
memory of the market Is short and most recent observations carry more weight In the 
determination of the current forecast. This idea can be grasped with a Discounted Least 
Square (DLS) estimator, which updates the weight of the estimator according to the 
following expression3:
G m_________ (6)
The estimator has been expressed In recursive form for latter convenience, where 
the term G, is the recursive gain (see Harvey (1981).ch.7). The parameter X Is the discount
3- This type of estimation b a particular case of Generalized Least Square, and the estimator is unbiased and 
efficient (see Harvey (1981).
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factor; the lower X, the more weight Is carried by the most recent past and the faster 
expectations are updated (X=J, In the ordinary least squares case).
Thus, the optimal rule Is simply a DLS updating rule of the parameter w. derived 
from minimizing the past forecast errors. The model which has performed better In the 
recent past will gain weight In the current period forecast and vlceversa.
Finally, as we Indicated above, structural knowledge of the economy Is Incomplete 
and the market Ignores the 'true' process governing the exchange rate, which we 
approximate In discrete time by:
s,«sM+6As£,nv (7j
v-NQO.a}
This can be Interpreted as a random walk with a drift which depends linearly on 
market expectations (we go Into greater detail on the interpretation of the parameter e 
below). This disparity between the 'true' process and the interpretation of the realizations 
of the process by the market provides the driving force for the model dynamics.
Divergence and conflicting expectations
We assume that the equilibrium exchange rate (5) follows a random walk (that is 
the discrete time version of a Brownian motion) with drift ji. such that In each period It 
diverges from the central parity at an expected rate equal to n:
e r M O ,cf) (8)
Recalling that the equilibrium exchange rate Is given by PPP and denoting the log 
of domestic and foreign prices by p  and p .  respectively, where 'foreign' can be 
Interpreted as an average of the member countries of the zone, it follows Immediately 
that the drift In the equilibrium exchange rate Is equal to the expected Inflation differential 
(jt-n)® between the countries:
5 * p - p *  => A S » A p -A p * *7 t -J t ‘ ; E C A s j^ K n - 'r t ')®  ^
Therefore, we can treat the drift of the process for the equilibrium exchange rate, 
ji. as a measure of divergence between the economies.
Figure 1 compares the expectations generated by both models In a target zone 
with a 12% fluctuation band. The unit period adopted is one month, so that the plot 
displays monthly expectations; the exchange rate Is expressed In (log) deviations from the 
central parity, which Is normalised to one (hence. Its log Is equal to zero). Assuming that 
the equilibrium exchange rate Is set equal to the central parity (s=c=0), both types of 
belief predict that the currency depreciates when It is In the lower part of the band and
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Deviations from the central parity
Figure 1 - Exchange rate expectations: Fundamentalists and Instttutionaists.
Fundamentcflsts have linear expectations but. If there exists divergence In the fundamentals, their expectations 
are not constant wtth respect to the position of the exchange rate In the band. Instttuttonafete have non-linear 
expectations which are constant wtth respect to the exchange rate position wtthin the band.
that It appreciates In the upper part of the band.
What happens as fundamentals drift away from the central parity?. If we assume 
a positive drift, the expectation derived from the fundamental beliefs shifts upwards by a 
m agnitude equal to the drift each period, as we can see In figure 1.
On the contrary, for the case of Institutional beliefs, the outcome Is in principle 
ambiguous because they can be seen to be based either on the evolution of 
fundamentals-from (2)- or on the position of the exchange rate In the band -from (3); 
these two mappings are both consistent In the-static setting represented In figure 1.
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However. If the fundamental belief contributes to the exchange rate movements (w>0). 
the mappings become Inconsistent, because the position of the exchange rate In the 
band will not correspond with the current level of fundamentals4.
We assume then that, when forming their Institutional beliefs, agents take Into 
account the position of the exchange rate In the band, which is Immediately observable 
and the level of fundamentals Is only used to form fundamental beliefs: If the exchange 
rate qualitatively behaves within the band as the institutional belief Implies, this assumption 
Is consistent with what agents are observing. Thus, Institutional beliefs are static with 
respect to the position of the exchange rate within the band, as figure 1 displays.
Under these circumstances, while the Institutional belief forecasts an appreciation 
of the currency, the fundamental belief will eventually forecast a further depreciation 
even when It reaches the limit of fluctuation. Consequently, the expectations deriving from 
the different beliefs are not only heterogeneous, but also eventually conflicting; hence, 
one of the models must predict Incorrectly. The potential for conflict cannot be ultimately 
avoided given the establishment of a target zone among economies with diverging 
fundamentals, as the ERM.
Even If the ERM parities approximately corresponded to their equilibrium exchange 
rate at the time they were originally determined, the exchange rate equilibrium has 
subsequently deviated from the central parity over time, provoking misalignments In the 
nominal exchange rate. Furthermore, the ERM has displayed recurrent periods of calm 
which have been Invariably followed by exchange rate crisis and realignments.
The obscure relation between fundamentals and the exchange rate documented 
In chapter two can be Interpreted In the light of our model as the evolution of an 
underlying conflict between the two types of beliefs, where one or another belief has 
dominated the market at any particular moment. The endurance of ERM parities for years 
while fundamentals were stlU diverging can be basically thought of as periods when the 
Institutional belief dominated the market, whereas the turbulent periods preceding 
realignments of Intrinsically weak currencies represent episodes when the market followed 
the fundamental belief. Our analysis will allow us to explore these Issues after the effects 
of Interventions are taken Into account.
4-The parameters which determine the solution to the (nstttuttonal belief underlying model could be updated 
In order to reconcile both mappings. However, the dynamics of the model may be such that long déviations 
of the equltbrium exchange rate correspond to exchange rate equal to the central parity, and, m mb case, 
reasonable parameters cannot be found.
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The signalling e ffe c t o f Interventions
When a  target zone Is established for an exchange rote, there is an assumed 
commitment to defend the band. The effect of interventions on market expectations 
raises the Issue of the sustainability of the exchange rate commitment. We assume that 
the authorities only Intervene a t the edges of the band and that these Interventions are 
Infinitesimal6. In chapter one we discussed the effects of Interventions and reserves on the 
credibility of the target zone; the approach here tries to Incorporate those considerations 
In our specification.
Let 5' be the exchange rate for the next period conditional on no Intervention, and 
t the period when an Intervention Is necessary. Then, when the exchange rate Is driven 
outside the (upper) band (s+ <s\=s,., , t+vt). a sale of reserves (R) will take place to
keep the exchange rate at the edge of the band (S,=s j . For simplicity, we will assume 
that A/?=-(s‘-5j  <0. The effects of this intervention con be considered from three 
perspectives: fundamental beliefs. Institutional beliefs and the overall market expectation.
Fundamental beliefs: expressions (1) and (9) Imply that unsterlllzed interventions 
affect the fundamental belief: the monetary contraction derived from a loss of reserves 
could affect the price level and would consequently push down the equilibrium exchange 
rate, reducing the depreciation expectation arising from the fundamental belief and 
hence easing the pressure on the currency. Despite the appeal of Introducing a more 
formal intervention-sterillzatlon framework into the model, we will assume In this paper that 
interventions are sterilized to emphasize the role of expectations. This being the case, the 
authorities only intervene when it is necessary (marginal Interventions) and rely completely 
on the signalling effect of Interventions to manage the exchange rate within the band, 
so that fundamental beliefs are not affected.
Institutional beliefs already account for the expectation that the authorities will 
Intervene at the edge of the band when producing forecasts. Therefore, the signalling 
effect of Interventions Is automatically Incorporated Into the target zone model and It 
generates the characteristic non-linear relationship displayed In Figure 1. Since by 
definition. Institutional beliefs always attach perfect credibility to the band, effective 
interventions do not affect their expectations, either.
S-Thts Is me assumption underlying the basic tcrget-zone model which determines Institutional beliefs, ft Is 
straightforward to Introduce Inlramarglnal Interventions. We already know that the result would be a higher slope 
of the institutional beliefs curve and therefore a higher stabflizir^ effect on the target zones. However, It would
also Imply a larger drain of reserves.
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Market expectations are on the contrary conceivably affected by Interventions 
and we have to devise a method so as to Incorporate them Into the model.
We saw In chapter one that interventions may send two conflicting signals to the 
market: on the one hand, when the band is put under strain and It is successfully 
defended, ft is reasonable to think that the authorities will gain credibility (a positive 
signal); on the other hand. Interventions erode the stock of reserves of the Central Bank 
and the ability of the authorities to defend the band In successive periods of pressure. 
Furthermore, the recurrence of Interventions may alert the market to the future viability of 
the zone and consequently about Its eventual sustainability; both factors send negative 
signals to the market.
Thus, the question to settle Is which type of belief will gain dominance when an 
Intervention takes place. In other words, how Interventions affect the dynamics of wt. 
given that a  net negative signal will presumably be reflected In a larger weight of the 
fundamental belief In the market, and vlceversa. We Introduce the following mechanism 
to account for this Intuition.
According to the updating mechanism of the model In (6). It can be observed that 
the effective  exchange rate change a s , s h o u l d  be used In the next period's 
estimation of the weights. This would Imply taking fully Into account the positive signal 
derived from Intervention. At the other extreme. If the Intervention had been dismissed by 
the market, the updating would be made as If no Intervention had been carried out: 
As‘t=s‘-s,.,. The signalling effect of Interventions Is then easily Incorporated into the model 
taking these two options as extreme cases, and modifying the exchange rate change 
which effectively enters Into the updating process (As") in the following way:
A S,’**A S, -'YrA/?t«(S. -St_,)+Y,(S,* -O  1101
where Qsye 1 is an Increasing function of the number of Interventions:
y=(**R- /;/f/A/?+1)
where /A R Is the number of Interventions. This specification captures the Intuition that 
highest positive signal Is obtained with the first Intervention, and it decreases thereafter:
#A/?=1 7=0 => As -s ,.,
#  A/?->ao => Y-> 1 => AS -St_,
At the first Intervention, the market takes fully into account the Intervention; whilst, 
at the limit the market will update as If there would have been no intervention at all. This 
mechanism conveys the Intuition that the negative Influence given by the drain of 
reserves eventually offsets the positive signal derived from a successful defence of the 
band.
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H-MATHEMATfCAL ANALYSIS
The aim of the model outlined above Is to explore the dynamics of the exchange 
rate In a  target zone system, where the Interaction between different and eventually 
conflicting beliefs In the market determines the evolution of the exchange rate. This 
section explores, as far as possible, the characteristics and restrictions of our model from 
a  mathematical point of view and the next section relies on a simulation analysis to 
overcome the limitations of the mathematical approach.
Some restrictions are necessary to obtain explicit results from the mathematical 
analysis. In particular, we constrain the range of exchange rate fluctuation to explore to 
the upper part of the band (s>c) and to overvalued exchange rates (5 > s)4. These are 
not strong assumptions: on the one hand, for positive drifts, below the central parity 
fundamental expectations drag the exchange rate towards the upper band, whereas 
Institutional expectations pull It towards the central parity, so that both forces are upwards 
and the exchange rate Is expected to remain In the upper part of the band; on the other 
hand. If the exchange rate depreciates above Its equilibrium level, both beliefs anticipate 
an appreciation. With these conditions. It follows that
Vf. F^OJ^O -> Xf>0.G,>0.
The model can be expressed as a system of four difference equations, governing 
the market expectation sM, the weight attributed to fundamental beliefs, w. the equilibrium 
exchange rate 5 and the effective exchange rate. s. The latter equation Is redundant and 
the dynamics of S are exogenous: therefore after solving for / In equation (4) and 
substituting terms In (6), this can be seen as a system of two difference equations with a 
forced motion conveyed In (8). Only In the cases In which Interventions are necessary, the 
mechanism which appears In equation (10) substitutes the effective exchange rate
6 W© atso assume In what follows that *-0 . i.e the process for the fundamentals fc deterministic and. unless 
otherwise stated, that v-O too. Rnatty, 1(00*0 < fj which Is orVy the case when the process assumed for the 
fundamentcist Is drtftless. These assumptions do not change the qudrtattve resufts of the analysis, but screes us 
from compicated notation of minor order terms.
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change. We con then write:
A sX .^w frO  - W)l, m
G,((e-l)(As£,+v,)). Vs,<s. (6')
(80
From (6') we can see that, for the system to have endogenous dynamics, l.e: 
dynamics which do not depend on the stochastic terms. It Is necessary that 9 Is different 
from one, otherwise ia' would be constant. The parameter e can be Interpreted as follows; 
there exists a group of agents who do not contemplate any particular model, but who 
follow the mood of the market, represented by the market expectation (and consequently 
does not participate In forming such expectation).
Slmilart kinds of behaviour have recently received much attention In the literature, 
under different names (stop-loss traders, chartists, noise traders, etc). The Important point 
to make Is that Its Implies that the structural models' forecast overshoot. We will then 
assume that 8 Is larger than one but the magnitude of such noise trading Is unknown by 
the market when forming expectations and this gap of knowledge Is crucial In the 
generation of exchange rate dynamics.
We can then think of the model as a system of recursive difference equations in 
which changes In the exchange rate Imply changes In the same direction In the weights 
(intuitively, when the exchange rate depreciates, the fundamental belief gains weight, 
because the institutional belief Is predicting less well). However, the opposite does not 
necessarily hold, see equation (14) below. This 'asymmetry', along with the forced motion 
component in the equilibrium exchange rate process, generates the complex dynamics 
of the model.
Nevertheless, we can still characterise central aspects of the dynamic behaviour 
of the model. First, we study the stability of the solutions, then we obtain a sufficient 
condition for the collapse of the zone and finally some Indicative results on the dynamics 
ore worked out.
Solutions and stability
The recursive structure of the model Implies that stationary points for s (S) are also 
stationary points for w (W). We can concentrate on the solution for the weights. From (4'):
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Us) Us)
_ _ _ _ _ _  s  — (1 1 )
p(£(sM)-s,)-/($,)
The value of this solution largely depends on two factors: norvllnearly on the 
position of the exchange rate In the band and on the equilibrium exchange value, which 
Is In turn a  function of time. The complexity of the system makes It unfeasible to find a 
general closed form solution unfeasible. Nonetheless, since the values of the weights are 
bounded between zero and one an Important question to Investigate Is whether the 
process win converge to those points and. In this case, whether these are stable solutions. 
It follows Immediately that W=0 ( -*S=c=0) and W= 1 (~>S=5) do constitute solutions to the 
system. In fact, they correspond to the phase planes displayed In figure 1.
The critical question Is whether these solutions are stable. Taking the total differential 
to the expression above, where dS/dt=y; dt/dt=  7; ds/dt=v, (note that disturbances are now 
being considered), we obtain:
Therefore, when there Is a positive disturbance at W=0 the system will follow an 
unstable trajectory, since the Increase In w  wHI provoke an exchange rate depreciation 
Of 5>s) and this will translate In a further increase In w. and so on. The Inverse process 
occurs for W= 1 when the disturbance Is larger than the drift In the fundamentals.
Relaxing the assumptions used In this analysis O.e. no disturbances In the equilibrium 
exchange rate, no drift Implied In Institutional belief) adds complexity to the above 
expressions but does not change the conclusion, which Is that the system Is potentially 
unstable at the extreme market beliefs.
Sustainability o f the target zone and collapse condition
The second Issue to explore Is the potential for collapse of the target zone or, in 
other words, the sustainability of the band. The eventual collapse of the band is provoked 
by the persistence of market expectations which drive the exchange rate outside the 
band. This depends on the behaviour of the system at the edges of the band. Let us 
retake the previous discussion on Intervention and assume again that the exchange rate
d W ^ + ï ^ .  »/A-1 /(S)(pOi/-vp-/'s(p(M t-S)) 
as aS
AHp(u t-S)-l(S))2
Let us now evaluate the sign of these derivatives at the solutions
(12)
put
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increases and eventually the edge of the target zone band is breached at some time t. 
so that a Central Bank Intervention Is necessary to defend the band. From (4). next 
period's change In the market expectation Is:
A$X.i *Asx.Kx+Awx,JF x-l(sJ)+wtAF'X.}+(] - w j  A/tt.,;
This expression has no definite sign. When it is negative the exchange rate returns 
to the band with no further Intervention. However, when this expression Is positive, a 
second consecutive Intervention will be necessary to keep the exchange rate at the edge 
of the band. Since AFf,, ~0AIX.,=0 and lx.,=l(sj. updating (13) for the period of the second 
intervention simplifies to:
ASt“  t.2xA S,” , +A w t<]t,2{Fi<1 ~/(S j} (14J
The sign of this expression only depends on the change In the weight (the rest of 
the terms are positive). Consequently, a sufficient condition for (14) to be positive Is that 
A w „,„j20 . The sign Is determined from (6 ''): while the gain G Is positive, the term In 
brackets may be negative. Ignoring the stochastic term, and taking Into account that 
stW=s,, this term simplifies to (y-l/QXs-sJ so that a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive Increase In the weight In the period is that
When that Is the case the market will expect further depreciations. More 
Importantly, since y Is an Increasing function of the number of Interventions, the above 
condition for Increasing weights verifies thereafter ( / / & < ? „ , 7 ) .  so that additional 
Interventions are required for the band to be defended. Given the dynamics of the 
system, these new Interventions drain the stock of reserves but are unable to reverse the 
expectations of the market. At this point, the band will be perceived as not sustainable 
and Institutional beliefs will swiftly be abandoned, precipitating the realignment.
This sufficient condition for collapse may seem quite complicated, but actually we 
can restate It in a simple practical rule:
COLLAPSE CONDITION
For 7/9<y„,<7 and positive misalignments (5-s >0) the target zone will collapse 
when two consecutive interventions ate necessary. I.e. when the exchange rate does 
no t return to the interior o f the band after one Intervention.
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Fixed points
Up to this point we have shown that the system Is potentially unstable and under 
certain circumstances, it may collapse. In this sub-section we aim at getting some 
understanding on the complex dynamics of the model by exploring the characteristic of 
the fixed points and dynamic mappings of the exchange rate (s) and weight (W).
Figure 2.a,b maps the current value on the future value of $ and w, respectively, 
obtained from expressions (4,6). Each line represents the corresponding mapping for given 
values of wand s respectively. This analysis is merely Indicative and we have made several 
simplifications, such as keeping the gain and the equilibrium exchange rate fixed ( i = 10% 
larger than the upper limit of fluctuation) and dismissing the effect of Interventions on the 
mapping. The Intersection of the lines with the 45’ line represents a fixed or equilibrium 
point of the mapping. Observe that the different equilibrium points are stable for the 
mapping ($,s.+,), although for high values of w  the equilibria are beyond the target zone. 
On the contrary, the equilibrium points are unstable for the mapping (w, ,wM).
This Is a partial picture of the system dynamics, since It lacks the link between the 
dynamics for the exchange rate and the dynamics for the weights. As a matter of fact, 
the evolution of the system makes the mapping switch between both curves In figure 2, 
so that the actual mapping Is obtained by Joining points between different lines. We use 
this intuition to draw a non-collapse (N O  and a collapse (O  trajectory In the 
mapping which highlights the sort of dynamics expected In the model and sums up the 
results obtained In this section. In principle, the non collapse trajectory differs from the 
collapse path only In the magnitude of the perturbation, vc>v*c. but the difference In the 
outcome Is dramatic. In the latter case, the exchange rate reaches the upper limit above 
the 45' line and this generates an Intervention spiral which causes the band to collapse.
The analysis carried out in this section has provided useful insights on the workings 
of the model, but It Is constrained by the complexity of this non-linear dynamic system. The 
chaotic feature above suggests that the outcomes are dependent on the magnitude and 
distribution of the shocks. We turn next to a simulation analysis. In which exchange rate 
trajectories are generated In order to fully Investigate the characteristics of the model.
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lll-THE DYNAMIC HONEYMOON EFFECT
The forma! evaluation of the model does not show how the honeymoon effect Is 
projected In time. By simulating exchange rate trajectories, we Intend to characterize the 
evolving divergence between the exchange rate and the fundamentals. We will also be 
able to show that the conflict derived from the coexistence of a target*zone and an 
increasing exchange rate misalignment (overvaluation) culminates In the eventual 
collapse of the target zone. Since this conflict arises from the existence of divergences In 
the process driving the equilibrium exchange rate, the drift parameter y becomes 
essential. Thus, we will analyse the outcome for different drifts In the equilibrium exchange 
rate process.
Exchange rate trajectories
We Intend to generate exchange rate trajectories that have similar characteristics 
to the recent ERM experience: a pattern of quiet and turbulent periods, periodic 
interventions by the authorities and realignments. These features depend on the values 
assigned to the parameters, so they will be chosen accordingly- In the previous section, 
some restrictions on the parameters were suggested, and to these we have added other 
principles In the choice of parameters. First, the white noise terms (v,e) are chosen to have 
a low variance, such that they do not dominate the drift In the fundamentals and they 
Introduce low 'a  prlorf volatility In the exchange rate; secondly, the weights and the 
exchange rate should be allowed to vary widely In time, so as to generate the required 
features mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph7.
The Initial setting Is the following: a 12% fluctuation band with respect to the 
exchange rate central parity c Is established between two countries. The central parity Is
7-<Stven these considerations, we have chosen as benchmark parameters for the stmutatkxi
Cf*0. Q5fj; o,*0.006; p»0.5 0» 10; X*0.8 
Abo note that, given the function for y. the sufficient condition for collapse holds from the out start.
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set equal to the equilibrium exchange rate at the starting period (t=0). We also assume 
that the exchange rate fulfills Its Initial equilibrium condition (s^o S ^  /). Finally, the market 
Is assumed to initially maintain fundamental beliefs A positive drift is assumed, so
Inflation rates differentials are positive. Inducing an upward trajectory In the equilibrium 
exchange rate process. We take one month as unit of time so that all plots refer to 
monthly observations.
With these Initial conditions and for the chosen parameters, exchange rate 
trajectories can be generated from the model. We will first consider one simulation to 
explain how the model works and then we will replicate the process one thousand times 
In order to Infer more robust conclusions.
Figure 3.a displays one realization of the exchange rate trajectory, where the 
equilibrium exchange rate (S) Is driven by a drift equal to 1% per year. Although the 
equilibrium exchange rate eventually exceeds the upper band, the target zone lasts much 
longer before It collapses (162 Instead of 75 periods). We can see that periods of calm 
and turbulence alternate In the exchange rate, while the misalignment (5-5) tends to 
widen. This trajectory can be explained by Fig 3.b. The solid line represents the relative 
weight given to fundamental beliefs by the market (w. the Institutional weight is i-w); the 
dashed line and the asterisks display the evolution of fundamental and Institutional beliefs, 
respectively. The relative weight assigned to each type of belief by the market evolves In 
time. When the market 'goes Institutional' the exchange rate remains close to the central 
parity, but It can be seen that there are periods In which fundamental beliefs gain 
strength In the market and the exchange rate depreciates.
The mognltude of such a depreciation is determined by equation (4). Nevertheless, 
figure 3 Illustrates a remarkable feature: the relative weight of fundamental beliefs tends 
to decrease, but In spite of this, the exchange rate Jumps to Its fluctuation limit with small 
Increases In w.
The resolution to this apparent paradox can be found considering the size of the 
misalignment (5 - s). On the one hand, as the misalignment Increases, market expectations 
have decreasing effects on the weight attached to fundamental beliefs; or, more 
Intuitively, as fundamental beliefs depart from the actual exchange rate evolution, they 
tend to lose appeal In the market. On the other hand, large misalignments imply that small 
Increases In the weight given to the fundamental beliefs can cause large exchange rate 
depreciations. Notice that this Is precisely the Interpretation of the realignment risk we 
gave In the last section of chapter two. We will return to this point when we relate the 
results of the models to the credibility of the target zone.
The conflict and Interaction between both types of expectations Is the crucial Fig
97
Port t-Modefc 3-A Dyr>am*c Model of Target Zones
EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Drift -  1%
Tims (months)
EXCHANGE RATE PATH; drift -  1%
Time (months)
Fig 3 .a fb-£xchange rate trajectories simulated by the model. The upper graphs display the trajectories of the 
equilibrium (5) and effective (s) exchange rates. The lower graph presents the evolution of fundamental (f) and 
Institutional (/) beWefs In that period with the trajectories of the weights
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FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS EXPECTATIONS
Deviations from the central parity
INSTITUTIONAL BEUEFS EXPECTATIONS
Deviations from the central parity
Fig 3.C,d-Exchange rate expectation wtth respect to the position of the exchange rate In the band
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feature of the model. Further Insight on how the conflict of beliefs determines the 
outcomecan be obtained from Figures 3.c and 3.d, which display the expectations for 
both types of beliefs derived from the model with respect to the position of the exchange 
rate In the band. As pointed out above, while the Institutional beliefs lead to an 
expectation which Is constant relative to the position of the exchange rate In the band 
(Fig. 3.d), the phase diagram of the fundamental beliefs show the divergence In time (the 
line In 3.c follows an upwards spiral trajectory). Once the equilibrium exchange rate has 
exceeded the upper limit of fluctuation, the exchange rate may be driven above the 
band and an Intervention Is necessary*. The target zone finally collapses (when our 
collapse condition Is fulfilled), and the exchange rate equilibrium Is reestablished In the 
form of a realignment (S=c).
The main Implication of the model can now be advanced: despite the underlying 
potential for collapse, the realignment only takes place long time after the equilibrium 
exchange rate surpasses the upper band. Hence, the zone allows a wide divergence 
between the level of fundamentals (embedded In S) and the effective exchange rate 
which Is reflected In the exchange rate misalignment. This divergence can be seen as a  
dynamic version of the honeymoon effect stressed In the target zone literature. It has two 
different dimensions, since it can be measured both In magnitude by the size of the 
misalignment and duration by the time Interval between the equilibrium exchange rate 
surpassing the band and the realignment.
Degree o f divergence and collapse of the band
The timing of the collapse, given the rest of parameters, essentially depends on the 
magnitude of the drift. Furthermore, we have Intuitively shown above that slightly different 
disturbances may lead to completely different outcomes. The working of the model has 
been explained with the help of one particular realization of the model, whose results 
cannot be readily generalized.
In order to draw more robust conclusions, one thousand (D=1000) simulations of 
the model have been mode for a wide range of drifts (0.2 % < <5%). Figure 4 and Table 
1 summarize the results of these simulations. Plots In Figure 4 display the period of collapse 
histograms, for selected drifts. In the first place. It Is remarkable that the distributions are 
not normal and become Increasingly skewed to the left, suggesting ogain the chaotic 
nature of the model. Looking at the table we can see that both for the first Intervention
*-We define attack» as episodes of strain for the band In which Interventions are necessary; each attack may 
last several periods. In the particular draw shown the graphs, no attack can be sustained by the target zone.
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distribution (i.e. when the exchange rate reaches for the first time the upper limit of 
theband) and for the collapse distribution, »he statistical tests reject the hypothesis of 
symmetry and normality for the distributions. We can also Identify the existence of several 
peaks In the distributions, and some of them are bimodal. in these latter cases, the reason 
is the existence of one or more sustained attacks, which spread out the distribution and 
generate the possibility of large outliers on the right of the distributions; these outliers Imply 
that, when the target zone resists more than one or two attacks, the collapse time Is 
postponed considerably In time (see range for the collapse time In the table). Looking at 
the table, we can also observe that the mean of number of attocks sustained Is lower 
than one and the mode Is zero for all the drifts, although Its range Is wide.
These are general results derived from the simulations. Further Inference regarding 
the effect of different drifts have to be made within the appropriate framework for 
hypothesis testing. The resulting non-normal distributions prevents us from using the central 
moments for Inference. Actually, although the mean of the distributions Is very close to the 
median (see table), the standard deviation can be misleading. Having the empirical 
distributions gives us the chance to make Inference on them directly. Instead’ .
Figure 5.a shows the mean, median and fifth quantlle of the collapse time 
distribution. Figure 5,b gives us an equivalent picture, but relative to the 'a priori' collapse 
time (denoted by APCT) defined as the period in which the equilibrium exchange rate Is 
expected to break through the band, that Is. when It reaches the upper limit of fluctuation 
( s j . Since the expected value of the equilibrium exchange rate per period Is given by the 
drift \i. this Is simply given by:
APCT=sJfj
This value appears In the first entry of the table. In the former figure, we can see 
that the collapse time decreases with the size of the drift, as expected. From the table, 
we can also see that the first intervention and the mean for the number of attacks follow 
the same pattern.
Figure 5,b tells us about the length of the honeymoon effect, defined as the ratio 
between the corresponding values of the simulations (median,fifth and tenth quantlles) 
and the respective APCT,  It suggests that the length of the honeymoon effect tends to 
decrease with higher drifts. The hypothesis of a significative spell In the honeymoon Is also 
shown In the graphs (see footnote 8): the spell turns out to be signiflcatively different from 
zero for all the drifts, but for \i=4.7%,5%.. at a 90% significance level, and for drifts smaller
’ -For any nuM hypothesis to test. It w* be rejected at, for Instance. 95% siyilflcance level. If the 95% of the 
distribution does not comply wtth the hypothesis. Hence, the nul hypothesis In Rgure 5. 'apriori' collapse «me
-  Qtlecttve cotapse time . Is tested by obtaining the fifth quantUe of the colaps® distribution tf that vaiue Is 
h l^er than the 'a  priori' coKapse time, the nu* hypothesis is rejected
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MEAN AND MEDIAN FOR THE COLLAPSE TIME
Dnft (X)
Fig 5.0-Coiapse time for different drifts. The fifth quantSe represents the 95% significance level
Fig 5.l>The figure shows the ratio between the respective statistics of the collapse distribution and the 'a priori1 
collapse time. I.e. the expected collapse when Institutional beliefs play no role
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than 4,5% for a significance level of 95%.
What about the magnitude of the dynamic honeymoon effect?. Given the process 
for the equilibrium exchange rate and the stochastic terms, we can derive a direct link 
between spell and magnitude, such that the previous Inference is also valid for the 
magnitude10. The difference between this equilibrium exchange rate at the time of 
collapse and the upper part of the band measures the magnitude of the effect. The 
median values of the magnitude of the honeymoon effect appear In the last column of 
the table, where we can see that It decreases with the size of the drift.
,0-Substituting In the above expression the effective colapse time for APCT, and solving for the exchange 
rate (s Instead of sj. the expected equWbrium exchange rate at the collapse ttne Is obtained.
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IV-PESO PROBLEMS, CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION
Up to this point, we have Just described the numerical results of the model. The 
outcom e could shed some additional light on the reasons for the empirical failure of 
target zone models. We can observe In figure 6 how the simulated behaviour of our 
heterogeneous beliefs target-zone model differs from the behaviour of the basic model.
Figure 6 shows the scatterpiot of the effective exchange rate changes with respect 
to the position of the exchange rate in the band for the example we have considered 
throughout the chapter. In chapter two we have used this relationship (using Interest rate 
differentials to approximate the exchange rate changes) to test (and reject) the basic 
target-zone hypothesis. Looking at the graph and comparing It with the Institutional beliefs. 
It would be difficult not to reject the target zone hypothesis. The co-existence of two 
models Interacting In the foreign exchange market disturbs the basic target-zone 
relationship.
Let us Imagine, for Instance, an analyst attempting to test the target zone model 
on a  data sample generated by our model, where a realignment has not yet occurred. 
Let us recall that Institutional beliefs rest upon the assumption of a perfectly credible target 
zone. Since the curve representing Institutional expectations has a negative slope, we 
have observed In chapter two that the simplest way to test the hypothesis of a credible 
target zone formally would be to estimate the regression Astlr,=a*bs,t- ^  and to test for 
b  having a negative sign.
This test, performed on our simulated data rejected the hypothesis In 61% of the 
replications” . The analyst would then explore the reasons for this rejection; following the 
literature reviewed In chapter two. he would probably point out that there exists a 
realignment risk Implied In the expectations.
This realignment risk Is explicitly derived In our model from the existence of two 
different (and conflicting) perceptions regarding the exchange rate behaviour, which 
break the theoretical relation derived from either one of the models. Let us recall again 
the conditional expectation expression In (1.12), from where the expression for a
1 '-Mcxe precisely the Mest on the significance of parameter b has been applied correcting the residuals 
with the Newey-West method to have Into account error autocorrelation (see section two of chapter two).
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EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE VARIATIONS
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Fig 7-The figure shows the ratio between the respective statistics of the cottapse distribution and the a priori' 
coHapse time. I.e. the expected cottapse when Institutional beliefs play no rote
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realignment risk was subsequently derived In the second chapter. In our model two 
outcomes are also possible;
-that the system prevails or
-that a realignment comes about.
The market assigns a probability ( 1-w.w , respectively) to each of these events. 
Therefore, expression (4) Is equivalent to (1.12) and (2.5) as we have already underlined:
*CO(ASf M I nowa^vTwoP"*"^ I motgnrr»n^m^ f Cl5)
From here, the realignment risk (c ,) Is given by the divergences between market 
expectations and Institutional beliefs:
c, =w,(Ft-lt) (16)
and w  can be Interpreted not only as the weight of the fundamental beliefs but also as 
the probability of a realignment (when the equilibrium exchange rate surpasses the band).
Expression (15) reflects the existence of a peso problem In the data (Krasker (1980), 
Obstfeld(1987), Lizondo (1983)). We already mentioned this possibility when explaining the 
failure of the empirical evidence In chapter two. Now the same Interpretation can be 
applied to our model. Recall that If during the period under study there has been no 
realignment (that Is, the event has not occurred) but that possibility affects expectations 
(and forward exchange rates) In the form of a realignment risk, the data will show 
anomalies, with respect to the target zone hypothesis. These anomalies as we have seen 
In the test on our simulated data consist of the presence of a unit root which lead us to 
reject the target zone hypothesis.
Underlying the peso problem then Is the problem of the Imperfect credibility of the 
target zone. We are now going to see how credibility evolves endogenously In the model 
and Is affected by the evolution of the fundamentals, as Bertola & Caballero (1993) 
suggest.
Credibility and reputation
The above expression has also been used by Cuklerman & Metzler (1986) In a 
different context to define the average credibility (AC) of a monetary announcements. 
AC  can be defined as the difference between the expectation derived from the 
announcement and the expectation which the market effectively holds. In our setup, the 
former Is evidently given by the institutional beliefs, which represent the case of a perfectly 
credible target zone. Therefore!. It Is straightforward to show that the average credibility 
Is Just equal to the realignment risk defined In (16):
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AC,-AS“  f,, j_/f —W^Ff-lf) (16')
The smaller A C  the higher the credibility of the announcement. The monetary 
announcement In our context Is the target zone. The announcement Is only perfectly 
credible In the periods when Institutional beliefs dominate the market (w=0) and the 
average credibility Is zero. Figure 7 shows w  and AC. The plot suggests that the model 
endogenously generates dramatic changes In the credibility of the target zone.
At this point. It Is Important to consider the distinction between credibility and 
reputation which Weber (1990) makes. Reputation can be seen as a stock variable which 
is determined by the evolution of the system, and It Interacts with the credibility of the 
system which evolves as a flow. We are now In the position to show the feedback 
between both elements.
In our model, the parameter driving the credibility of the regime Is the weight w. 
whose dynamics are determined by equation (6‘). The gain G, In that expression contains 
Information about the past performance of the model. In particular on the expectations
generated by both beliefs In the past (recall that X^ =F*-/k. k = l.... t-1). Consequently, there
may exist a link between the gain and the reputation of the system. Indeed. On the one 
hand, the gain Is a positive term which determines the loss of credibility induced by 
exchange rate shocks; the larger the gain, the larger loss of credibility In the face of a 
shock, since from (6'):
dAw/dv=G(d-1)>0 -> AC>0
On the other hand. If we take the derivative of the gain with respect to the 
exchange rate misalignment, we can show that the gain decreases with the size of the 
misalignment:
dG .pO S-X2) ^
¡K s -s )  (X L + X * )2 j l T j
XM-*X2<X2
From the first result. It follows that the marginal credibility loss Increases with the size 
of the gain. The second result Implies that the gain is reduced with the size of the 
misalignment. Hence, considering both results together, the larger the misalignment the 
smaller the marginal loss of credibility. This outcome Is consistent with the trajectories of our 
simulations, where It Is observed that the model generates widening realignments; the foct 
that the target zone survives with widening realignments should strengthen the credibility 
of the system and this Is reflected in a downward trend of w  in figure 7.
The two previous expressions provide us with the elements to define a measure of
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reputation. The most suitable candidate is the Inverse of the gam G \. since a small gain 
derived from a large misalignment Is the observable measure of a high reputation12.
The feedback between credibility and reputation Is now apparent from figure 7, 
where the Increases In w  are Inversely related to the degree of reputation ((?',). The 
opposite feedback can also be Identified In the plot: losses In credibility erode the 
reputation of.the system, because larger values of w  are associated with narrowing 
misalignments, which. In turn. Increase the value of the gain.
Several points are Important to stress. Firstly, the concepts of credibility and 
reputation just presented are defined with respect to the relative performance of both 
models, such that the credibility and reputation of the target zone (with respect to the 
fundamental beliefs) will be high as long as the expectations are conflicting. Secondly, the 
results above show that the mognltude and spell of the dynamic honeymoon effect tend 
to decrease with larger drifts; the reason Is that large drifts make the equilibrium exchange 
rate diverge more rapidly. Inhibiting the cumulation of enough reputation to postpone 
further the time of collapse.
Finally, we can rephrase the mechanics of collapse In the model In the light of this 
definition of reputation. Since, from (6) perfect reputation (G^O) Is not attainable; this 
Implies that w  may suddenly Jump and. more Importantly, that the danger of collapse Is 
always present even In systems with high reputation.
The smooth divergence In the fundamentals Implies then that the expected size of 
reallgment Increases with time. Therefore, when w jumps and the misalignment Is large the 
exchange rate may be driven outside the band, even though the Jumps tend to be 
smaller due to the accumulated reputation.
,2-Thts Inverse relation between reputation and the value of the gain is equivalent to the Interpretation given 
In Basar & Salmon (1969), where our concepts correspond their to mfomxjttan-credtolllty and Kalman gam, 
respecttvely. Furtherm ore, deriving the gain with respect to the discounting paameter dG/cA.<0, we obtain a 
positive relationship between sluggishness in the adjustment of expectations ( M and reputation, which abo 
confirms their results.
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V-CONCL USIONS
This chapter has offered a rationalization of the evolution and collapse of 
a target zone regime with divergences In the fundamentals. Note that the Intuitive 
explanation of chapter two regarding the sustainability of the target zone follows almost 
word for word the Interpretation of the model given In the previous paragraphs. Therefore, 
the schizophrenic role of the fundamentals, to which we referred In the conclusions of the 
previous chapter has been explained by a formal model of target zones: on the one 
hand, the fundamentals determine the collapse of the target zone, due to the large 
expected size of realignment which Is accumulated: on the other hand, they allow for the 
accumulation of reputation and credibility. These two opposing forces generate the rich 
dynamics of the model. All In all. the exchange rate misalignment is the decisive factor 
for the collapse of the zone even If the system enjoys high reputation.
The main Insight Is that a target zone generates a dynamic honeymoon effect, that 
Is. the target zone may last for a long time despite divergences In the fundamentals and 
even endure attacks against the parities, thanks to the accumulated reputation. However, 
this short run success Is eventually challenged by the existence of sufficiently large 
exchange rate misalignments. The overall result Is a honeymoon effect which abruptly 
vanishes.
Thus, the model highlights the existence of a perverse self-defeating mechanism 
built Into a  target zone between divergent economies and underlines the Internal 
Inconsistency of exchange rate pegs: the exchange rate misalignment which the target 
zone Itself generates becomes the ultimate cause for the collapse of the system. This 
comes about due to the existence of a continuous clash between backward looking 
expectations, which sustain the credibility of the zone, and forward looking expectations 
which foresee the return of the exchange rate to Its equilibrium level.
The simultaneous accumulation of both reputation and future Instability seems to 
have been neglected by policy makers, who Instead enjoyed the vision of a secure path 
to Monetary Union. The 'new EMS' developed a high reputation prlior to 1992, In the face
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of the targe misalignments of the MgOlnflotlon currencies. The existing parities were 
credible because the market tended to hold an Institutional view which was self-sustaining 
and avoided tensions. When diverse shocks hit the system, its credibility and the 
reputational gains were eroded and the market Judged that the parities were 
unsustainable, provoking the speculative attacks that followed.
This paper could be contemplated as a contribution to the current debate on the 
future of the European Monetary System. It subscribes to the view that a rigid target zone 
regime In a  world of Integrated financial markets faces Important problems In the 
presence of divergences In the economies; although the system can deliver stability for 
a long time and even contribute to the convergence of the economies (as we will see 
in next chapter), exchange rate dlsequlllbrla are simultaneously built up and this leads to 
the eventual collapse of the target zone.
In our opinion, the direct Implication of this Intrinsic Instability Is the need for a 
¡ eform of the system, which renders It more In line with the behaviour of the fundamentals 
and. as a consequence, more stable. Notwithstanding this, the current specification of 
the model does not allow us to consider the issues of design adequately, because the 
fate of the target zone Is predetermined. Only If the target zone becomes an Instrument 
of convergence might collapse be avoided.
The consideration of convergence requires then a further step: relaxing the 
assumption of a constant drift In the fundamentals. When this is done, we can analyse the 
possibility of convergence In a target zone, that is, the case for a successful exchange 
rate peg. It also allows us to consider alternative and more flexible designs along the lines 
mentioned above. This Is the object of the next chapter.
112
C U m p ^ i r  4
© m w m g ® ñ < s ®  m u d  
Q M W < § > t¡g m m < § >  ¡M ím d te
When there ore divergences In the fundamentóte, the stabilisation argument In 
favour of target zones only holds in the short-run and the model In the previous chapter 
has shown that the cost of maintaining a nominal exchange iate parity today is a sudden 
collapse of the target zone In the future. Given this conclusion regarding the fate of target 
zone systems when persistent divergences exist In the economies, one could reasonably 
wonder what are the advantages of Joining a target zone regime.
The ERM has evolved from a stabilizing device to a disciplinary device. In order to 
force convergence in inflation. In this chapter, we assume that Inflation convergence is 
Indeed the main objective of the authorities who peg their currency to an anchor country 
with no Inflation. The underlying claim of this and the next chapter Is that the exchange 
rate should not be regarded as an objective In Itself, but as an Intermediate target to 
attain other objectives.
In chapter three the drift in the fundamentals, which was equal to the Inflation 
differentials has been taken as exogenous and fixed. Relaxing this assumption allows us 
to consider the possibility of convergence in Inflation differentials. The deflationary effects 
of fixed exchange rates are attained through two channels: discipline In monetary policy 
and deflation through the external position.
If pegging the exchange rate to a strong currency is credible, monetary authorities 
will be able to exploit the reputation ot the foreign Central Bank (the Bundesbank In the 
ERM case). This argument has been exhaustively studied In the literature on international 
policy coordination (see also next chapter). The main problem Is how reputation Is 
attained to make this option credible. The framework of our model does not allow us to 
explore this question In a straightforward way, although In the final section we will Indicate 
extensions to make this possible and then the chapter five we will retake the issue.
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Thus, we will consider the second channel: deflation through external Imbalances. 
The overvaluation of the currency exerts a downward pressure on Inflation due to the 
reduction of the price of Imported goods. This deflationary effect Is stronger, the more 
open is the economy. It only requires a minor modification Into the model which is 
considered In the next two sections.
Once the model allows for convergence, we are able to explore In section III the 
possibility of designing a target zone towards such an objective, extending the analysis 
outlined In Alberola (1995). The recent crisis of the EMS provides the motivation for this 
exercise. We present a proposal to reform the ERM In the transition to the European 
Monetary Union. The proposal supports the adoption of convergence bands Instead of 
the fixed bands of the ERM In order to avoid large misalignments. Convergence bands are 
Implemented through a correction of the central parity and/or the band width to adjust 
for inflation differentials. These corrections should endow the system with sufficient flexibility 
to avoid exchange rate crises derived from the support of unrealistic central parities.
After setting up the framework to consider this proposal, it Is evaluated through two 
different simulation experiments, depending on whether the band Is allowed to narrow or 
not. The outcomes of this simulation establish a ranking between the different alternatives. 
It turns out that there is an Important trade off between flexibility and convergence and 
that the current system of fixed central parity and rigid bands Is not the best alternative 
In general.
The final section of the chapter elaborates further the convergence bands 
proposal and takes Into account other considerations which may change the conclusions. 
In particular, other positive implications that flexible convergence bands may have are 
examined, before being more formally developed In the next chapter.
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l-ENDOGENOUS DRIFT
The first step to consider the possibility of an endogenous drift Is to provide a 
rationale for It. Let us assume without loss of generality that the Inflation of the foreign 
country Is zero (p,'=0. Vt) so that the equilibrium exchange rate is simply equal to the price 
of the domestic goods: S,=pr Therefore. If the domestic country has an Interest In reducing 
Inflation differentials, one beneficial strategy would be to adopt a target zone regime'.
We can demonstrate this claim more formally by expressing the consumer price 
Index (Pc) as a weighted average of the domestic and foreign goods prices:
p >  (l-h )p t+h(s,+p't)
where the parameter h is the share of Imports in the consumer basket and also can be 
seen as a deflator for the economy or the degree of Integration between the economies. 
It Is convenient to rewrite the above expression as follows:
p,c~st-h(sr sp (D
Let us assume on the other hand that wages are fully Indexed to the consumer 
prices2, and this indexation translates Into increases In the price of the domestic good: 
Ap*f=ApcM. Since the expected price Is equal to the expected equilibrium exchange rate, 
taking differences In (1) and substituting, we can obtain an expression for the changes In 
the drift for the fundamentals:
An,«A2 s? *hA(sM -sM) (2)
This expression Is appended now to the original model of heterogenous beliefs to 
study the effects of a target zone on convergence. The rest of the model equations and
’-We Implicitly assume the case of a small country which does not create mflatten problems to the foreign 
country by pegging the currency. As a matter of fact. this Is the view odopted by the literature which has not 
provided yet a plausible reason for the anchor country (Germany) to accept the arrangement The next chapter 
treats both countries on equal baste.
2-Th*s seemln^y Innocuous assumption discards the announcement effects of the target zone on Inflation 
expectations. In any case, there Is little empirical evidence that the EPM has greatty affected Inflation 
expectations (see Glavazzl *  Glovannlnl (1989), Collins (1966)). Such announcement effect and the credbftty 
attached to It Is the Issue of the other dtedpHnary channel of exchange rate pegging. Thus, here the game 
played between the authorities and the prtvate sector Is dfemtesed and the time consistency problem does not 
arise.
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assumptions are carried through to this section. We will see that the existence of a 
dynamic honeymoon effect, reduces the drift In the fundamentals and promotes 
convergence.
Expression (2) could also be expressed In terms of real exchange rate
z=s-(p-p)=$-5
Then, we can see that an overvaluation of the real exchange rate (z<0) exerts a 
deflationary effect through the reduction In the drift. This effect Is more Important the 
higher the share of Imports. The Introduction of a variable drift feedbacks Into the model 
and affects Its dynamics, as w e will explore In detail below.
Entry clause and convergence gains
It Is useful to define more precisely the concept of convergence. First of all, the 
simplicity of the setup precludes any reference to real convergence. We are dealing 
exclusively with nominal convergence on inflation rates, although the deflation Imposed 
by the system Is presumably costly In terms of output. Nevertheless, this approach is in line 
with the philosophy of the Maastricht Treaty, which Ignores the real effects of nominal 
convergence altogether. Therefore, we bypass the conflict of objectives between real 
and nominal targets. I.e. the trade-off between Inflation and unemployment, which may 
arise In the target zone. We will take up this point In the final remarks.
The question to settle Is then whether convergence Is understood in terms of the 
level of prices or In terms of differences, that Is, In terms of inflation. Each Interpretation 
conveys different implications for the behaviour of the exchange rate.
The Maastricht Treaty demands convergence In Inflation rates and the 
m aintenance of the nominal exchange rate In the ERM during the two years prior to the 
Monetary Union. This suggests an Interpretation In terms of differences. However, this has 
Important consequences for the exchange rates and the real economy. In chapter three, 
we observed that If no realignment Is made and Inflation divergences remain, the real 
exchange rate becomes overvalued.
Let us suppose that the countries adopt a common currency when Inflation 
converges but that the equilibrium exchange rate is outside the band and that the 
established conversion is equal to the central parity or any exchange rate within the band 
(in order to avoid one-way bets). This would mean that the domestic country enters the 
union with an overvalued currency, with no possibility to be subsequently corrected by 
'nominal' policy actions.
This unsatisfactory situation Implied by the Maastricht conditions gives rise to the
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problem of a  'last realignment clause': countries with an overvalued currency will go for 
a final realignment that restabllshes their competitive position and this, when recognised 
by the markets, will leave scope for one-way bets, introducing Instability In the last stages 
of the ERM (Glovannlnl (1993). Begg et al. (1991)).
The alternative would be an approach based on convergence In the level of 
fundamentals, whereby not only Inflation rates but also prices levels must have converged 
to Join the Common Currency. This approach Implies a much stronger concept of 
convergence. A period of negative Inflation differentials Is required In this case. In order 
to return the real exchange rate to the central parity or, at least, within the band3.
Here we will follow the Maastricht approach, so that convergence is defined In 
terms of Inflation differentials. We will assume that the domestic country starts with a two 
percent drift (jj=2%) and converges On Inflation) at a speed determined by the share of 
Imports In the consumer basket. When convergence Is achieved, the target zone Is 
substituted by a  common currency.
An entry clause has to be defined for the high Inflation country. Since the inflation 
rate depends on the misalignment and this Is variable. It Is sensible to consider the 
evolution of Inflation over several recent periods, let us say one year. Instead of Just the 
last period. Therefore, a country will be allowed to enter the currency union, when the 
average annual rate of Inflation Is below a certain threshold:
ENTRY CLAUSE
1 „  l3)
** *  V
The entry clause plus the variable drift assumption Introduce the possibility of an 
additional outcome In the model. Now the target zone will either collapse or be finally 
abandoned through the adoption of a common currency4. We can then talk either of 
the failure or success of the target zone strategy. However, this Interpretation might not 
be accurate. In particular. It may be possible that after the collapse not all the 
convergence gains are wiped out. despite the Jump In Inflation that the collapse and the 
consequent return to the equilibrium exchange rate level may Imply.
In order to make this point more clear, let us take the expression for the evolution 
of the drift (2) for all the periods. We can then write:
where the sum of error terms Is expected to be zero, so that we can dismiss It. if the target 
zone collapses at time t. the last line In (4) Is:
3-This ts tfve criterion assumed In AJbefota (1995).
4-ln the stfTHJtatton exercise we w« see that an intermediate outcome Is possible the drift varies around on 
stationary value close to zero and the band does not colapse
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♦ t o t e ,  - s , ) « a  -A i) (n , )+ h (A 5 t - e , ) ;  
H3^ ij+<1 -h)/TA(Sj-^)«<l -h)V i *0  -WKA5,
(4)
(5)
where the last term represents the Jump In the drift In the colopse time. Some of the 
convergence golns will be consolidated If the drift, after the collapse. Is lower than the 
Initial drift, that Is. If vx-(J,<0- From (5) this condition holds If:
The first term Is negative and the second term Is positive, but the sum of both terms 
Is also negative, highlighting that the endurance of the target zone reduce the Inflation 
differentials. However, at the time of collapse the Jump In the drift may reverse this gain. 
In the simulation exercise below we will compute this expression to determine the sign. We 
can say in advance that the overall outcome is the existence of small gains, although 
there are particular realisations In which the result Is positive
-W-'-DJn, (1 ♦ * 5.,-*.,) <0 (6)
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ll-SIMULATING CONVERGENCE PATHS
The analysis carried out In this section Is analogous to that In the previous chapter, 
but with the modified model. The focus of the analysis shifts now from the magnitude of 
the drift to the degree of Integration, represented by h. and from the duration of the band 
to the possibility of convergence.
For simplicity, we will assume In what follows that full convergence In Inflation Is 
required Qi=0) Instead of a divergence of 1,5% which Is contemplated by the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Initial drift Is assumed to be equal to 2% annual Qjo=0.02). so that a sizable 
degree of convergence Is required. We let the process run until the band collapses or the 
entry clause (zero annual Inflation) Is satisfied. Therefore, two different outcomes of the 
model are now possible, since we now recognise the possibility of convergence within the 
target zone regime5. Now we present several examples to Illustrate the possible outcomes.
The first example assumes a closed economy, such that h=0. In order to compare 
these results with the following examples, when the drift Is assumed to be variable. With 
these assumptions, the only change In the dynamics of the model Is given by the drift 
correction equation (3), which Is In tum driven by the degree of Interdependence and the 
size of the misalignment.
Figures 1 .a,b are equivalent to figures 3.a and 8 in chapter three. In figure 1 .a the 
evolution of the equilibrium and effective exchange rates Is shown and In the second the 
evolution of credibility, reputation and the weight of fundamental beliefs are displayed. 
The plot labelled 'b' will be considered In the Interpretation of the results, after the 
replication exercise.
Let us assume now that that the share of Imports h Is equal to 10%. Figures 2.a,b 
display the result of the simulation; they do not greatly differ from the fixed drift case. 
However, an additional line appears In the figure 2.a. which displays the equilibrium 
exchange rate in the case that no convergence was allowed In Inflation. This has to be 
com pared with the dashed line of the effective trajectory of the equilibrium exchange
S-A imlt of periods (I«500) has been Imposed In the simulation This Impdes that thefe may be cases In which 
the system netthef codapses not convefges.
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH Drift = 2 % ; Dcflactor = 0%
Figure 1 .a -Exchange rates trajectories Equilibrium and actual exchange rate
CREDIBILITY & REPUTATION Drift = 2% ; Deflator = 0%
Figure 1 .b -Probability of realignment, average credibility and reputation
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Drift = 2 *  ; Den actor = 10*
Figure 2.0 -Exchange rates trajectories. Equilibrium and actual exchange rate
CREDIBILITY & REPUTATION Drift = 29b ; Deflactor = 10%
Figure 2.b -Probability of realignment, averoge credibWty and reputation
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Dnft = 2 % ; Deflator = 309b
Time (months)
:igure 3.a -Exchange rates trajectories Equilibrium and octual exchange rate
CREDIBILITY & REPUTATION Drift = 2% ; Deflactor = 30%
Time (months)
Figure 3.b -Probability of realignment, average credibility and reputation
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Drift = 2 % ; Deflator = 30%
Time (months)
Figure 4.0 -Exchange rates trajectories. Equilibrium and octual exchange rate
CREDIBILITY & REPUTATION Drift = 2% ; Deflactor = 30%
Time (months)
Figure 4.b -Probability of realignment, average credibility and reputation.
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Drift = 2% . Deflator = 50*
Time (months)
:igure 5.0 -Exchange rates trajectories. Equilibrium and actual exchange rate
CREDIBILITY & REPUTATION Drift = 2% ; Deflator = 50%
Time (months)
Figure 5.b -Probability of realignment, average credibility and reputation.
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IN FLATIO N CONVERGENCE
IQJhS
Mcd
Time (months)
Figure 6-Evolution of annual Inflation rates for the trajectories displayed In me respective figures.
rate, that Is. taking Into account the reduction of the Inflation that the misalignment 
Induces.
Convergence In the (annual average) Inflation rate (ji,,) can be observed In the 
line labelled (1) of figure 6. There, we observe that the Inflation differential Jumps to values 
slightly lower than the initial drift of 2% at the collapse time. We observe that the target 
zone collapses anyway; the convergence In Inflation only contributes to slightly postpone 
the collapse. This delay can be explained by the more sluggish behaviour of the 
equilibrium exchange rate; It passes through the band around 8 periods later than when 
no convergence Is assumed (see the horizontal distance between the two equilibrium 
exchange rates on the upper bound line). This behaviour has a direct effect on the 
dynamics of the fundamental beliefs which also evolve slowller. postponing the strains in 
the expectation formation process6.
The next two examples assume an equal deflator (h=30%). but the outcome varies
•The Institutional beliefs have to be updated every period becouse the drift Is variable. Although the 
differences are very smal. Institutional beliefs are not constant with respect to the position of the exchange rate 
m the band, like In chapter 3.
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dramatically7. In the first case (figure 3.a,b) the target zone collapse as before, although 
the collapse time Is deferred; on the contrary. In the second case (figures 4.a.b). full 
convergence Is achieved. In both cases. Inflation Is largely reduced (see lines (2) & (3) in 
figure 6) but In the first case this convergence Is not fast enough to avoid the collapse.
Note that these two examples are replications of the same models, so that the 
different result Is exclusively due to the different shocks hitting the model, highlighting 
again the Importance of the stochastic components In the outcome of the model.
The final example In figure 5 assumes a very high level of Integration (h=50%) so 
that full convergence Is achieved before the equilibrium exchange rate surpasses the 
upper bound of fluctuation, due to the sharp reduction In Inflation (see line (4) In figure 
6). This Is a case In which the strong concept of convergence (In levels) can be applied 
because-ln the case of a final realignment, the exchange rate would not need to Jump.
Intuition Is consistent with the message derived from these examples: convergence 
can be attained given a determined level of Integration. As In the previous chapter, this 
Intuition has to be confirmed by a replication exercise. Here, the crucial variable to 
consider Is the degree of Integration (h). The rest of the parameters are kept at the same 
values.
Table 1 and figure 7 sum up the results from 1000 draws and different values of h. 
The first row recalls the case In which the drift Is assumed fixed (h=0). The table consists 
of two blocks of data. We have divided the table Into two parts: the first block refers to 
the replications In which a collapse occurs and the second to the draws In which the 
band succeeds In providing convergence. The first row reproduces the values for the 
constant drift case, which appear In Table 1 of chapter 3.
The first column In each block computes the percentage of draws In which the 
band collapses-column (1> and In which convergence is achleved-column (7), 
respectively; the plot (a) In figure 7 displays graphically the same Information.
The next two columns -(2,3) and (8.9)- In the first (second) block and graph (b) in 
figure 7 list the median period and the range of periods respectively, for which the band 
collapses (Inflation converges).
Finally, the first block displays three additional columns: (4) lists the median of the 
drift after the collapse and (5) computes the median of minimum Inflation achieved In the 
cases of collapse; they are also displayed In graph (c); column (6) and graph (d) 
compute the median magnitude of the honeymoon effect, computed as the difference
7 #- This choice of the deflactor Is Intentional In table 1 below we can observe that for this value the zone 
converges m dmost half of the cases.
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between the equilibrium exchange rate and the upper edge of the band (5-s). Several 
conclusions can be drawn from these results:
I) From columns (1,7), It Is observed that the higher the level of Integration, the 
higher is the probability of convergence and the smaller the probability of collapse. 
Moreover, column (5) shows that even In the cases of collapse the decree of 
convergence Is larger for higher values of h.
II) For low degrees of Integration h< 10%. convergence Is not feasible. There are 
however some cases In which there is no collapse, either; this Is revealed In the sum of 
columns (2) and (7) which do not reach 100% for low degrees of convergence, because 
the time period taken Is too short.
III) More remarkable Is the fact that convergence Is not guaranteed even for very 
high degrees on Integration. For h=50%. for Instance, the band collapses In more than 
20% of the cases.
tv) The collapse and convergence times are consistent with the first conclusion. 
Higher degrees of Integration Imply that the median of the convergence time comes 
earlier and the collapse time Is postponed. However In the column corresponding to the 
ranges, we observe that for large values of h there are realizations In which the band 
collapses earlier than In the constant drift case; as a consequence, the resulting 
distribution Is more scattered and skewed than in the constant drift case®.
v) The magnitude of the honeymoon effect Is smaller the larger the degree of 
Integration. For h>40% It Is less than 1%. Finally, when there Is a collapse the drift Jumps 
but It does not reach its Initial level In most of the cases.
Interpretation o f the results
Most of these conclusions confirm Intuition. As seems reasonable, the target zone 
is more likely to succeed when convergence is faster, that Is. when the economy Is more 
Integrated. Nevertheless, there are some results which are rather striking and 
counterintuitive. Therefore, the Interpretation will be done along the lines of the last 
section In chapter three.
The first is that the band has a sizable probability of collapsing even for the 
maximum level of Integration allowed. The second Is that for some realizations the
8-Since the constant drift distribution Is not normal, these distributions are non-normal too (we have canted 
out the same normality tests than In the previous chapter and the normcllty hypothesis Is rejected In all cases) 
This explains why we have cfco the medtan as reference In this chaprfer.
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collapse may arrive earlier with higher degrees of Integration. These patterns of 
behaviour can be explained by the mechanisms which underlie the model. In particular 
on the credibility process. The reduction of the Inflation differentials exerts two opposing 
effects on the determination of the collapse time:
-On the one hand, as we saw In the previous examples, lower Inflation 
differentials imply that It takes longer for the exchange rate to pass through the band 
limit; this Implies than the strains In the system are postponed because the fundamental 
beliefs also start to expect a collapse of the target zone later; this factor works In favour 
of a  delay in the collapse of the band.
-On the other hand, the slower evolution of the misalignment also slows down the 
accumulation of reputation; as we saw In the constant drift case, this affects credibility, 
because credibility Is defined In relative terms. We can observe in figures l-5.b that the 
average credibility is closer to zero when the degree of integration is low. This Implies 
that reputation gains are obtained at a faster rate than when Inflation converges 
rapidly. When this happens, the wedge between the actual and equilibrium exchange 
rate does not widen as fast as In the constant drift case; fundamental beliefs are more 
credible and the updating mechanism Is less biased towards the Institutional beliefs. 
Therefore, the evolution of w  tends to give more weight to the fundamental beliefs, as 
we can see In figures 3-5,b.
Thus, for larger degrees of Integration, the slowdown In the accumulation of 
reputation and the longer time span to build It has to be confronted with the faster rate 
of convergence. The dominance of one or other factor will determine the success or 
failure of the target zone.
The unfavourable factor tends to be more than compensated for by the longer 
time span to build up reputation that the Inflation convergence provides. However, 
when reputation is built up too slowly, the system collapses. As a matter of fact, this may 
happen when the equilibrium exchange rate has Just surpassed the upper bound; this 
explains the narrowing of the honeymoon effect and the earlier collapse In certain 
cases for large levels of Integration.
The positive probability of collapse, regardless of the value of the deflator h 
stresses the risk component derived from the stochastic environment. Nevertheless, we 
can see that the lower the Initial drift and the more open the economy, the probability 
of convergence Is higher, while for very low degrees of Integration and/or large Initial 
drifts the collapse Is guaranteed.
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M-CONVERGENCE BANDS
We have seen that when the assumption of a constant drift Is relaxed, the 
resulting misalignment reduces Inflation differentials. However, If the band collapses, the 
gains derived from convergence virtually vanish.
These results have been obtained with the target zone taken as given. The failure 
or collapse of the target zones Just depend on the Initial conditions (Initial drift, 
parameters of the model) and on the continuum of shocks hitting the process. In this 
part of the chapter, we explore the possibility that the policymaker plays an active role 
in designing the target zone. The main goal of the policymaker is to achieve 
convergence and the secondary objective Is the sustaioabllty of the target zone.
The design of a target zone can be seen to depend on the choice of two 
parameters In particular: the width of the band and the central parity9. Therefore, It 
would be desirable to contemplate a flexible and simple mechanism to design and 
analyse the target zone. We will refer to this mechanism as convergence bands. As 
above, the complexity of the model again precludes a mathematical analysis of 
optimality; thus, we will carry out another simulation analysis In order to choose the most 
favourable design.
The rationale for the convergence bands mechanism can be found both In the 
ERM experience and In the results of our dynamic target zone model. Large 
misalignments without perfect reputation are In both cases behind the collapse of the 
target zone. It Is then evident that If the target zone would have been built around a 
real exchange rate target instead of a nominal target, large misalignments would not 
be possible, and the target zone would be sustainable.
This alternative reminds the Williamson proposal (1985,87) of real exchange rate 
parities. However, given our Inflation modellzation. no convergence would be possible, 
because no deflationary effect would be attained. An equivalent argument can be
’ -AJtemattve management of reserv« could be another possible Instrument considered by governments. 
Here we maintain the assumption of marginal Interventions dfhoug^ relaxing It would be an Interesting 
extension.
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applied to the band width. If the bands are too wide there would be no problem of 
surpassing them, but It would also Imply that they are not binding, and little or no 
honeymoon effect would arise.
Chapter three formally showed that excessive rigidity In the ERM has led to the 
collapse of the system. Therefore. It may be suitable a target zone design m which the 
conflict of objectives Is not so apparent. The alternatives proposed In the aftermath of 
the crisis ranged, from the Immediate locking of parities to a return to floating. The Ecofln 
finally decided to widen the bands dramatically (15%). This implies that the potential of 
exploiting a honeymoon effect or ensuring convergence derived from the existence of 
the target zone Is doubtful.
Another question of Interest is the degree of monetary autonomy that a target 
zone should allow. One of the main reasons for the doubts of some countries. In 
particular the United Kingdom to enter and then stay In the system was the loss of 
control on monetary policy.
Which type of target zone Is required then? The mechanism we propose Intends 
to be flexible enough to allow for a wide choice of target zones and to be simple 
enough to be testable in our general framework. Furthermore, as It will be Immediately 
apparent, the sacrifice of monetary autonomy In this proposal Is chosen by each  
country, albeit at the cost of the disciplinary effects that the system can deliver.
The results which will follow the proposal are Intended to give us an Indication 
about the optimal target zone arrangement.
Elements
The convergence bands link the evolution of the fundamentals to the adjustment 
of the central and/or the band width by a  functional form of the following type:
CONVERGENCE BANDS 
Central parity C,K1 -pXs^nO
Band width (s,‘ -CJ=Y0+7 ,p.,
0 < p<1; y0-Yi>0
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; rbo = 0.5 ; Deflactor = 30%
Time (months)
Figure 8 -Exchange rates trajectories when the central parity partially occomodates Inflation differentials.
EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Drift = 2% ; Deflactor = 40%
Time (months)
Figure 9 -Exchange rate trajectories when the bands nairow as Inflation differentials decrease
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Let us consider first the expression for the central parity. The model Is defined In 
terms of the nominal exchange rates and the ERM displays a fixed nominal parity 
between realignments. Consequently, an overvaluation of the exchange rate Is 
expected when price differentials are positive, since the nominal exchange rate Is 
bounded. Therefore, a value for p equal to 1 portrays the ERM case.
On the contrary, the Williamson proposal Implies a fixed real parity10; hence, the 
exchange rate target equals the expected equilibrium rate S+y. which Is defined In 
terms of PPP. Thus, the central parity adjusts to the evolution of the equilibrium exchange 
rate, such that p=0.
These proposals represent In our specification the extreme cases of flexible and 
rigid target zones. The virtues and disadvantages of each option have already been 
mentioned. Note that now given the choice of the convergence bands parameters, 
countries can keep more autonomy than In a fixed central parity regime. While In this 
latter case ihe cost of non-dlsclpllne Is a collapse of the band, now the costs are 
measured In terms not only of the future collapse, but also on the continuous nominal 
exchange rate depreciation of the currency, which dlfflcults the attainment of 
convergence.
The essence of the convergence bond proposal Is to consider the Intermediate 
options, too. The range of Intermediate values would partially offset the inflation 
differentials In the exchange rate target. This possibility Is considered because there may 
exist a certain range of values for p which reconciles the advantages of discipline with 
the sustainability and monetary autonomy of a more flexible regime. In order to obtain 
a flavour of how the central parity correction mechanism works, figure 8 shows the case 
of a target zone with adjusting central parity (p-.S) and a low share of Imports (h= 10%) 
which Anally collapses.
The choice of the band width also has Important Implications. In chapter one we 
observed that the degree of exchange rate stabilization In the static model negatively 
depends on the width of the band. This conclusion is obtained when perfect credibility 
Is assumed. When this assumption is relaxed and credibility Is endogenous as In our 
model, a too narrow exchange rate band may be counterproductive, due to the lack 
of reputation. In any case. It should be noted that the concept of 'too narrow' or 'too 
wide' Is related to the magnitude of the drift. If the band Is narrow but the drift is also 
small the reputation problem may not arise. As a matter of fact, the ERM considered two
10 ^-The second dfference Is that Wtttamson favours the existence of approximate band widths (soft bands) 
whtte In the ERM the band width Is we« determined. We w* return to this issue In the next chapter
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different band widths before 1992: a narrow band (2.25%) for the core countries and a 
wide band (6%) for the periphery countries.
These remarks have been taken Into account In the expression for the width of 
the target zone band above. The width of the band depends negatively on the current 
drift In the fundamentals, so that as convergence progresses the bands of fluctuation 
narrow up to a lower bound, given by the parameter Figure 9 Illustrates this case.
Intuition suggests that the convergence band proposal faces the same sort of 
trade-off between reputation and convergence as before. On the one hand, a flexible 
central parity will be more easily maintained and the time to accumulate reputation Is 
longer; however. It also Implies smaller misalignments and therefore a slower 
accumulation of reputation. On the other hand, the width of the band Is also linked to 
the issue of reputation; too tight a target zone may leave a too little horizon for the 
accumulation of reputation, even If the exchange rate misalignment Is larger; for a wide 
band the opposite reasoning applies.
Testing the convergence bands
The optimal solution to this trade off can only be found by performing simulations 
experiments. A complete analysis of the question would require an extensive 
consideration of Initial and final values of the band widths for every value of p and every 
degree of integration; a simulation run should be applied on each combination. This is 
a cumbersome task, so we have simplified the problem by running Just two types of 
experiments.
Fixed band widths will be assumed In the first experiment, so that i a=6%,y,=0 ; 
In the second experiment, we wHI allow a narrowing of the band by setting 
t f f= 2 .2 5 % ,1.875. The choice of these values Imply that for the Initial drift we consider 
fj=2%, the Initial band width Is 6% . coincident with the wide ERM band and with the 
earlier analysis and the floor Is given by the ERM narrow band. In both experiments, the 
two options will be considered for different choices of the central parity, tfiat Is from p=. 1 
to p=f. with . 1 steps” . Given the different values for the share of imports (.05<=h<=.5. 
with 5% steps), we then build a 'grid' of 100 different subcases (ten cases for each value 
of p).
The cases considered In the evaluation of the convergence bands are now
11 .The complete offsetting of Inflation cffferentlate p-0. I.e. the WHUamson proposal. Is not considered because 
It precludes convergence and Is always sustainable.
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summed up, where the experiments correspond to the rows of the table:
Central parity 
correction
NO YES
Band width I" exp. NO ERM c c
correction
2nd exp. YES CW CWC
The cases can be classified In terms of rigidity. The most flexible case is the 
possibility of central parity correction (C O  and the most rigid case Is represented by the 
correction of the band widths (CW) . The two Intermediate cases are the current 
situation of fixed central parity and band width, namely the ERM. and the simultaneous 
correction of central parity and band width (CWC).
The ERM is a particular case of the first experiment with p=l and has been 
analysed In Table I. The second case (CW) is composed of 10 subcases, equivalent to 
the ERM with the only difference being that now the bands narrow with declining 
Inflation. Table 2 and figure 10 present the results of this modification.
The rest of the cases contain 90 subcases each. Tables 3-5 present the cases CW 
(tables labelled 'o') and CWC (tables labelled 'fcO. for several values of p. The structure 
of these tables Is Identical to the first table to allow for comparison. Figures 11-14 give 
an overall picture of the results of the two experiments.
Evaluation o f the proposal
The objective of this section is to rank the four cases according to their respective 
merits. The analysis of these simulated data can be done in two steps. First, we will 
compare column-wise the cases of central parity correction and then we will consider 
the band width. Apart from the results summarised In the tables and graphs we have 
constructed a test on the difference of median values In order to make Inference on the
9
simulated data. The hypothesis to test Is H0: M,=M2 vs. H,: M,>M2 or M,<M2. where M,.M2 
are the medians of the samples to compare S,£2.
The test Is quite simple. The combined N ^ N ^ N  values from S,Sj are ordered by 
increasing size, the median M Is determined and the values In each sample are 
arranged according to whether they are larger or smaller than the common median In
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the following scheme (.a.b.c.d are frequencies):
Number o f ocurrences 
o f the value
< M >M
S,: a b
Sr c d
The statistic x = (N(a+c)2)/((a+b)(c+d)) which Is distributed as a x2 with one 
degree of freedom, is then computed. If the value of the statistic Is larger than the 
critical value of the distribution the null hypothesis Is rejected (from Sachs (1984, 
pp.302,347-348). The results of these tests can be found In tables 6-8.
137
138
To
b)*
 
2-
Re
su
lts
 f
rom
 
si
m
ul
at
io
n.
 F
ixe
d 
ce
nt
ra
l 
pa
rit
y 
an
d 
co
rre
ct
io
n 
of 
the
 
ba
nd
s
Part ll-Design 4-Inflation convergence and convergence bands
Figure 10 -Results of the simulations wtth endogenous drifts and narrowing of the bands (CW). AH the results
are expressed in medians.
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Table 3.a-Central parity correction with fixed bands (1-p)=.2
CWC p=.8 | COLLAPSE CONVERGENCE
h % Ca$es%
0)
Time
(2)
Rang«
(3)
Posterior 
drift (4)
Minimum 
drift (5)
DHE
(¿•0(6)
Cases%
(7)
Median
<•)
Bang«
(9)
0 100 55 35-162 2 2 400 0
5 99 68 43-21 7 1 96 1 70 256 0 -
10 985 70 40-217 1 94 1 43 2 13 0 •1 5 985 75 35-240 190 116 2.17 15 447 237-478
20 87 5 79 46-173 1 89 098 256 125 178 154-392
vf)(M 79 83 45-154 1 84 080 281 21 137 5 108-276
30 565 82 34-129 1 8C 0 70 5 16 43 5 118 93-261
35 54 5 81 48-141 1 83 064 4 21 45 5 101 74 203
40 58 76 34-127 1 74 060 3 42 42 93 59-172
e
45 34 70 47-110 1 62 0 48 3 14 66 80 57-178
50 40 66 5 31-95 1 61 0 52 264 6C
-
79 53-167
Table 3.b-Central parity correction  with narrowing bands (l -p)= 2
u o
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1 CC ps.5 COLLAPSE CONVERGENCE
| h % C ases%
(1)
Time
(2)
Range
(3)
Posterior 
drift (4)
Minimum 
drift (5)
DHE 
(»-».) (*>
Cases%
(7)
Median
(•>
Range
(9)
1 ° 100 60 31-160 2 2 4.00 _ _ o
I 5 995 95 67205 ! 96 1 83 ,41 0 *
I  10 99 98 68-223 1 93 1 60 1 17 0 -
1 15 99 104 70-229 1 89 1 40 1 23 0
20 99 105 72-276 1 85 1 10 1 05 0
25 95 112 71-225 1 81 1 02 1 10 4 5 219 195-260
30 90.5 114 75-204 1 79 0 53 1.00 95 187 131-243
35 74 121 76-218 1 74 0 46 0 89 26 161 5 106-205
40 50.5 124 79-183 1.74 042 0 63 49 5 146 110-213
45 365 123 84-177 1 70 0 39 0 27 63 5 131 88 187 |
50 165 118 101-157 177 0 36 0 10 835 125 88-146 I
Table 4.a-Central parity correction with fixed bands (l-p)=.5
j CWC p=.5 | COLLAPSE CONVERGENCE
J h % Cases%
(1)
Time
(2)
Range
(3)
Posterior 
drift (4)
Minimum 
drift (5)
DHE 
< *-0  (6)
Cases%
(7)
Median
(S)
Range
(9)
1 ° 100 55 35-162 2 2 400 0
5 98.5 93 64-184 1.96 1 75 1 29 0 -
10 98 97 68-308 1 92 1 51 1 22 0 - •
15 98 103 69-262 1.89 1 29 1 23 0
20 98 112 5 73-241 1 85 1 01 1 19 0 -
25 93.5 120 75-230 1 83 0 78 1 33 65 202 157-455
30 81.5 116 39-181 1 78 0 69 1 21 185 159 134 314
35 70 118 65 169 1 75 C 55 3 85 30 139 5 117-340
40 44 108 5 73-174 1 71 0 49 3 44 I 56 133 101-300
45 33 5 104 40-148 1 69 0 44 3 03 I 66 5 116 82-275
50 32 98 55-145 1 58 0 42 2 65 68 1 12 5 81-239
Table 4.b-Central parity correction with narrowing bands (l-p)= 5
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Table 5.a-Central parity correction with fixed bands (l*p)= 8
| CWC p«.2 COLLAPSE CONVERGENCE
h % Cases%
0 )
Time
(2)
Range
(3)
Posterior 
drift (4)
Minimum 
drift (5) DHE 1(* ».) (6) | Cases%1 (7) Median(*> Range(9)
I ° 100 55 35-162 2 2 400 0
5 99 200.5 167-293 1 96 1 78 039 0
10 99 211 169-346 1 91 1 52 0 48 0 ♦ '
15 98 2185 182-391 1 88 1 31 0.35 0 •
20 98 228 5 185*390 1.84 1 08 025 0 *
25 96.5 245 197-392 1 79 0 81 0 32 1 500 398-500
30 90 258 5 208-397 1 77 0 57 041 7 5 360 316-500
35 75 270 194-352 1 75 0 40 3 17 21 5 313 5 233-500
40 45 5 251 5 154 298 1 73 0 33 3 40 48 276 217 500
45 39 230 116-279 1 51 0.29 2 97 !1 53 5 255 * 82-500
50 31.5 210 108-250 1 52 0 33 2 47 1 “ 227 1 76-500
Table S.b-Central parity correction with narrow ing Dands (1 -p)=.8
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Figure 11 -Results of the simulations. Cases of convergence and collapse for the two experiments AH the
results are expressed in medians
143
Part Il-Design 4-Inflation convergence and convergence bonds
Figure 12 -Pesufts of the simulations. Times of convergence and colapse for the two experiments. AJi the
resuits are expressed In medians.
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CC: Degree of convergence CWC Degree of convergence
2V 2x
0.5, 0.5,
0 0 Value of rho 0 0
Figure 13 -Resuits of the simulations Minimum and final drifts for the two experiments AJI the results are 
expressed in medians.
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:igure 14 -Results of the simulations. Magnitude of the dynamic honeymoon effect for the two experiments 
AH the resufts are expressed In medians.
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PROBABILfTY Of CONVERGENCE
ERM cwc
cw . .
cc
O O  (pr 2) 
* (rest)
Table 6-Test on the d ifference of conve rgen ce  time. The first results com pare the fixed 
b a n d /va ria b le  b a n d  for the different degree  of correction  in the band, given by p The second set of 
results c o m p a re  fixed bands with variable bands. Finally, an overall comparison betw een both cases is 
carried  out.
TEST ON DIFFERENCE OF COLLAPSE TIME
h > 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
cc I IM /C W ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW ERM/CW
oila 0 /0 O /- o o /- -/' 0 0 /0 0 - /O O - /o o -/- -/- 0 /0 0
P =  8 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 O O / ' 0 0 /0 0 O O /' 0/0 OO/- •/OO - / O
p= 7 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
oIIa 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
p = 5 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /0 0 0 0 /00 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
IIa 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /0 0 00 /00 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
p= 3 0 0 /0 0 00 /0 0 00 /00 00 /0 0 00 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
CNIIa 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00 00 /00
p=.1 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 0 0 /0 0 00 /00 0 0 /00 00 /00 00 /00
ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM
CW L o o XX XX XX XX
1 ERM-CC ERM CC ERM-CC ERM CC ERM CC ERM-CC ERM CC ERM CC ERM CC ERM CC
cwc 1 OO OC I X XX XX
Table 7-Test on  the d ifference of convergence  time. The first results com pare the fixed band/vanable 
b a n d  for the  d iffe ren t degree of correction in the band, given by p The second set of results com pare 
fixed bands w ith variab le  bands. Finally, an overall comparison betw een both cases is corned out
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TEST ON DIFFERENCE OF CONVERGENCE TIME
h > 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1 cc EVM/CW ERM/CW EVM/CW ERM/CW EVM/CW EVM/CW ERM/CW EVM/CW EVM/CW EVM/CW
1 P= 9 11 -/OO -/oo 00/00 0/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/0 00/00 00/00
800IIa 0/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 0/0 oo/- -/oo -/o
1 P= 7 */oo -/oo 00/00 •00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
8 p= 6 -/oo •/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
H p= 5 -/oo -/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
ha -/oo -/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
1 P= 3 -/oo -/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
1 p=2 B -/oo -/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
1 p=-1 g '/OO -/oo 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00 00/00
I ERM ERM EftM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM ERM
cw - - XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
ERM-CC EtMCC EtMCC ERM-CC ERM-CC ERM-CC ERM-CC ERM-CC ERM-CC ERM CC
ewe • • * XX XX XX XX XX X
Table 8-Test on  the d iffe rence  of convergence time. The first results com pare  the fixed band/va riab le  
b a n d  for the d iffe ren t deg ree  of correction in the band, given by p The second set of results com pare 
fixed bands w ith variab le bands. Finally, an overall com parison be tw een  both cases is earned out
N ote  for the tables  6-8
The null hypothesis (HJ is that the median (M) in the two samples is the same The alternative 
hypothesrs H1 is tha t the m edian of one of the samples is larger than the other Thus:
Hq.
H, Mi>M2 or M2>M1
The s ta tis tic  to  c o n s id e re d  is x w hich  is d is tribu ted  as a  / ;  (see text)
The c r it ic a l va lues a re  2 706 for a  95% sign ificance  leve l a n d  1 642 fo r a  90% sign ificance  level
The sym bo l m eans th a t the null hypothesis is n o t re je c te d
'o ' / o o '  im p ly  re je c tio n  a t  90%,95% le v e l respective ly, o f the hypothesis a n d  tha t the m e d ia n  o f 
the  sam p le  c o n s id e re d  in th e  colum ns is la rger,
'x ' /x x ' im p ly  re je c tio n  a t  90%. 95% leve l, respective ly, o f tne  hypothesis a n d  th a t the m ed ian  o f 
th e  sa m p le  c o n s id e re d  m the  rows is la rger;
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Considering first the question of adjusting the central parity to partially offset 
inflation differentials (cases ERM.CWvs. CC.CWO. a careful Inspection of the tables and 
graphs allows to reach the following conclusions.
I) From tables 3-5. we observe that keeping the central parity fixed Improves the 
probability of convergence (7% more cases) but It also Increases the probability of 
collapse (4% more cases); there are however subcases in which the result Is reversed 
(33%). that Is. with fixed parities the band collapses and with correction of the central 
parity there exists convergence. This happens In general when both the degree of 
integration and the parameter of adustment are high.
Notwithstanding this, the results of the test In table 6 shows that the hypothesis of 
an equal probability of convergence cannot be rejected In this case, except when the 
comparison Is done between the ERM case and CC with p=0.2. Therefore, allowing for 
a correction of the bands In general does not Improve the probability of convergence.
II) The correction of the central parity allows to postpone the collapse time (In 
median) between 9 and 273 periods (for p=.9„ 1. respectively). As a matter of fact, when 
p Is low. there Is an Important number of subcases in which the maximum number of 
Iterations Is exceeded without collapse. Table 6 confirms that the collapse time Is 
signlficatlvely postponed In time, even for low degrees of Integration.
III) In a similar way. correction of the central parity also postpones the time of 
convergence, provided that the value of p Is not too high, as It can be infered form the 
test In table 8.
tv) For high degrees of integration and fixed bands, the degree of convergence 
is higher when the central parity is corrected; for low h and for narrowing bands, this 
result Is reversed. Also, the dynamic honeymoon effect Improves 1,46% (in median) 
when the central parity Is corrected. These results are robust to statistical Inference (not 
reported)
The overall conclusion Is that correcting the central parity does Improve the endurance 
of the target zone, because the misalignment Is smaller; however, the performance In terms of 
convergence Is worse: the probability of convergence does not Improve and convergence 
arrives later. The Interpretation for this unsatisfactory outcome Is straightforward: the gains In 
terms of time that correcting the central parity provides are not enough to compensate the 
costs in terms of credibility that a smaller misalignment brings about. As a consequence, 
correcting the central parity Is In general an adequate strategy only If the emphasis Is places 
on the sustainability of the target zone, not on convergence.
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The second set of options to consider are either the bands fixed or allow for a hardening 
of the band as convergence progresses, that Is. the ERM-CC and CW-CWC cases. We can 
mainly focus on the comparison between ERM and CW contained In tables 1 and 2. 
respectively, because the results do not differ greatly when correcting the central parity is 
considered. Close Inspection of the tables reveal that:
I) with narroving bands (CW) there are more cases In which convergence Is 
attained and less cases of collapse for low and Intermediate degrees of Integration 
(h=,05,.3) but ERM performs better In both aspects when h Is large. However, there Is no 
significant difference In the probability of collapse (see table 6)
II) From the tables of results and table 7. we observe that keeping the band fixed 
allows to postpone the collapse time for large values of h . On the contrary, for 
intermediate degrees of Integration (h=.25,3CJ) narrowing the bands is shown to 
significatively postpone the collapse time (see two last rows in table 7).
III) For all cases, convergence Is achieved earlier when the bands narrow. This 
result is confirmed by the hypothesis testing In table 8 (see two last rows)
Iv) Fixed bands Imply higher degrees of convergence In the collapse subcases.
The final drift, on the other hand. Is smaller, too. Finally, the dynamic honeymoon effect 
Is larger In the CW-CWC case.
Thus, narrowing the bands tends to dominate the choice of fixed bands. Only for large 
values of h. the ERM case seems to perform better In terms of sustainability, although 
convergence Is achieved latter and the dynamic honeymoon effect Is smaller.
Ranking the alternatives
The overall consideration of these results allows to rank the alternatives on the basis of 
two main criteria: convergence and sustainability. However, the moin conclusion of our analysis 
Is that, except for one case, the hypothesis that one choice increases the probability of 
convergence (or sustainability) Is rejected. This Implies that neither of the analysed choices 
Improves the ability to converge and that the ranking has to be exclusively made In terms of
«
speed of convergence or collapse. In which we can observe some differences among the 
options. According to the sustainability criterion (postponement In the collapse time) and the 
convergence criterion (ontlclpatlon of the convergence time), the options can be ranked:
SUSTAINABILITY :
1Uj£oAUoAU (for Intermediate h)
CC> CWC ► ERM> CW ( for large h)
CONVERGENCE : CW>ERM>CWC>CC
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Flexible management of the central parity improves the sustainability of the band. 
However, It is somehow striking that the most flexible alternative (C O  does not always rank first 
under the sustainability criterion. On the contrary, the most rigid option (CIV) Is the best choice 
under the convergence criteron and the most flexible (C O  ranks worst when the convergence 
time is considered.
The rationale for these results Is again related to reputation considerations. In the case 
of a flexible central parity, reputation Is only slowly accumulated. This sluggishness Is decisive, 
because in this case, convergence Is also slowly achieved. Under these circumstances, the first 
strains on the system, despite appearing later, may not be counteracted by high credibility of 
the target zone and collapse follows.
These rankings do not reveal an unique best alternative. Notwithstanding this, the 
emphasis of this chapter has been placed on the question of how a target zone can deliver 
convergence. it turns out that the misalignment and reputation necessary In this model to 
achieve convergence is best administered by a rigid target zone.
From this point of view, with all the cautions and caveats that will be considered In the 
final remarks, hardening the target zone bands appears as the best alternative while correcting 
the central parities seems to be the counterproductive, because reputation is acquired too 
slowly. However. the design of more flexible target zones should not be dismissed before taking 
Into account other considerations, which cannot be properly analysed In the current framework.
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IV-FINAL REMARKS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The validity of the previous analysis and Its conclusions should be considered in the light 
of our approach, taking Into account the limitations Inherent In the model. Therefore, the results 
should be seen rather as an Illustration of the effects of flexibility on a target zones rathen than 
a recipe for policymaking.
In the Introduction we listed the required features for a successful targeting strategy. 
Our specification conveys only some of these characteristics, while others. In particular, the 
policy coordination aspects cannot be Included In our model. On the one hand, we only 
consider one country which pegs the currency to a foreign country, which act as an onchor, 
this second country Is not affected by the evolution of the domestic exchange rate, so that the 
latter Is Implicitly assumed to be a small economy. On the other hand, the policymaker is 
assumed to contemplate one policy objective: Inflation convergence; there Is no reference to 
real variables. Therefore, some crucial considerations are left aside. Some of them work In 
support of more flexibility and some others would advise more rigidity. Let us start with the latter.
The option of a rigid peg Is supported on the basis of the reputation of exchange rate 
announcements, which Is precisely the second source of inflation convergence that a peg may 
provide. We are already fdmlllar with this argument: full convergence Is achieved by pegging 
the exchange rate to the anchor currency If such an announcement Is credible. In this case, the 
best option Is the most rigid target zone.
However, as we know, acquiring credibility Is not a free lunch. Glavazzl & Pagano (1988) 
show that the costs In terms of misalignment of non-dlscipllnlng In the face of a peg would 
provide the necessary credibility, but this commitment would only be slowly recognised by the 
markets and misalignment would appear anyway. This view emphasizes the real costs of 
misalignment. Vlftals (1994), Elchengreen & Wyplosz (1993) etc, have recognized that this Is an 
unsatisfactory feature of the system because Inflation differentials are persistent. The first author 
suggests that more flexibility would Increase the chances for further convergence.
There remains an open question then: which option Is better, a rigid system which Is not 
credible given the expected evolution of fundamentals, or a less tight regime which can enjoy 
credibility? . The policy coordination literature (see references In next chapter) show that a
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coordination equilibrium (attainable through an exchange rate peg) would be the worst option 
If reputation Is absent, suggesting that the second alternative might be better. All these 
considerations have guided our quest for flexibility.
Glavazzl & Pagano rightly underline the Importance of real variables in the determination 
of the credibility. The account of the ERM and the peseta crises above has highlighted the 
Importance of real variables.
As a  matter of fact, considering the existence of real targets In the Implicit objective 
function of policymakers provides some additional arguments for the flexibility case. Correcting 
the central parity has been observed to reduce the deflationary effect of the target zones; this 
observation which conflicts with the achievement of credibility and convergence In our model 
Is, on the contrary, a bonus if output Is an additional target. In this case, losses In terms of output 
are reduced and this can Improve the credibility of the regime, since It Is perceived to be less 
costly to maintain.
The second caveat-the small country assumption- does not seem realistic In the case of 
the ERM and Its relaxation further favours the flexibility option. If the anchor country Is not 
Immune to exchange rate movements of the domestic country. It will Import Inflation In the same 
way that the domestic country Imports deflation. This raises doubts about the willingness of the 
anchor country to respect the parity. In this situation a correction of the central parity would 
relieve the Inflationary pressure on the anchor country and the credibility of this bilateral band 
would Increase.
There Is a final consideration which further strengthens the case of flexible parities. The 
way In which our specification builds up reputation Is at odds with the convergence play. 
whereby progresses In convergence are enough to strengthen the credibility of the system. In 
our model, the size of the misalignment is positively related to the reputation of the zone, which 
Is defined In relative terms (see chapter three, section V); this implies that progress in 
convergence Is, ceteris paribus, counterproductive for the reputation of the model. If the 
credibility mechanism was modified somehow to take Into account this progress, the conclusions 
might be reversed.
All In all. taking Into account some factors which are difficult to Introduce In our 
framework would have positive Implications for the robustness of the regime, beyond the formal 
analysis of the model.
In the first place, flexible central parities endorse more sustainable parities and therefore 
they are more easily Justifiable and consequently, easier to defend. Secondly, the system is 
transparent because rules are automatically enforced; countries Immediately perceive the costs
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of Irresponsible behaviour through a depreciation of their currency; this mechanism Induces 
discipline and should Increase the attraction of commitment for the domestic country, but also 
for the anchor country, which will not suffer from the Indiscipline of the others. Finally, these 
elements should contribute to Improving the chances of policy coordination, because the 
exchange rate regime around which they are Implemented has more chance of being 
Incentive compatible. In the next chapter, we explicitly analyse this case, albeit In a static 
model, and Incentive compatibility will become a necessary condition to design the exchange 
rate targets.
Secondly, while ruling out the main source of Instability, convergence bands do not 
guarantee the absence of speculative attacks, provoked by expected policy shifts or other 
types of shocks not foreseen when setting the bands'*. Nevertheless, the cooperation and 
coordination climate which the new system Is expected to provide could help to overcome 
these crises. Furthermore, we should not forget that the ERM turmoil affected all currencies with 
a domino effect. First, the currencies with larger misalignments were attacked and after their 
success the speculators turned to other currencies In the systen.. Including the healthy ones. Our 
system. In principle, would avoid this sort of contagion, because there is no scope for excessive 
misalignments to develop.
A flncH consideration concerns the feasibility of the system. We should be aware that 
technical difficulties could arise: how often to adjust, how to correct the deviations from 
expected Inflation differentials, which body should determine the parities, how much scope to 
allow for discretion and how much for rules, how to channel the parities and so on. Besides there 
remains the question of the political feasibility of this option. While core countries might prefer 
It to the current ERM, the periphery might be reluctant to accept a system which Imposes a 
visible cost on divergences. But they should also recognize the reputation gains that a good 
performance In this system would grant and the higher commitment from the core countries to 
defend the system. From this perspective, the goal to Join the currency union would be 
perceived as costly but also as challenging, and this sense of challenge and the dangers of not 
facing It could stimulate the will to push ahead the necessary reforms.
- Obstfeid (1986,94) shows how expected shifts In policy can Induce self-fulfllilng attacks. In procttce. the 
strains to which the French Rare was exposed In the recurrent crises of the ERM did not essentially reflect 
fundamente* cfcequfibria, but rather the expectation that the French Government woukj eventually abandon 
tts franc fort poicy for the sake of a much needed reduction In the Interest rates
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In this chapter we turn to consider explicitly real variables and how exchange rate 
targeting may be Justified In a wider optimal policy coordination framework. We will also 
see that the design of the exchange rate arrangement will be seen to be equivalent to 
the convergence band proposal.
This chapter deals with the design of exchange rate targets and their use as 
stabilizing device In the face of economic shocks. The policymakers have to choose 
among a set of targeting strategies the subset which provides the best outcome 
according to their policy objectives. However, as we will see targeting the exchange rate 
may be counterproductive under certain circumstances.
In the last section of the chapter one. we reviewed the efforts to embed target 
zone models In an optimizing framework and Judged positively the attempts to include 
real targets In the loss function, albeit In a unilateral target zone. In this chapter, we 
dispense with the target zone models we have been using up to now and adopt a static 
game-theoretic perspective which has been standard In the early policy coordination 
literature.
The assumptions are more realistic. The actions of policymakers spillover to other 
countries In Interdependent economies; the existence of an arrangement between two 
symmetric countries Is also more accurate for the European environment than the Implicit 
small country assumption of target zone models'. Welfare considerations then determine 
the gains from coordination and. in our case, the virtues of a exchange rate arrangement.
'-Of course, the approach does not lack problems A mufflcountry setting would complicate the results of 
the analysis; the underlying behaviour of the economy ts stylfced and dispensing with the restrictive assumption 
of a quadratic loss function would have generated many technical problems (see Currie & Levine (1991)). Even 
the use of different empirical models can provide contradictory results (ftankel & Rockett (1968))
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Players In the policy gome only agree to follow a cooperative strategy If both gain with 
respect to the non-cooperative (Nash) outcome; in other words, the outcome from 
cooperation has to be Incentive compatible.
Countries are considered on an equal strategic basis. In contrast with the targeting 
strategies traditionally contemplated In the literature, where leader-follower schemes have 
Implicitly been used. Therefore. It will also be Interesting to compare how the respective 
results differ.
The policy coordination literature has In general been more pessimistic than target 
zone models regarding the possibility of gaining from exchange rate pegs2. The outcome 
can even be worse than the non-cooperative solution If reputation Is not previously 
acquired. This result arises both In a static setting (Rogoff (1985a). Canzonerl & Henderson
(1988). Currie et. al (1992)) and In dynamic games (Miller & Salmon (1985.1990). Levine & 
Currie (1987)).
A form of cooperation is Implicit In our model through a exchange rate 
arrangem ent on which countries commit beforehand. The Idea Is similar to the optimal 
Institutional contracts considered in the literature, albeit here both agents (countries) enjoy 
the same strategic position.
Incentive compatibility Is the condition used to reach on ogreement. Otherwise, 
private agents In the market would realize the Incentive to renege that a return to a non- 
cooperative equilibrium offers. The system would not be credible and, as a consequence. 
It would be prone to Instability and speculative attacks.
The optimal contract should also Ideally deliver an efficient outcome. Since Pareto 
optimal solutions correspond to the cooperative solution In our static model, the exchange 
rate target would then act as a  perfect surrogate for cooperation.
The feasibility of the arrangement is thus defined by two conditions: Incentive 
compatibility and Pareto optimality. Note that although the optimality condition Just 
improves the virtue of the arrangement, it Is not necessarily required. Therefore, an 
Incentive compatible target zone may turn out to be Just a second best to explicit 
monetary policy coordination.
This Instrumental role for the exchange rate make It qualitatively different from the 
rest of targets In the economy. On the one hand, it implies a common target for both 
countries which Is appended to the original optimization function of both policymakers; 
on the other hand, the exchange rate Is an intermediate target to attain the actual policy
2-See Currte & Levin® (1991) for a survey on pofcy coordination literature
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objectives but It has no value on Its own right.
The search for an optimal targeting strategy Is developed in two stages, in the first 
stage, we consider all the types of shocks which may hit the economy, making It diverge 
from Its equilibrium level; then we explore the possibility of targeting the exchange rate 
for the different types of shocks. This Is formally done by delimiting the type of shocks for 
which the exchange rate arrangement is Incentive compatible and Pareto optimal, it turns 
out that the feasibility of targeting the exchange rate depends on the type of shock.
The second stage directly tackles the question of designing optimal exchange rate 
targets within the relevant shock subset. We will observe that there Is some scope for the 
discretion of the policymakers who can choose between a wide range of exchange rate 
targets, provided that they also choose the optimal commitment to the selected target.
All these questions will be explored in more detail in this chapter. Next section 
presents a flexible framework to generate the set of targeting strategies. This allows to 
consider both nominal and real exchange rate targets. Section II describes the model 
used In this chapter, originally developed by Canzonerl & Henderson (1991). The optimal 
targeting strategy Is derived from the concepts of Incentive compatibility and Pareto 
optimality defined In the third section. Section IV and V develop the two stages to 
targeting. The conclusions summarise our results and compare them with alternative 
proposals of exchange rate management and to the recent experience and future 
prospects of the EMS.
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l-The exchange rate as intermediate target
We start by considering two Identical and Interdependent economies (subscripts
*
1,2) and their loss functions (L ,l2) defined so as to penalize the deviations of employment 
(n) and consumer prices (g) from their desired levels (superscript d). Deviations from the 
desired values Imply welfare losses:
L, *2(o(n, -n,‘V  -Kg, - q ^ 2)
(1)
i2-^(o(n?-n2,V +<q2-q 2<V)
The quadratic form and the arguments of these loss functions are standard In the 
policy coordination literature, pioneered by Hamada (1976). Penalty values are normalized 
with respect to the weight of Inflation In the loss function.
Ham ada adopts a game-theoretic approach to measure the gains from 
cooperative macroeconomic policy with respect to the non-cooperative solution. The 
outcome also determines Implicitly the type of exchange rate management required.
Each country Is a player In this policy game. The policy Instruments are given by the 
money supplies. When countries do not cooperate, they use their respective money 
supplies to minimize welfare losses, taking the actions of the other player as given. On the 
contrary, when countries cooperate, a common welfare function Is Jointly minimised.
The Implications for the exchange rates differ, depending on the features of the 
model employed. In Hamada's deterministic environment, fixing the exchange rate mimics 
the efficient cooperative outcome; however, in a stochastic setting with rational 
expectations the conclusion Is not so straightforward. In the Henderson model (1984), shifts 
In demand require the exchange rate to float while shifts In asset preferences advise the 
use of a peg; In the case of supply shocks, there Is a conflict between the preferences of 
the players. The Canzonerl-Henderson (1991) model which we use here, highlights- In the 
case of symmetric supply shocks- the need for a leader to determine the money supply 
and a follower who pegs the exchange rate, yielding an asymmetric arrangement. The
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rest of the mentioned references on the policy coordination literature also underline that 
cooperation In the exchange rate management pays depending on the nature of shocks. 
Also Gemberg (1989), In a non-strateglc setting arrives at the same conclusion.
The diversity of results suggests that it Is advisable to adopt a flexible approach to 
exchange rate targeting. In which the different alternatives are considered.
Exchange rate targets as optimal contracts
The ERM and Bretton Woods regimes targeted the nominal exchange rate around 
a narrow band while the Williamson (1985) proposal advocated maintaining the real 
exchange rate around a predetermined level; In this case, the band was loosely defined. 
The 'Program for Monetary coordination' proposed by McKinnon (1984) suggested an 
agreement on the global money supply to maintain exchange rates fixed. This global 
money supply had then to be allocated between countries, on the basis of a price 
stability target.
The central role of the exchange rate In the practice of policy coordination 
emphasises the value of exchange rate targets as surrogates for explicit policy 
coordination. One of the main reasons Is observability. In the words of Kenen 
'...governments are prone to cheat and will not engage In optimal coordination because 
they cannot trust each other. A government cannot cheat on a  firm commitment to 
exchange rate pegging without being caught. Therefore exchange rate pegging Is 
viewed as a  viable alternative to full-fledged coordination ' (Kenen (1989).p.54).
Notwithstanding this. In the policy coordination literature the choice of the 
exchange rate usually appears as a by-product of the coordination solution and It is not 
explicitly considered. Nevertheless, a strand of this literature (see Righes Hallet et. al
(1989) and. In particular. Hughes Hdllet (1993)) has explicitly Included exchange rate 
targets In the policymakers optimization problem. We can Justify this Inclusion more formally 
using an analogy with the optimal contract literature, adapted to the context of policy 
coordination.
This literature has Its origin In the credibility problem of monetary policy pointed out 
by Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983). Their contribution revealed the 
utility of setting up rules for the management of policy to which the monetary authority 
(principal) has to commit to cancel the Inflationary bias In agents expectations. Barro and 
Gordon underlined the Incentive to cheat on these rules, due to time Inconsistency.
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This incentive problem was addressed by Rogoff (1985b) which highlighted that it 
could be overcome If monetary policy was entrusted to the Central Bank through some 
kind of institutional provision regarding some intermediate target (optimal contract), if the 
commitment to the rule could be achieved, the Incentive to renege would be 
eliminated3.
In our case the contract is specified In terms of exchange rote targets, for the 
reasons of observability and controllability we have mentioned above. Two sovereign 
countries decide to commit to an exchange rate arrangement If they are expected to 
gain from It; that is. the incentive problem Is redefined here In terms of Incentive 
compatibility. Note that prlncipal-agent considerations are no central here. The behaviour 
of the agents is guided from their rational expectations and both players are on an equal 
strategic footing. Reneging on the arrangement opens the possibility of retaliation by the 
second country and the suspension of an agreement which Is benefltlal for both countries. 
Therefore the Incentive to renege Is eliminated.
The contract is appended to the optimizing problem of the countries. Since the 
countries are equal from an strategic point of view, the contract Is the same for both of 
them. The function which each country considers is then modified to become:
W,=L,+V
W2=L2+V
The contract Is defined In terms of the real exchange rate (z) and enters In the 
optimizing problem with a weight p. More precisely, we propose a contract of the 
following form:
At this point. It should be clear that the exchange rate is an Intermedldte target in 
the modified loss functions It serves as a vehicle to attain the final goals
represented by employment and Inflation, but It Is not a final goal In Itself. Consequently, 
the gains from targeting are not directly derived from fulfilling the exchange rate goal but 
from the benefits on the rest of variables that respecting the agreed parity provides; 
therefore. In the evaluation of the gains, the deviations from Vare not taken Into account.
3-Later works refined these Ideas and orientated the research to the design of Institution«* regulations See 
Baron (1969), Walsh (1992), lohman (1992) and Persson & Tabettnl (1993)
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The design o f the targeting strategy
The contract is signed by the countries at the beginning of the period In order to 
minimise the welfare loss derived from unanticipated shocks. The question Is then how to 
design a  contract which Is Incentive compatible when a shock occurs. Note that the 
design of the contract Is determined by the choice of a  desired level for the real 
exchange rate and by Its weight (P) In the modified loss function. Thus, the design of 
the optimal contract Is equivalent to the choice of the optimal targeting strategy and we 
will use both terms Interchangeably.
Following Rogoff (1986b) we can define the parameter or weight p as the optimal 
degree of commitment to the Intermediate target. In this case the exchange rate. The 
parameter p Is constrained to be positive, otherwise what is being targeted Is the 
exchange rate to avoldl. If p were equal to zero, no constraint is Imposed on the 
exchange rate and the result corresponds to the non-cooperative free-float solution.
Since positive values of p penalize deviations from the desired values. It represents 
a soft band of fluctuation for the desired exchange rate target; the larger the value of p, 
the narrower will be the Implied band. This specification allows us to think of the targeting 
strategy as a target zone with soft bands, where ?  represents the central parity. As a 
matter of fact, the specification for the exchange rate target is also familiar to us, from the 
convergence bands proposal above.
Hbw Is the central parity chosen?. In other words, how do players agree on the 
desired level for the real exchange rate?. The exchange rate target In our model Is 
Inspired by the exchange rate arrangements mentioned above, especially on the nominal 
ERM regime and the Williamson proposal. The singularity of our approach Is the 
consideration of a continuum of exchange rate targets, which spans between both 
alternatives. This setup allows for flexibility In the design of the contract; a feature which 
adds new Insights to the question of exchange rate targeting.
The ERM and Williamson's proposal have In common the choice of a target 
exchange rate which is allowed to fluctuate within a band, if rigidity Is defined with 
respect to the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of Purchasing Power Parity, they 
represent the polar choices of a rigid system with 'hard' bands and a flexible regime with 
'soft' bands, respectively. This suggests the use of an approach which Incorporates both 
of these proposals as special cases, as well as the range of Intermediate options, as we 
did In the convergence bands proposal. This Idea can be formalised as follows.
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Let us take the real exchange rate (z) Identity, In terms of purchasing power parity:
z=e-(prP i)
where p Is the price level, the subscripts denote countries one and two respectively and 
the nominal exchange rate e. Is defined as the price of country 2 currrency In terms of 
country 1 currency.
The ERM regime alms a t maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate parity. I.e. 
ed-0. Substituting above, we observe that this Is equivalent to a real exchange rate target 
equal to the negative of price differentials:
The Williamson target zone on the contrary Implies a desired value for the real 
exchange rate equal to zero ¿*=0 or. equivalently, a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate equal to the price differentials:
ed=(PrP2).
Let us now define the parameter p, such that ed=(l-pXp,-Pi)- Note that (1-p) 
represents then the degree which the nominal exchange rote target offsets price 
differentials. Thus, we can write the exchange rate target In general form as a function of 
the price differentials
z d-e  a-{p, -p2)«-p(p, -pp (2)
It Immediately follows that p - 1 corresponds to a nominal exchange rate target, as 
In the ERM regime and p =0 corresponds to the Williamson target zone, that Is, a real 
exchange rate target. As p moves away from zero the desired exchange rate partially 
accomodates Inflation differentials. These Intermediate values present special Interest 
because they provide flexibility in the choice of exchange rate target, occordlng to the 
preferences of policymakers.
We con observe that the design of the targeting strategy Is determined by the 
choice of Just two parameters: p and p. The first specifies the extent to which the real 
exchange rate Is the target and the second determines the degree of commitment to 
such a target. We will refer to them as target parameters. The range of parameters Is 
constrained to positive values of p and to values of p between zero and one. I.e. between 
real and nominal exchange rate targets.
Countries can choose among a wide combination of exchange rate targets and 
values for p. which represent the set of targeting strategies. This set. denoted as X can be 
formally defined as:
W ( p Xp), V p>0, Osp< 1}
In this way we have a very simple and general method to explore whether
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targeting the exchange rate pays when countries are placed on an equal strategic 
footing. When the answer Is In the affirmative, our specification will be able to determine 
which Is the optimal targeting strategy within the set. Prior to this, we have still to develop 
the economic model of reference and to define the concepts which will be used in the 
formal analysis. This Is done In the two next sections.
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ll-The model
*
In this section we present the Canzoneri & Henderson (1988,1991) two-country 
model of symmetric monetary economies. For a more detailed explanation of the model 
we refer the reader to their paper.
This economy Is subject to shocks on the demand (u,,u2) and the supply side (x, jc2). 
Rational expectations ore assumed, so that only unanticipated shocks can affect 
equilibrium. The disaggregation of shocks and the treatment of the exchange rates 
Introduce some minor modifications into the Canzonerl-Henderson model.
Two countries are considered, each producing a different good with the 
corresponding subscripts. All the variables except the Interest rates are expressed In logs 
and represent deviations of octual values from equilibrium. Symmetry holds In the strong 
sense that all the parameters are the same In both countries (for the exchanges rates they 
have opposite signs).
The output of each country (y, 1=12 where the subscript I refers to the variable In 
each country) is obtained through a Cobb-Douglas production function. It is an Increasing 
function of domestic employment n, and It decreases when some adverse supply shock 
x ; hits the economy:
y,=(l-a)nr x ‘,
y2=(l-a)n2-x'2
For convenience we present In the table in next page the values and definitions 
of the parameters appearing In the model and those derived from the transformations 
which follow.
Firms hire labour up to the point In which real wages equal the marginal product 
of labour:
w l-p,=-<xri)-x )
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Par. Definition Range
7-a Labour coefficient in the production function 0<1-a<l
e Marginal propensity to spend 0<e<l
8 Effect of exchange rate in demand 0<6<1
V interest rate elasticity 0<v<l
Ç Share of import goods in domestic bosket 0<Ç<»
y yas+o-zyvj' 0<y<i
Ç Ç-J-0-2Ü* 0<ç<7
^yO-a) 0«KÇ
Cx St\<1
e o<e<fc 
i......  ....... .......... ii
where wt and p, are nominal wages and prices, respectively. We can assume that the 
supply shocks take the form of adverse labour productivity shocks. Contracts are signed 
at the beginning of each period, so that shocks are unanticipated. These contracts 
specify nominal wages and employment rules and workers agree to supply whatever 
quantity of labour firms want at the nominal wage specified In the contracts.
Consumer price Indexes q, are weighted averages of domestic and foreign goods
prices:
q,= (1-VP,
q2= (l<)P2<(e-P2)=P2<z
The market equilibrium conditions for the demands of goods are:
-Ki =8z+< 1 -Ç)e K, +Ç* y2<  1 "Ovr.1 -pvr2 *u 
Kt+O -Q\r2*u '2
where r, are the real Interest rates and u, stand for positive demand shocks. Uncovered 
Interest parity holds, so that r}-rf=f-z. The superscript stands for expected value.
Finally, the equilibrium In the money market Is given by the Cambridge equations:
m,=p,+y,
m,=p7+y}
Nominal wages are set as follows. From the output and the wages equations
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above, and using the money market equilibrium equations, employment can be 
expressed as a function of the money supplies and nominal wages.
n,=m,-w,
Firms and workers choose the nominal wage that minimises the expected square 
deviations of employments from the full-employment value, set equal to zero. Optimizing 
the square of the expression above, we observe that the respective nominal wages are 
set equal to the expected money supplies:
3(n,V #-n d(n,)-
—-----=w,-m, O  ; --------*w2- n \  «
awx dw2
The reduced forms are obtained by expressing all the variables of Interest In terms 
of the Instruments and the shocks. The expressions for the employments are 
straightforward:
D|—m | -m j
Dp*
The expressions for the consumer price Indexes require several steps. First, we solve 
for the output prices and then for the exchange rates. The output prices expression is 
straightforward. Substituting the equilibrium values for nominal wages and the expression 
for employment In the product prices, we can express them In reduced form as:
p, *m, -Ka -1  )(m, -m,*) ♦x',;
Pj -Ka -1  )(mj -rr^*) *x \.
To obtain the reduced form for the real exchange rate, we note first that the sum 
of excess demands must be zero. Substracting the expressions for the demand for goods, 
we obtain
-y2) -2&z-(l -2Qv(r, -r2)*u ! -u£ -0
Using the equations for the real exchange rate and the uncovered Interest parity, 
the real Interest differential from this expression Is given by:
rr r^0 -2 ^ )(f-z )
Substituting this value above and eliminating y,-y2 with the nelp of the output 
expressions, we obtain the reduced form for the real exchange rate:
1 - 2Q2vz*-t(u ,'-u j’)
In this expression, we can reasonably assume that the expected real exchange 
rate Is equal to zero <[f= 0 .). On the one hand, the expected values of the disturbances Is 
zero; on the other hand, since nominal wages and prices are perfectly flexible, the 
expected real exchange rate Is Independent of today's money supply. Finally, the 
existence of an exchange rate target does not Influence 'a priori' exchange rate
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expectations, because they are only binding In the case of shocks.
The nominal exchange rate reduced form Is obtained from the real exchange rate 
expression. Substituting in the reduced forms for product prices and the real exchange 
rate, we obtain
eKm, -mj) -Kgr-1X 1 -a) ((m, -m,*) -<m2 -mf)) -Ku^-a,')
Finally, the expression for the consumer price Indexes is obtained by direct 
substitution:
q, *m, *<♦ +a - 1 )(m, -m,*) +x,' -Ctfu,' -u ,') ;
Finally. In the appendix Is shown that the expected money supplies are zero. The 
shocks are redefined as follows
xj=\/r\xi and Uj=vtiCyu/, 1= 1,2 
and the reduced forms for the variables of Interest take the following form:
; n^/r^*
q ,-(7n )',(ml -2Qn\+X)-(u} -u2))
(3)
q2«(>/Ti’)‘ '(m2-20ml +Xj-*<u, -Uj)) 
p,-am,+(v/rf)''x,; p ^ /T V ^ ) ''^
The implications of the model are standard. A domestic monetary expansion 
positively affects domestic employment and prices and negatively affects foreign prices; 
adverse supply shocks (x,>0) reduce domestic output and Increase domestic consumer 
prices through the Increase In the price of the domestic good. Positive demand shocks 
In country one (u,>0) push domestic consumer prices down because of the appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate induced by the excess demand for the domestic good. 
More precisely, the reduced forms for the exchange rates are:
e*(a-M^(l -^))(m ,-m 2)+ v ^ (x l-x2H ;v /n)‘,(u1-u2)
14)
z«g< 1 -aXm,-m2)-(^ v/Ti)''(u, -up
In this model, we can see that the nominal exchange rate Is affected by both 
demand and supply shocks, while the real exchange rate Is only affected by demand 
shocks.
The excess demand created by demand shocks require a correction of relative 
prices and consequently of the real exchange rate. Since the price of the good Is not
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affected, the burden of adjustment falls upon the nominal exchange rate. On the 
contrary, a domestic adverse supply shock does not affect the real exchange rate. The 
reason Is that the resulting nominal exchange rote depreciation In this particular model 
offsets the price differential In the real exchange rate expression.
It Is also convenient to write the real exchange rate target derived from the 
correction mechanism derived In the previous sections. Substituting terms we obtain:
z tf«-p(a(m, -m2)+{^ /tj")’l(x, -x,))
r~ U.-U, ^z-z d«(pa 1 -a))(m, -m j )'' (p(x,
From (4), It Is evident that supply shocks would not affect the desired exchange 
rate and In this case p=0. others things being equal.
However, shocks also affect the policy goals and countries react to them using 
their policy instruments to stabilize the economy around the desired levels. For Instance, 
In the face of the asymmetric demand shock considered above, the domestic country 
has an incentive to Inflate and the foreign country an Incentive to dislnflate. The resulting 
exchange rate Is the result of both Influences and consequently the desired exchange 
rate value (determined by the choice of p) has to be chosen so as to Induce the optimal 
response of both countries, to stabilise the economy for any given shocks. This Is the Issue 
to be explored In the remaining part of this chapter.
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Ill-Incentive compatibility and sustainability
In this section we define the conditions to derive optimal targeting strategies. They 
are encompassed by In the requirements of sustainability and optimality. However, before 
reaching a formal definition we need to make use of other related concepts which are 
now presented.
The derivation of the model allows us to substitute the reduced forms (4.5) in the 
modified loss functions. Assuming that the derJred Inflation and unemployment levels are 
set equal to zero (n,d=0. qf=0J-12 ). the expression to minimize turns out to be just a 
function of the instruments (m,,m?) and the different shocks.
W, «L, +V'=-L{o(m,)J+(m, -200^ +x, -(u, -Uj))2 ♦
i n i  (6)
+fJ(VÂ (mi -m^+JLcx, -Xj) —(u, -u,))2}
G  Cv'n
W2*L2+V'*^|o(m2)2+(mj-20m1 ^ Xj-Ku,-Uj))2 ♦
+p(/p^~ (m, -m2)-JL(x, -x2)-_L_(u, -Uj))2| (7)
Vti C.'/n
where \[ç/~*pa+çy(1 -a)
The Introduction of a exchange rate target in the optimization problem Implies that 
the exchange rate target acts as an Indirect cooperation device. It Is Indirect because 
the optimization problem facing each country Is equivalent to the non-cooperative case: 
each country maximizes Its welfare with respect to Its instrument, taking as given the 
actions of the foreign country, but also taking into occount the common exchange rate;
£ ^ 0  => /?,: m, (v2m2 -< 1 +p)y3)x, •*-p\|/3x2 +y4(u, -u2))
dm,
=> Rr  m 2a v ^ ( v 2m , - (  1 +p)y3Xj^V 3X1-y4(ul-u2)) (8)
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where
V,*l-"0 +|lp'; V j*2e-Pp';
v'n *
The points where the reaction functions (/?, Intersect represent the solutions. The 
reaction functions and the rest of concepts defined In this section are represented In 
figures 1 and 2. below. We operate In the space, where the ellipses are Isoclines
of the loss functions and the reaction functions are represented by straight lines.
The solutions depend on the parameters of the model, the shocks and the values 
of the target parameters; while the two former are taken as given, the latter are chosen 
by the authorities In some optimal way to be defined.
The choice of the target parameters In the strategy set induce a set of targeting 
equilibria which can be specified as a function of X. T(k)=fmlT.m21}. where for convenience, 
here we redefine X as the product pp\
m  r.  +V?*;) ^(pCVz-ViMKXrXj) ,  (V4CV1
V1-V2 V i+Vi V»"V2
r - i V i W i * ? )  (p(V2-V )>V j)(x ,-X i)rru *__________ ________________ __________________i  2 2 2 2  2 2V1-V2 V i+Vi V 1-V2
It is important to explore the characteristics of the targeting solutions because they 
will be crucial to derive the next propositions. We show In the appendix that the set of 
targeting solutions Is a straight line (target line, hereafter); More formally. It Is claimed that;
Proposition 1: The set o f targeting equilibria. T(k). Is contained In a straight line with 
slope equal to -1  in the space, where:
7(X):{(m,T,m/) | m j— * '***  -m,7} (10)
1 *a -20
One particular point of this line refers to the case In which the exchange rate is not 
targeted, l.e p=0. V p. This Is of course the Nash non-cooperative solution N=T(0)=(m",m"\ 
of our model4. In this case, where y,= l+<s, y 2=20, v3=0. v^= 1. It Is straightforward to see by 
direct substitution Into (9) that;
4-See C anzoneri & H enderson (1991 pgs.21 a n d  37). They onfy consider symmetric supply shocks (x,«x,) an d
opposite  d e m a n d  shocks (u ,/2—u,/2). Substituting in (11) w e obtain  th e  sam e expressions as theirs
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r. ( 1 +<y)x, *20X, -( 1 -20)( u, -Uj)m, ---------- !------ 2------------------ L _ L
w  (1 *o)2-(20)2
r. ( 1 -*o)x, *20x, +( 1 +o -20)( u, -u,)
m2 L ^ a - -  —I— ■■ —
(1 *<j)2-(20)2
( 11)
The set of Incentive compatible solutions or bargaining area (A) Is defined as the 
set of points which are Pareto superior to the Nash solution:
AlVnvmj | Wì (m ì jn J & W ì (m,N.m?)
The explicit cooperative solution Is obtained by the minimization of the weighted 
joint loss function W0.where 5,7-6 are the weights assigned to each country:
W C=8W,-(1-5)W2
The contract curve (C(S.)) Is obtained by minimizing this loss function with respect 
to each Instrument, and setting the rate of marginal substitution equal to minus one 
dm3/d rn ì so as to fulfill the condition of Pareto optimality:
n x * . i . dWc dWcC(8): { m, ,m2 | ----- _=------ - =>
dm , d m j
(12)
-8)20Xj)-(8+<1 -6)20)(u , - 14)«  
*-C2^m2-2 0 m ,- (6 2 0 x 1-<l -5 )x 2)+{820+(l -6)X u ,-i^ )) I
where I , *5(1 -k jM I -8)(20?; IjK l -5)(1 *o)+5(20)2 
Setting 5= 1.(5=0), the instruments of both countries are chosen to maximize the 
welfare of the first (second) country. These solutions are known as bliss points (B,.Bj)
C(l)=B} l t.,= {m *'.m 2B'M0j(,/2Q-(uruJ)/2i:
C(0).B21 t^={m ,Bi,m282}={x1/29+(ur u2)/2j0f 
Since the bliss points corresponds to zero welfare losses, S,.S2 are placed at the 
center of the respective ellipses.
Finally, It Is convenient to define the segment which Joins the bliss points as the bliss 
line (?). Taking the expressions for the bliss points. It Is straightforward to derive the following 
segment:
e:Im,,m2c(B,XS2)|m 2=(^.+^!L^)+£>ml|
2 20 (13)
where b=-_l,Vx,*0; b*l,V u /0>1.2  
*2
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Incentive com patible and optimal targets
The only novel concept among the above definitions Is the set of targeting 
equilibria derived from the exchange rate arrangement. Since we have shown that this 
set Is em bedded In the tdrget Hne. we can conveniently make use of the latter to specify 
the sustainability and optimality of the targeting strategy.
Recall that. In general. Incentive compatible strategies must be Pareto superior to 
the Nash solution, that Is. they have to belong to the bargaining area. Therefore a target 
strategy will be Incentive compatible If It lies on the target line that passes through the 
bargaining area:
SUSTAINABILITY CONDITION
(14)
3X | K\.yr\A*{0)
Similarly Pareto optimal strategies are placed on the contract curve of cooperative 
solutions C(h). Therefore the targeting strategy will be Pareto optimal when the target line 
Intersects the contract curve:
OPTIMALITY CONDITION
(15)
3k.b | 7(X)-a5)
Countries aim at designing contracts that are Incentive compatible and Pareto 
optimal at the same time, /however. It could be the case that there Is no possible means 
to design a Pareto optlmol strategy which Is sustainable or, vlceversa, an Incentive 
compatible strategy which Is Pareto optimal.
Note that the first situation would preclude the arrangement; on the contrary, an 
Incentive compatible strategy which is not Pareto optimal could be accepted because 
Incentive compatibility Is a sufficient condition. Nevertheless In this latter case. It should be 
convenient to contemplate some complementary criterion (suboptlmallty criterion) to 
achieve the most efficient targeting strategy which Is sustainable; for Instance, the 
sustainable targeting equilibrium which minimizes the distance to the contract curve point.
Considering both conditions Jointly and taking Into account the suboptlmallty 
criterion, the optimal targeting strategy (or optimal contract) can be defined as follows:
X* I 7(X-)Hm,*,m2*|
(16)
{nvm iV T iJO naS 'U f ra )n c (8)e A 
or. In the case that the Pareto optimal criterion cannot be fulfilled:
A I min(d/sf(A,C(8)))l , If 7(X)nC(8)e A *17)
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IV-Economic shocks and optimal targets
Supply and demand shocks have different effects on welfare as an Inspection of 
(6.7) reveals. Consequently, the scope for targeting may crucially depend on the type 
and magnitude of the shock hitting the economy. In this section we formally analyse the 
possibility of designing an optimal targeting strategy for the two different types of shocks 
we are considering. The results take the form of propositions whose proofs appear In the 
appendix.
We will apply the above conditions when the shocks arise on the demand side 
and on the supply side: first, we will explore Incentive compatibility, then optimality and 
finally the Joint hypothesis.
It Is Important to keep in mind that In this section we focus on the whole target line, 
without any constraint on the target parameters. However, In the next section we will 
restrict the relevant subset of target strategies, which corresponds to positive values of fi 
and p between zero and one6.
Figures 1 and 2 give a flavour of the results In this section. They represent the 
concepts defined In the previous section In the (m ^m j space when different types of 
shocks hit the economy. We consider the case of symmetric (x,=xj. Idiosyncratic 
(x1>x2=0.u,>u2=0) and opposite (x,=-x2.u,=-u2) shocks. From the observation of the reduced 
forms (4.5). we can see that symmetric demand shocks (u,-Uj) have no effect whatsoever 
on the economy.
s-Therefore. strictty speaking the propositions below are necessary but not sufficient conditions for targeting 
the exchange rate appropiately. Only when the value of of the targeting parameters are specified, the 
propositions will be compteted. In the next section we will focus m more detail on the conditions for which 0 is 
positive when p is between zero and one Nevertheless, we can anticipate that for demand shocks positive p 
can always be found, while for supply shocks the sufficient condition does not apply In a l the cases
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Effect of demand shocks. Asymmetric and id tosine ratic shocks
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EfTcct of supply shocks. Idiosincralic shock
1.2
1 / ßl
0.8 -
0.6 / i -
« 0.4 
E V /  : c
—
0.2 / /  •: -
0 !------------------/ U r -
/  A-0.2 -
-0.4 / V -
T
à l
-1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 C) 0.2 0.4
m,
Figure 2.b-Strategic behavkxjr and idiosyncratic supply shocks
Effect of supply shocks. Symmetric shock
/Bl
1
/  '
0.5 / % *
#4
S A
/  \  c
» u
/  H
/  A-0.5
-1 - > ^ T
- » i.
-1 -0.5 () 0.5 1
Figure 2-C-Strategk: behaviour and symmetric suppty shocks
175
Part ll-Design 5-Opflmal »xchang» rat» targets
Demand shocks
Figure 1 suggests the conclusions of the formal analysis below. An asymmetric 
demand shock can be Interpreted as a shift In demand from one to another country 
(from country one to country two If u, Is positive) and an idiosyncratic shock may be the 
result of an expansionary fiscal policy In any of the countries.
The plot shows that the target line crosses the bargaining area (A) and the 
contract curve (C(5)) for both asymmetric and Idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that a 
Incentive compatible and Pareto optimal targeting strategy can be specified. This 
Intuition Is confirmed by the formal analysis of the model, which Is carried out in the 
appendix. The results can be summed up in the following three propositions:
Proposition 2: For dem and shocks o f any type or magnitude, there exists a t least 
one exchange rate arrangement which Is Incentive compatible.
Proposition 3: For dem and shocks o f any type or magnitude, there exists a Pareto 
optim al exchange rate arrangement.
Proposition 4: For dem and shocks o f any type or magnitude, the Pareto optimal 
exchange rate arrangement Is Incentive com patible and corresponds to the point CVh). 
where
C(1)H/t)’,/Dj*}€ Kk)
. (W2exu.-uj) . n 8 )m, *_______ !— _=-nrv,
(c-K 1 +2QŸ)
The two first results are linked by proposition four which shows that whatever the 
shock, the targeting equilibrium which Intersects the contract curve belongs to the 
bargaining area, so that the Pareto optimal equilibrium Is also Incentive compatible. 
Therefore demand shocks present no problem for the design of optimal targeting 
strategies.
Supply shocks
The question Is not as straightforward as In the case of supply shocks. The different 
plots of figure 2.a-c display a quite different picture: only In the case of asymmetric supply 
shocks, does the target line cross A and C(b).
We can interpret an asymmetric supply shock as a shift in productivity from one
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country to another, due, for Instance to tne transfer of a Industry from one country to 
another. More standard are the other two cases. A symmetric supply disturbance may be 
due to price shocks on raw materials used to produce both goods (typically an oil shock), 
if the shock affects only the production of one good, the case of an Idiosyncratic supply 
shock would arise.
The mathematical analysis of the appendix shows that the case for targeting Is not 
general In the case of supply shocks. As before, we can convey the result In three 
propositions:
Proposition 5: For supply shocks a t least one Incentive compatible exchange rate 
target will exists If -(1+o)x/2Q <x<.-2Qx/l+o. V xf>0. IJ= 12 !*}.
Proposition 6: For supply shocks there exists an optimal exchange rate target only 
If -(1+o)x/2Q <x£-28x/l+a. V xf>0. !.}= 12 ty.
Proposition 7: For opposite supply shocks (x,=-x2). the Pareto optimal exchange rate 
arrangement Is Incentive com patible and corresponds to the point COh):
Vx, =-Xj=> CClM e KX)
. (1 +20)(2x,) . <19>
m,  -------------_*-m ,
(o +(1 +2G)2)
From propositions five and six. It follows that the existence of sustainable or Pareto 
optimal targeting strategies Is restricted to a range of shocks determined by the values of 
the rest of the parameters of the model. The parameter e Is positive and less than ’/? (see 
table) and o Is positive. Therefore,
-(l+o)/2Q<-l -2Q/1 -+g>- 1 
and consequently x,=-x2 always belongs to this range. The Implications of this result are the 
following:
-Idiosyncratic and symmetric supply shocks (figures 2.b,c) preclude the design of 
Incentive compatible or Pareto optimal targeting strategies.
-A necessary condition for the exchange rate arrangement to be Incentive 
compatible Is that the shocks are of opposite sign.
-In particular, opposite shocks (figure 2.a) allow for Incentive compatible targeting 
strategies, for a range of parameters to be determined In the next section.
Furthermore, proposition seven states that only In the case of opposite supply 
shocks Is the existence of a Incentive compatible strategy which Is Pareto optimal 
attainable.
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For the rest of the cases In the relevant range we have had to proceed by 
numerical simulation. The outcome depends on the values of o and 0. In particular, for 
values close to the extremes of the range the Pareto optimal point does not fall within the 
bargaining area. In any case, for these latter situations, the suboptlmallty criterion 
Indicated above (see expression (17)) can be applied and the Incentive compatible 
targeting equilibrium which minimizes the distance to the contract curve point would be 
chosen.
Interpretation o f the results
Note that In our model the cases for which a targeting strategy Is feasible have 
some features In common. Comparison of figure 1 (demand shocks) with figure 2.c 
(opposite supply shocks) actually reveals an equivalent outcome In graphical terms. In 
particular, note that In both cases the equilibria are found on the quadrants where 
monetary supplies have different signs; of course. If the sign of the shocks Is reversed, the 
solution would appear In the same quadrant. Note that In the quadrants where money 
supplies have different signs, that Is. when one country reacts by expanding and the other 
by contracting the money supply In the face of a shock, there may be scope for an 
optimal targeting strategy. This suggests the following claim:
Proposition 8: The necessary condition for the existence of a Incentive compatible 
or Pareto optimal exchange rate arrangement Is that, for any type o f shocks
sign (mN’)*sign(mN2)
This conjecture is proved In the appendix. The economic significance of this result 
Is quite clear: when the reaction of one country exerts a positive externality on the other 
country there is scope for an optimal exchange rate strategy. Regarding the exchange 
rate, we can observe that both countries agree on the direction of change for the 
exchange rate; the wish of country one to inflate In order to depreciate the exchange 
rate can be alternatively satisfied with a deflation of the second country.
The magnitude of the desired exchange rate change is what differs between 
countries; for instance, in the case of a positive global demand shock (u^u^O). the 
Individual effort to depreciate the exchange rate Is too cautious when countries act non- 
cooperatlveiy and It will result In an insufficient depreciation, yielding an inefficient 
outcome. However, the Joint effort to depreciate derived from the targeting strategy will 
Induce an optimal outcome.
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Note that this Implies a more activist role for monetary policy derived from the 
targeting strategy. Comparing the expressions for the Nash solution In (11) and the optimal 
targeting strategy for demand and opposite supply shocks (expressions (17) and (18) 
respectively), we can express the latter as a function of the Nash solution; It turns out that:
This result shows that the optimal strategy will always Imply a larger change In the 
money supply, both for the expansionary and the deflationary country. This result Is 
confirmed by the graphical analysis where we can observe that. In the relevant figures, 
the optimal solution Is more distant from the origin than the Nash solution.
Finally, It is interesting to point out that the slope of the target line Implies that the 
global money supply does not change when the solution shifts from the Nash to the 
targeting equilibrium. More formally, the expression for the target line In (10) shows that at 
the targeting equilibrium the global money supply remains constant and equal to the 
Nash solution: for supply shocks
and for demand shocks the global money supply Is simply zero.
Thus, the effect of the targeting strategy Is to allocate more efficiently a given 
global money supply than In a non-cooperative situation, which Is a conclusion similar to 
McKinnon's (1984,1988) proposal for Monetary Stabilization.
(1 +20)(1 +0+26)
o+{l+2e)2
IJ ^ 2
I m,N I <2x,+u-uy (20)
+g -2Q )
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V-The design of optimal targeting strategies
Up to now, we have shown the feasibility of designing optimal torgetlng strategies. 
Once the set of possible shocks has been determined, attention con be shifted to the 
more concrete Issue of designing optimal contracts.
As a matter of fact, the analysis of the previous section Is Incomplete unless the 
characteristics of the target line in the bargaining area are determined. The position on 
the target line depends on the target parameters p,p. In principle, they are Independent 
parameters which are chosen at the discretion of policymakers, but the range of values 
that each of them can take Is constrained. The parameter p. which determines the 
desired exchange rate target Is bounded between real and nominal exchange rate 
targets and p. the optimal commitment to the desired exchange rate target, must be 
positive6. Thus, the feasible range for the parameters are:
Qsp< 1: p>0
We will first explore the conditions to obtain a positive degree of commitment, for 
the considered range of exchange rate targets and then we will specify the reldtlonshlp 
between them.
Let us recall first that the quodratlc optimization solution minimizes deviations from 
the desired targets; hence, when p is positive, it Is obvious that the new solution must 
reduce the deviation from the now binding exchange rate target relative to the Nash 
solution, where the exchange rate Is not targeted.
Therefore, comparing the effects of a particular exchange rate target at the 
optimal solution with the Nash solution determines the existence of a positive value for p. 
More precisely If
K z -z T M iz -^ 'N P ^  (2 1 )
and vice versa. The appendix shows that
6-From (5) Jhe exchange rates and the targets are defined wtth respect to one country. Countries one and 
two have then to be labelled, depending on the type of shocks, such that a nominal exchange rate target 
correspond to p-J, not to p— 1 (the nominal exchange rate target for country two).
180
Part H -D esl^ 5-Optlmal exchange rate targets
Proposition 9: In the case o f dem and shocks, the degree o f commitment Is positive 
for Poth nominal and real exchange rate targets, that Is.
V 0<p<l =>Kz-z^^l»|(z-.zc,)*|=*p>0 ®2)
Proposition 10: In the case o f opposite supply shocks, targeting the real exchange 
ra te  Is counterproductive (p=0 Implies p <0). while a  nominal exchange rate target may be 
appropriate. More precisely
Vp*p*--------- *2----- —>0 => IC z-z^ l > Kz-z^’ |=»p>0 (23 ,
W2e+_1 .-C^n !♦» *  1
Thus, for demand shocks the existence of a feasible targeting strategy Is confirmed, 
while existence Is not clear for opposite supply shocks because p* may Indeed be larger 
than one. Note that expression (23) Imposes an additional condition on the existence of 
an optimal targeting strategy (with positive P) In addition to the conditions derived m the 
previous section. Targeting the real exchange rate (p =0) Is therefore discarded for supply 
shocks, because p* is strictly positive.
Inspection of the exchange rate expressions In (5) may help to explain this result. 
Since the optimal target Implies a more activist monetary policy and supply shocks do not 
affect the real exchange rate, deviations from z are actually maximized, rather than 
minimised If the real exchange rate Is targeted. Implying a negative p. This Is not the case 
for the nominal exchange rate, which depreciates In the case of an adverse productivity 
shock, other things being equal. Since the optimal policy response may offset this effect 
more than the Nash solution, targeting the nominal exchange rate may or may not turn 
out to be appropriate, depending on the parameter values7. On the contrary, demand 
shocks do affect both nominal and real exchange rates, so that targeting either of them 
will be adequate.
The degree o f commitment to a specified target
The optimal degree of commitment (p‘) to the exchange rate target is the value 
of p which attains an optimal solution for a given value of p. The previous expressions have 
shown that the sign of p depends on the value p. This suggests that the optimal degree 
of commitment (p‘) can be expressed as a function of the exchange rate target and the
7- In particular,we will see below that low levels of goods market Integration (low Q wcxid make even 
nominal exchange rates Inapproplate. For low values of o. a similar result holds. See figures 3 b and 4 b
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structural parameters of the economy: p’=f(p. ). Two of these parameters are particularly 
Important: the weight given to the employment objective (o) and the degree of 
openness of the economy (Q.
The function f(p..) can be obtained as follows. The optimal money supplies in the 
cases of dem and and opposite supply shocks must belong to the target solution which 
appears In (10). Noting that x,=-x2 and
(W i'W j/C vf-v/)- 1+o+2&+2$ p'
It follows that:
(1 -u ,M l +2pifl)2x,1
I r
Considering each shock separately, we can equate both terms to solve for p:
020^ ;p.
J T  ((1 ♦20)2*o)-2 +;v/ÎT(1 ♦20)>/pT_) 
o2©VÎÇV x ,- -^ ,  p - ------------
J T  (p((W20)2+o)-Vii‘(K20V^")
This Is the general expression for the optimal degree of commitment to a given 
exchange rate target. In other words, this result gives a formula to define the optimal 
targeting strategy, taking Into account the parameter constraints given above.
Given the complexity of the expression. It is helpful to plot f(p..) for the most 
relevant parameters: f(p£..). f(p.o..). Figures 3,4.a and 3.4,b. display the weight assigned 
to the exchange rate target relative to the weight attached to the other final targets for 
different values of o and £, respectively*. The value of p corresponds to the optimal 
targeting strategy; recalling that the Nash solution corresponds to p=0. all the values 
between zero and p are also Incentive compatible, albeit suboptlmal and correspond to 
the segment of the target line between the Nash point and the contract curve in figures
1 and 2 ’ .
Note that f(p..) is continuous for demand shocks, but for opposite supply shocks It 
presents a discontinuity at p=p<; for values of p lower than p* would Imply a negative p‘, 
precluding the possibility of targeting the exchange rate.
®-More precisely, the weight Is normalized relative to the unemployment penalty In flgure 3 and A (a) a-1: 
however, but figures (b) the optimal degree of commitment is expressed as p/o and the weight attached to the 
to the price objective is 1/a otherwise.
9-Actually, there Is also a range of values above p for which the target zone Is also sustainable Thto range 
corresponds to the segment of the target line between the contract curve and the outer imtt of the bcig<Jnlng 
area In figures one and two.
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Figure 3.a.-Demand shocks. Optimal commitment for a given exchange rate target when the degree of 
Integration varies.
Figure 3.b.-Demand shocks. Optimal commitment for a given exchange rate target when the weight of 
employment In the loss function varies.
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Figure 4.a.-Oppostte supply shocks. Optimal commitment for a given exchange rate target when the degree 
of Integration varies.
Weight of unemployment 2 0___________________Correction of central parity
Figure 4.b.-Opposlte supply shocks. Optimal commitment for a given exchange rate target when the weight of 
employment In the loss function varies.
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It m ay also be interesting to comment briefly the consequences of changes in the 
relevant parameters for the targeting strategy. The derivatives of p with respect to these 
parameters are:
Dem and shocks
dlI da
Supply shocks(Vp>0)
i£ < 0 ;* < 0
do
The effects of the level of market integration (£) on the targeting strategy are 
different, depending on the type of shocks. We already m entioned that low and medium  
values of £ preclude exchange rate targets in the case of opposite supply shocks. For 
dem and shocks, we observe that higher levels of integration which increase the spillover 
effects call for tighter exchange rate targets (larger p), as intuition suggests.
The param eter o-the weight assigned to the em ploym ent goal- has equivalent 
effects for both cases. Let us note from [6,7] that the unemployment goal penalizes any 
deviation of the money supplies from zero. Since the optimal policy is more activist than 
the Nash solution, an increase in a will reduce the need for targeting.
A first apparent result is that in the case of dem and shocks (Fig 3,a.b) the emphasis 
on targeting is less than that on the final goals in Lt,L2; this seems reasonable, given that 
the exchange rate is an intermediate objective,. For opposite supply shocks this is also the 
general result, although for values of close to the discontinuity term, we find p’>1.
Flexible targets
Another interesting feature of the outcome is that it depends on the type of shock 
affecting the economy, but not on the magnitude nor the sign of the shocks. This is a  result 
which is also found in the existing policy coordination literature, and it greatly facilitates 
the design of the optimal contract. As a matter of fact, for any dem and shock the formula 
above can be applied: for supply shocks, we already know that only in certain cases will 
it be possible to find an optimal targeting strategy. In this case, the corresponding 
expression can be applied. Otherwise, an alternative type of targeting strategy should be  
em ployed, as we observed above.
The third and most relevant conclusion of this analysis is that there is not an unique 
optimal design for the exchange rate target. Although the optimal degree of commitment 
is determ ined by [24], it ultimately depends on the definition of the optimality em braced  
by the policymakers who can choose between different combinations of commitment
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and exchange rate targets given the function This trade-off Is conveyed In the 
derivative of p* with respect to p In (24) and It gives an Idea of the type of targeting 
strategy to odopt:
Demand shocks: ^ > 0 ;
dp
Supply shocks: i^ < 0  . Vf}>0 
9p
If the policymaker's goal Is to design a target zone which minimizes exchange rate 
volatility relative to the desired target, the higher p \ the better. On the contrary. If the aim 
is to provide exchange rate flexibility reaping the full benefits of coordination, the value 
of p which allows for the highest exchange rate flexibility will be chosen. According to this 
second criterion, a real exchange rate target would be the optimal choice in the case 
of demand shocks while for the case opposite supply shocks, a nominal peg would be the 
solution.
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and exchange rate targets given the function f(p .; This trade-off is conveyed In the 
derivative of 0* with respect to p In (24) and ft gives an Idea of the type of targeting 
strategy to adopt:
Demand shocks: i^ > 0 ;
dp
Supply shocks: f!E<0 , VB>0 
dp
If the policymaker's goal Is to design a target zone which minimizes exchange rate 
volatility relative to the desired target, the higher p*. the better. On the contrary. If the aim 
Is to provide exchange rate flexibility reaping the full benefits of coordination, the value 
of p which allows for the highest exchange rate flexibility will be chosen. According to this 
second criterion, o real exchange rate target would be the optimal choice In the case 
of demand shocks wNIe for the case opposite supply shocks, a nominal peg would be the 
solution.
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Vl-Conclusions. The need for flexibility
Welfare considerations should be the basis for any exchange rate arrangement 
among countries. Consequently, exchange rate targets which are not Incentive 
compatible cannot be sustained. Given this Idea we hove set up a framework for 
analysing exchange rate targeting In the form of an optimal contract between countries 
which are on an equal strategic basis.
The exchange rate target Is viewed as an intermediate objective. The policymakers 
in order to attain their final targets, agree on a targeting strategy consisting of a desired 
exchange rate target and their optimal commitment to It. The approach allows us to 
design simple rules which do not depend on the nature of the shock, but on Its magnitude 
and this appears to be general enough to encompass all reasonable exchange rate 
arrangements.
Despite this generality, targeting the exchange rate In such a way turns out not to 
be always approplate. While for demand shocks of any type or magnitude an optimal 
contract can be devised, for supply shocks the answer depends on their differential 
Impact on each country. The reason Is that the optimal contract can only be designed 
when both countries are Interested In moving the exchange rate In the some direction; 
this Is the case of demand shocks and opposite supply shocks. Even In this latter case, the 
feasibility of the targeting strategy may be constrained by the structural parameters of the 
model.
Flexible targeting strategies
The assumption of an identical strategic role for each country In the targeting 
strategy turns out to be a crucial feature. The resulting optimal contract allocates a fixed 
global money supply more efficiently than In a non-cooperative Nash situation but It does 
not pay when the reactions of one country exert a negative externality on the other 
country.
The following table compare our results with those of Canzonerl and Henderson
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(1991). It Is Interesting to make this comparison, not only because the model Is the same 
but also because they devise a different type of targeting strategy.
TARGETING STRATEGY
DOES TARGETING 
PAY?
OPTIMAL CONTRACT 
(Our model)
LEADER-FOLLOWER I 
(CanzAMwt) 1
DEMAND General General 1
SHOCKS YES, but
S (u) YES suboptimal
H Opposite shocks
O SUPPLY YES Symmetric shocks
C
SHOCKS (but parameter
K
(x) dependent and may be
S suboptimaf) YES
Rest of cases
NO
Canzoneri and Henderson consider an exchange rate target from strategically 
asymmetric perspective, where one country (the follower) pegs the exchange rate to the 
leader. The leader sets the value of Its money supply to minimize Its own welfare function 
and the follower only cares about maintaining the parity. Note that In this situation, there 
Is no exchange rate arrangement but simply an unilateral exchange rate peg by the 
follower.
In the table we observe that this asymmetric strategy pays In the case of symmetric 
supply shocks. In this case, as It Is apparent In figure 2,a. both countries respond by 
changing their money supplies In the same direction, provoking an overshooting of the 
exchange rate with respect to the efficient solution. Therefore, the result of a leader- 
follower strategy Is to offset this negative externality and place the economy on the point 
H, which Is optimal.
Note that In this case, the existence of a leader exerts a disciplinary effect on the 
actions of the follower because changes In the money supplies are smaller. Thus, when 
the optimal response to a shock requires a restraint or discipline In the management of the 
money supply a leader-follower strategy Is desirable because the leader provides an 
anchor to the monetary policy. From the table we can observe that this Is the only
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situation In which the Canzone fl-Henderson strategy Is superior.
However, when countries act on an equal strategic basis, they can only agree on 
an optimal contract which has the same effect on the behaviour of both countries; In 1hls 
case, no disciplinary effect can be attained. Therefore, the optimal contract strategy may 
only be beneficial when a  more actMst response Is required. This Implies that our 
alternative dominates for demand and opposite supply shocks'0.
These results emphasize the Importance of the environment to design exchange 
rate regimes. The risks of devising a targeting strategy In Inapproplate circumstances 
becomes apparent. The rules and goals with which the arrangements were conceived 
m ay not apply in practice and the likely result Is a collapse of the system.
The principle which has guided this research is that a more flexible approach to 
exchange rate m anagement Is advlsdble. In the light of the subsequent analysis, the 
advantages of flexibility are manifest.
On the one hand, there Is a flexibility of response. Our outcome suggests that the 
adequate targeting strategy depends on the type of shock hitting the economy: In 
certain situations It will be convenient to adopt a leader-follower strategy; In others, both 
countries should play an equal strategic role; In this latter cases, sometimes it will be 
convenient to target the real exchange rate. In others It may be possible to target both, 
etc. Thus, a  flexible approach to exchange rate targeting may cover most of the possible 
range of shocks.
On the other hand, there Is a flexibility of design. We have shown that the trade-off 
between the exchange rate target and the optimal commitment to it leaves some room 
for discretion In the choice of the target to policymakers, as long as the optimal degree 
of commitment to the selected target Is chosen.
Practical Implications
We have not shown a general dominance of a nominal exchange rate target on 
a real target or vice-versa. Indeed, we have proved that In certain cases (demand 
shocks) both are valid and In others neither of them Is (a wide range of supply shocks). 
Only for the case of opposite supply shocks the nominal exchange rate target-lf any- Is 
superior to a  real exchange rate target. As we have mentioned, our results encompass
,0-As wo have mentioned. Canzonerl and Henderson onfy consider shifts In demand (opposite demand 
shocks) cr»d common (symmetric) supply shocks. Notwithstanding this, the results for the demand shocks can be 
generated, as It suggested by the table.
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McKinnon's proposal because the global money supply target can be agreed 
beforehand and then allocated according to the optimal strategy. However, the choice 
of final targets also Includes here unemployment explicitly, not only prices, as In 
MacKinnon's formulation.
The message from this paper Is then twofold:
-First. It Is the economic and not the political environment which should determine 
the targeting strategy. Therefore, when the outcome of the bargaining process does not 
adjust to the economic demands the system will be Inadequate and It Is no wonder that 
It cannot satisfy the goals for which It was originally devised. This remark recognises the 
objective difficulties to designing optimal exchange rate targets.
-Second, the nature of the regime should be revised when the economic 
environment or the goals of the system change.
These conclusions provide ammunition against the excessive rigidity envisaged In 
the new EMS. On the one hand, major demand shocks as German reunification are at 
odds with a nominal target plus narrow bands; The optimal response would have been 
a move to a  real exchange rate target or a widening of the band, as the markets 
ultimately achieved through the crisis of 1992-93. On the other hand, when the emphasis 
shifts from exchange rate stability to Inflation convergence to attain a Common Currency, 
a reflection on the adequacy of the old rules is In order.
It goes without saying that the convergence process needed In Europe to attain 
a common currency Includes dynamic considerations which fall beyond the scope of this 
analysis. In the conclusions to the dissertation we will examine possible extensions to 
Improve on this analysis and reconcile It with the previous work. We have also omitted the 
Issue of policy delegation as a means by which conducting polcy. The concept of the 
optimal contract Is assumed In our approach to concern sovereign countries, tied by a 
commitment to respect the contract. This contract could also have been viewed as the 
constitution of a supranational Central Bank, which In a first stage has the responsablltty 
to monitor the behaviour of the exchange rate between the countries, much In the way 
that the European Monetary Institute Is supposed to operate at present.
All in all, we wish to point out that In the transition to a Common Currency, where 
sound stabilization strategies are required, some sort of exchange rate management Is 
clearly needed. From the analysis above, we suggest that the approach be flexible and 
adapted to the circumstances.
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Appendix
This appendix shows that expectation on money supplies equal zero and develops 
the proofs to propositions one to ten.
M oney supply expectations
Substituting the reduced forms In which expectations explicitly appear In the 
functions to optimize and taking the derivative with respect to the Instruments, we obtain: 
dW
_ _ i «0 =>o(m, -m,*) ^  +a)(m-K^ -Kx -1  )(m, -m,*) -^{mj-m f)  *x, ' -ÇyCu,'-^')* 
dm,
+P! vP ' ((m, -n \)  -{m * -mj*)) -K1 -p )(x ,'-^ ')-y (u ,'-u î')} -0
dW
— *a)(m-K$ +a-l -M rr^-m f)+X,' -u, ') -
O/Tîj
-PI yp ' ((m, -rrij) -<m * +( 1 -p)(x, ' -Xj ' ) -y( u, ' -a, ' )| * 0
Taking expectations from these expressions, and noting that xle=u*=0. 1=12. 
because they represent unanticipated shocks. It Is straightforward to conclude that the 
expected  money supplies equal zero. Setting m,*=m*=0 the reduced forms net of 
expectation which appear In (4.5) are obtained.
Proof to proposition I (Target line)
The slope o f T(k) In the tm }.m j space Is obtained by the cod en t of the derivatives 
o f the target solutions appearing In (9) with respect to X:
dm ^/dm 7 ,=(dmTJ/dk)/(dmT ,/dk).
Let us consider the different terms In equation (9). We observe that the last two 
terms In the expressions .and consequently their partial derivatives, are equal and o f 
opposite sign.
On the contrary, the first term is different In both expressions. Let us denote these 
term as m t,T.m2l7. respectively and let us express x2 In terms o fx ,. x^Kx,.K e M. Taking the
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partia l derivative with respect to p o f m lT(tl),,n !T(tl). we get:
,  (1 -K)(l +<j-26)2 _ _
"((l+o+pp^-tfo+pp)2)2 * Bk
Therefore
dm 1i/dm 1,=0mT2/dX)/(dmT,/B\)=-1 
Finally, from (11) the Nash solution Is known to represent one po in t In this line, so 
tha t we can derive the equation o f the straight line:
7’(X):{(m,T,m2T) | m j— * '***  -m,T)
1 +o-20
Proofs to propositions 2 and 5. (Sustainability)
Taking as reference the m,-axls. the slope o f the target line Is equal to - h so that 
tg(G>j)=-l, where etf= 135e.315° and  to represents the angle formed by the tanget line and 
the m,-axis a t the Nash p o in t
Let us note first that the bargaining area. A, Is formed by the area within the ellipses 
crossing a t the Nash solution (N). Thus A is p laced between the tangent lines to the two 
ellipses a t N. Secondly, from (10,11), N Is known to be a point on the target line. Therefore, 
as the figures suggest. If the target line lies between the angle formed by those two 
tangents: a\M<(oT<(o v/f.{i.J}=l 2 . the target line will cross the bargaining area. The general 
expression for the ellipses slope a t Nash point are given by:
d n \ i 81V,/5m, _ (1 *c)mxN-2Qrr^l*x) -<u, -Uj)
dm, dw,'° dWf/drr^ 20(m,w-20m2N+x, -<u, -up)
dm2l dW2/dm, (l+o)m /'-20m,*+x^+<u1-u2)
~dm}cM^ '  20(mJ*-2em,*+x2< u 1-u2))
Let us consider first demand shocks (x,=0*2=0). Substituting the Nash solution (11) 
Into the previous expression, we obtain
dm, o dm, 0
The angles formed by these tangent lines depend on the sign o f (u,-u2). in 
particular, for the ellipse corresponding to W,:
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dm.
Urn — tg(.<x>w) 0
m,-*rrym OfT)^
and  3e>0 |
Vu,-Uj<0.m,€ ;
am,
Vu,-Uj>0.m ,€ (m,N-e ,mx* ) .= > ^ ! l l^ ^ c O .
am,
rhus Vu, -Uj<0,(o^ -0°*360°; Vu, -u^O.co^-1800 
and for the second ellipse W3:
dm,
Vu, ,Uj. L/m l<*w,'0 *0°=* W«>w)m00
/n,-.irv‘ Om |
and 3t>0 \
u u dm*
Vu^Uj-cO.mje +(m2 -e /rvJ . =>----- -Id w ^ 0 •'
d n \
ju u
Vu,-u?>0 .mj6 (mj -e.mJ,v).=»__L|e(W<>0.
d n \  ’
7/us Vu,-t^<0,cow»900 ; Vu, -u12>0.a>kV*270o
It follows then that
Vu,-Uj<0 =* (oWi<a)T<tow ;
Vo,-i^>0=* a>Mr<a>7<a>M, 
and the target line Is precisely the bisectrix o f the angle formed by the tangents to both  
ellipses. Thus, the target zone will always cross the bargaining area. /
Proceeding as before we obtain for supply shocks (u^O.u^O): 
dm j _ o _n . __o20((l-K j)v 2ex,V
d m /‘*v''°’ "c2e((l ^ x ^ e x ,) )  ’  * dm ;1^ * 0’  0
Applying the same reasoning, we have for W, and W2, respectively:
xo£- ^  x. =»<ow«90° ; x^--^? x,=xow»270°
Noting that2Q<1 <l+o (see table) the following cases arise:
Vx,<0:
(a) -J L x ,s x j< --L £  => fgCcO=360°; fgCoO-270*
1 +c 26 ' ’
(b) x2> -— =>tg((0w)*18Oo;tg(o3Wi)*27O°
28 1
Oa
(C) x.<-_il-=>fg(tovv)*3600;fg((ow)-900
l+o ’
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Vx,>0:
(o) - J ^ 1sx^--i® _=>fo(iow)-900;fg((ow)-2706
20 1 <-20 ' w>
(to) X j < => fo(a)w )«360°;
20 1 1
(c) >9»-^^=>fg<<ow)*1800;fcKa)Wi)*2700
Thus, the target zone constitutes the bisectrix o f the angle formed by the tangents 
to both ellipses In cases labelled (a): for the rest o f cases, the target Ihe Is perpendicular 
to the bisectrix and consequently are ruled out. The range o f shocks for which, the target 
zone crosses the bargaining area can then be  established:
V Xf>0. IJ= 12 btj. If -(l+o)x/2Q Z X £ -2 B X /1 H 3  3 X, IT (k)riA
/
Proof o f propositions 3 and 6
Let us consider the bliss line B. Instead o f the contract curve, since the latter Is too 
com plex to  work with. As a previous step. It Is claim ed that If the target line Intersects the 
bliss line It also Implies Intersects the con tract curve. We prove this claim as follows.
Since the contract curve, the target line and the bliss line are continuous and  
differentiable, we can express:
m2c=f(b) as a function o fm ,c=g(S): m2c= f(g '(m ,c)=C (m,c) 
m2= f(k ) as a function o f m,T=g'(X): m21= f'(g ’~'(m,T)=T(m,1) 
m2B as a function o f m,B: m B=B(mB)
Then the lemma below, based on the Botzano-Weierstrass theorem can be directly 
applied a n d  our claim Is proved.
The coordinates for which T=B are now  found for the two different types o f shocks. 
The Intersection between T and B Is obta ined by equating expressions (10) and (13).
For dem and shocks (x ,=0jc2=0), we get
T 8_ 1 U, -Uj r B 1 U,
m] *rn, ~ .. -n — , —rr^  =
2 20 2 20
which corresponds precisely to the middle point o f the bliss line. Thus. In the case o f 
dem and shocks the target line will always cross the contract curve.
The resolution Is more comple* when supply shocks hit the economies (u,=0.0^0). 
Equating the target and bliss lines, the solution is given by
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r  .  ( 1 m j ) x ,* 2 0 X j  X j/7)i */T)i ■- , n , „ „ ;
20(1*0-29) Xj-X,
, b 0 * a ) X 2 * 2 6 X , x ,
0^ 2 *fiTn »
20(1 -kj- 20) Xj-X,
where It Is not straightforward to ascertain whether this point falls within the relevant 
segment o f the bliss line. Thus, a ll the possible combinations o f supply shocks are examined 
to obtain the range o f shocks which make the target line to Intersect the bliss segment. 
The solution turns out to be  given by the foBowing range:
V x;>0. IJ= 12 H  If -O-Ksyx/28 Zx£-2Qx/1+ o *  3 \Jb I T(k)=C(b) 
the same than above*
Lemma (Bolzano- Welerstrass)
The lines C(S) a n d  B have a t least two com m on points a t 5=0, 5= l.Then.
If 3m, I T(K)-B *+3m,' I T(K)=C(S).
PROOF: The claim Is thaf3m, l (T-C)m, "-0.
Adding and substractfng B. we ge t (T-B+B-C )m,
Let us assume thaS m ,' I B(m, )=T(m, )=m2.
Recall that C(0)=B2.C(1)=B, so that (C-B)m,B,=(C -B)m,a =0.
Since B2.B, are the extremes o f the bliss line, this Implies that If
fl(m,“)*C /(m,*)> r(m ,fl').0 (m ,V C /(ml*)< T'(m?).IJH 12\,I*J 
It follows tha t
3m," |C '(m ;')« r'(m t")
by Bolzano-Welerstrass. and  the lemma Is proved  / .
Proof o f proposition 4  (and 7). (Optimal and  Incentive compatible points)
Rom (10), we observe that the m /= -m / on the target line. Substituting m, for -m2 
In the first order conditions o f the cooperative solution (which correspond to the left-side 
term and right-side term o f the expression for C(b) In (12)) and substituting Z, for the 
respective values, the following equalities must hold:
(6(1 + o M l -5X20)2 +20)m,r=<6+{l -5)20)(u,-u2);
((1 -5)(1 +c) +6(2 0)2 +20) m,r«(52e +(1 -6))(u, -u,)
Given the dem and shocks, this Is a  non-llnear system In 8 and m,T. However, we 
showed that T Intersects the bliss line a t the middle point: tNs suggest that a reasonable 
value for solving the system Is 6=1/2. Substituting this guess above. It Is Immediate to see 
that 8= 1/2 satisfy both equations. The Pareto optimal point on the target line Is then given
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by;
C(lWm,\m;}e 7ft)
. <W2e)(u,-<4>/Di * ........ ■ 9~fTh
(CHW26)2)
Substituting N and C (l/2 ) In the loss functions, the welfare loss Is obtained:
< • < « 2 ___L2 _ ( u ,- l l ) ;
2 (1 *o*2G)J
u /- iji/# (1+C+282) xa/ nWy *W2 *------------------ ------ Wy =>
(1 *o+20)2*<2e)2a 
=>W;<W,N. M 2
and consequently the Pareto optimal point Is Incentive compatible. /
Proof o f proposition 8 (Positive externality)
Substituting the value o f the shocks In the Nash solution (11) we get
Vx?Oxp > 1 2MJ=>slgr>imlN)~$lgn(mlH)
28 1 **0
VXj>0, ~ l^x< j(< : -J L * . .1* 12.bJ=>slgn(mlN)*slgn(mlN)
26 1 *kj
Vu,.u2=»m,N*-m 2N
/Vo/© that the first case covers Just the range o f values for wNch neither optimal nor 
Incentive compatible exchange targeting strategies can be devised and other two cases 
conveyed the range o f shocks for wNch propositions 2-7 apply. Thus, the proposition Is 
proved  /
Proof o f propositions 9 and 10
Exchange rate deviations appear in (5). Substituting the Nash (11) and optimal 
solutions (18.19) for the values o f the instruments, the expressions to compare are 
expressed In function o f the shocks. Rearnanging terms, we can write, in the case of 
dem and shocks:
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(Z -/d)--2 ( V^ ~ (U20) 1—)(u, -U,)
OHW20)2 2^
and. when the shock arise In the supply side (opposite shocks):
(2- * r - 2 ( _ H ^ L - P  )x,
I-k j+26 ^
(z-z ^  •—2 ( ^ ^ _ J L )Xi 
0 ^ 1 *26)* ^
From these expressions, where we note that only source o f divergence In these 
expressions Is the term In brackets, we can deduct the sign o f p sustractlng the optimal 
strategy from the Nash strategy. If the result Is positive this Is Indication that p is posllve.
Let us start by considering the demand shocks. After consulting the parameter 
table , we can  see that this term u> negative In both expressions. However, the first term In 
the brackets Is less than one for the considered range o f p. and the second larger than 
one and It Is straightforward to show that the Nash solution In absolute value Is larger than 
the optim al targeting solution. Thus, for demand shocks:
V Osp l^ =* K z -z^ l> |(2 -zd)*|=*p>0
The outcom e Is not so straightforward for opposite supply shocks because p 
appears bo th  In the numerator o f the first and second term. However, operating and  
simplifying, the following condition for a positive p can be derived:
Vp^p*«-------- —-------- >0 =>|(z-z‘,)N|>|Cz-z‘,)*|=>P>0
1 +20+_S_-t^
where we have m ade use o f 2Q=(Sr\)$. Given the values o f the parameters. It follows that 
real exchange targets produce negative p and that, for reasonable values o f the 
structural parameters, nominal targets are valid.*
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The debate on exchange rate targeting can be summed up In the conflict of 
objectives which such a strategy generates. On the one hand. It Implies the subordination 
monetary autonomy to the exchange rate objective, preventing In consequence the 
unhindered reaction to adverse domestic or external circumstances. On the other hand, 
targeting the exchange rate tends to provide exchange rate stability which Is a goal In 
Itself and contributes to the coordination of macroeconomic policies among 
Interdependent countries.
In the ERM experience, which has been the main reference In this dissertation, 
these considerations have to be complemented with other circumstances which render 
the Inherent policy conflict even more apparent. The use of the ERM as a disciplinary 
device to reduce Inflation expectations In the periphery countries has been considered 
as the main bonus of the system In the last few years but, at the same time, maintaining 
the exchange rate parity weakens the competitiveness of these countries, and Imposes 
significant real costs In terms of output and employment.
The sluggish progress in Inflation convergence, due to the slow gains In the 
credibility of the policymakers commitment, explains this situation. The longer the target 
Is maintained, the more apparent are its costs, the greater Is the temptation to recover 
monetary autonomy to stabilize the economy and consequently, the more difficult It Is to 
achieve credibility gains.
This Inconsistency of objectives has always been present under different forms. In 
our research. It Is reflected In the credibility of the commitment to the announced target. 
Note that the basis for successful exchange rate targeting is the credibility of the target 
and therefore the evolution of the conflict Is reflected In the evolution of credibility.
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In the first port of the dissertation we have attempted to uncover the nature of the 
conflict using target-zone models. As a matter of fact, the Initial claim of these models Is 
that a certain degree of monetary autonomy can be kept In a target zone. However, this 
result depends on the credibility of the exchange rate target and the empirical evidence 
reveals the difficulties In achieving credibility In a target zone. In the final chapter of this 
first part, we propose a model which displays the nature of the conflict; the persistence 
of Inflation differentials Imposes a series of real costs (In the form of real exchange rate 
misalignments) and Itself creates credibility problems which make the band unsustainable 
In the long-run.
With these Insights, the second part of the thesis considers the possibility of 
designing exchange rate targets to overcome this Inherent policy conflict. The recipe we 
put forward Is for a more flexible approach to the design of exchange rate targets.
These Ideas constitute the basis which have guided our research. However, 
there are still many loose ends which will need to be tied up In future work. For the 
moment, we sum up the main conclusions which have been reached In the dissertation 
and list the directions of further reseorch.
Theoretical models
Target zones models have stressed the stabilizing behaviour of exchange rate 
expectations when the nominal exchange rate is pegged within a narrow band of 
fluctuation. In chapter one we have pointed out the limitations of these models. Some of 
these limitations are derived from the techniques used and from the economic models 
and perspective adopted.
The tools of stochastic calculus allow to present a ctosed-form non-linear solution 
for the relation between exchange rate and fundamentals In a rational expectation 
setting, but their use Is limited to very simple economic models. In spite of this, target-zone 
models highlight Interesting Insights which could only be Informally considered before. In 
particular the stabilizing role of expectations in a target zone. This is the great Innovation 
of these models. ?
However, one main problem limits interest In target-zone models. We have often 
stressed that stabilization has not been the primary objective of target zone» In practice. 
They hove become In the ERM disciplinary devices to place fundamentals In line with the 
anchor country. This conflict In objectives has received relatively little attention in the 
literature and has created an Inaccurate view of the rationale for target zones. In this 
sense, we can say that the research has been misguided. A closer approach to the policy
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coordination literature, where the exchange rate has been effectively considered as a 
disciplinary mechanism Is therefore In order.
As hinted above, this alternative perspective allows us to place the Issue of 
credibility at the center of the discussion. All In all, the lack of perfect credibility which has 
characterized the target zone reveals a system which behaves more as a crawling peg 
In the long run. albeit In the short run the exchange rate can remain stable. The reason 
Is the subtle role that fundamentals play In determining the exchange rate. 
'Fundamentals', whatever may be Its definition, do not seem to determine the exchange 
rate In the short run, but they are decisive In explain realignments of exchange rates. The 
Spanish case analysed In chapter two provides a good example of this.
These features have motivated a different approach to modelling target zones In 
chapter three. By relaxing the rational expectation hypothesis and substituting for It the 
notion of heterogenous beliefs, the new model uncovers the Interaction between the 
evolution of the fundamentals and the credibility and reputation of the model, which now 
becom e explicitly dynamic processes. It Is formally shown that the sustainability of the 
band In the face of larger divergences Increases the reputation of the regime but this Is 
a self-defeating mechanism because. In the absence of convergence In the 
fundamentals, misalignments finally bring about the collapse of the regime. In other words, 
the conflict of objectives becomes unsustainable In the end.
In my view, the model developed In chapter 3 captures some of the Important 
characteristics of actual behaviour of the exchange rate In a target zone and offers an 
Interpretation based on the evolution of credibility, which determines both the endurance 
of the regime and Its sudden collapse.
The model also allows a shift In the emphasis from stability (sustainability In a 
dynamic setting) to convergence, when divergences In the fundamentals are 
endogenously determined. The choice of the target zone must be seen under this prism 
as a long-run strategy for convergence which Is not exempt of risks: pegging the 
exchange rate In a target zone can only be successful If the depth of the conflict (In terms 
of real costs) Is kept under control and this can only be achieved If gains In convergence 
are attained with enough speed: otherwise, the peg will not enjoy credibility and the 
regime will finally collapse.
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Exchange rate targeting strategies
This Interpretation raises the Issue of designing the optimal target zone, which brings 
together the appropriate mix of convergence, credibility and flexibility to minimise the 
magnitude of the policy conflict. Thus, the second part of the dissertation Is guided by a 
quest for designing flexible exchange rate targets.
This flexible approach has been motivated by the observation that the ERM 
became excessively rigid before the crises and allowed to appear misalignments that 
were too large and clearly unsustainable in the long run. On the methodological side, the 
flexible targeting strategies enabled the analysis of a wide range of possibilities for the 
management of exchange rates.
In both chapters four and five, the exchange rate acts as an Intermediate target 
to attain convergence and to stabilize the economy with respect to desired levels, 
respectively. Notwithstanding these similarities, the approoch Is completely different In 
each model. Chapter four extends the dynamic target zone model presented earlier, 
while chapter five uses a small static model to explore the strategic Interactions of 
symmetric exchange rate regimes.
Judging from the simulations of the extended dynamic target zone model, more 
flexible target zones -defined with respect to the behaviour of the fundamentals- do not 
appear as superior alternatives to more rigid schemes, such as the new EMS. The reason 
Is that, although flexible schemes postpone the conflict of objectives, the achievement 
of convergence and. consequently, of credibility Is also postponed.
This conclusion should be weighed up with other considerations which could bias 
the balance towards more flexible targets: transparency, real variables, the consideration 
of second country objectives, etc. The cost of taking these considerations Into account 
Implied that we had to dispense with the rich dynamics of the previous models.
In chapter five, the targeting strategy Is considered from an optimization framework 
In which the nature of the policy conflict Is explicitly considered. The concept of a target 
zone Is substituted by that of a optimal contract between countries taken on an equal 
strategic footing. The optimal design of this contract determines the optimal commitment 
to a desired exchange rate target. It turns out that exchange rate targets are a 
sustainable and efficient alternative to explicit coordination for certain shocks, while for 
others It would be better too pursue a leader-follower strategy.
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Conclusions
The results of this port hove not generated a general answer, regarding the optimal 
targeting strategy, because it depends on the nature of the shocks. What Is clear however 
Is that these results suggest a more flexible approach to targeting the exchange rate In 
order to minimise the policy conflict.
Directions for future research
This dissertation has considered possible extensions In exchange rate targeting 
which should be considered In future research.
In my view, any further extension of the target zone models Is difficult for the 
reasons mentioned above. The dynamic target zone model In chapter three could be 
refined In several aspects. The first concerns the expectations mechanism. More 
sophisticated updating methods could be considered and, more Interestingly, noise 
traders and chartist could play an explicit role in the model, which In this case would be 
defined In terms or three and not two different beliefs. The second aspect has to do with 
the way to model Interventions. In particular, the role of Intramarglnal Interventions.
The study of the empirical evidence has left open a promising Issue. We have 
explained the existence of realignment risk In terms of conditional expectations, but no 
confirmation of such hypothesis has been attempted. Therefore. It would be challenging 
to devise an estimation method to extract conditional expectations from the data, along 
the lines of switching process estimation or Bayesian multi-process Kalman fitter. Both 
methods would first require the estimation of fundamentals, which Is not an easy task. At 
this point, the expression to estimate would be similar to (3.15). where the data would 
reveal the evolution of the weights.
Regarding the second part of the thesis, the convergence band proposal and the 
optimal contract approaches should be put in a unifying framework. The Idea would be 
to pick up the dynamic characteristics of the target zone model within the optimizing 
setting of chapter five. The natural framework to Implement this project Is the 
macroeconomic dynamic game literature.
The first step would be to choose an economic model of reference and an 
objective function for both countries. The exchange rate would play a analogous role as 
In chapter five. The difference would be that. In this dynamic problem, the emphasis could 
be shifted from stabilization to convergence.
This extension would overcome the limitations of the two models used In the second 
part of the thesis. Furthermore, with an adequate specification of the objective function
202
Conclurions
(for Instance, considering the Maastricht criteria), the optimal transition to a common 
currency could be explored by considering alternative exchange rate regimes. Thus, It 
Is hoped that the policy Implications of the model, which at this stage seem quite loose, 
could be strengthened and they could contribute to provide Insights to attain a smooth 
transition Into a Common Currency.
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